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The Naked Land: The Dayton Accords, 
Property Disputes, and Bosnia’s  
Real Constitution 
 
Timothy William Waters∗
The urge to destroy is a creative urge. 
                 —Michael Bakunin1
The government of the national revolution regards it as its duty 
. . . to keep those elements from influencing the nation which 
consciously and intentionally act against its interests. The the-
ory of equality before the law cannot be allowed to lead to the 
granting of equality to those who treat the law with contempt 
. . . . But the Government will grant equality before the law to 
all who, by taking part in the formation of a national front 
against this danger, back the national interest and do not fail to 
support the Government.   
Our legal system must serve to maintain this national commu-
nity . . . . The nation rather than the individual must be re-
garded as the centre of legal concern. 
                  —Adolf Hitler2
Not only may one imagine that what is higher derives always 
and only from what is lower; one may imagine that—given the 
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1. In George Esenwein & Adrian Schubert, Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Con-
text, 1931–1939, at 125 (1995). 
2. Adolf Hitler, Speech to the Reichstag on the Enabling Law (Mar. 23, 1933) in Alan 
Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives 463 (1993). Bullock notes that “[t]he essence of the 
Nazi view of law was the distinction between friends and enemies of the national community 
as defined by the Nazis.”  
2 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 40 
polarity and, more important, the ludicrousness of the world—
everything derives from its opposite: day from night, frailty 
from strength, deformity from beauty, fortune from misfortune. 
Victory is made up exclusively of beatings. 
                    —Ladislav Klíma3
I. INTRODUCTION 
More than three years have passed since the Dayton Accords 
brought the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina to an end.4 That 
agreement has been remarkably successful in bringing peace, and 
even tentative stability, to the country.5 Yet the Accords were in-
tended to do more: they were meant to create conditions for the re-
turn of the millions of refugees and displaced persons and to restore 
political unity among Bosnia’s factions. On these scores, Dayton 
has failed completely. Moreover, there remains a wide rift between 
the international community’s perceptions of the local parties’ obli-
gations and those parties’ own perceptions and, indeed, their con-
duct. The international community views Dayton as a blueprint for 
a final settlement of the conflict, whereas the parties view Dayton 
as a trucial way-station, a means of continuing the struggle for 
dominance and control.6
 
                                                                                                              
3. In Bohumil Hrabal, Dancing Lessons for the Advanced in Age before title page (Mi-
chael Henry Heim trans., 1995). 
4. See generally Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia-Yugoslavia: General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 
[hereinafter GFAP]. The documents negotiated in Dayton, Ohio from November 1 to 21, 
1995 were formally signed in Paris in December, but are still commonly referred to as “the 
Dayton [Peace] Accord[s],” “Dayton,” “GFA,” or “GFAP.” I have worked from a Dayton, not 
a Paris, version of the Agreement, but it is identical in all particulars. Also, I will often refer 
in this Article simply to “Bosnia” as shorthand for the official name of the country, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 
5. Zoran Pajić, The Dayton Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina—A Critical Appraisal 
of its Human Rights Provisions [hereinafter The Dayton Constitution], in Constitutional 
Reform and International Law in Central and Eastern Europe 187 (Rein Müllerson, Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice, & Mads Andenas eds., 1998) (noting in late 1996 that “[t]he General Frame-
work Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . provided a comprehensive initial 
framework for ending the war, and . . . a year of peace in [Bosnia].”); Cf. Charles G. Boyd, 
Making Bosnia Work, in 47 Foreign Aff. 42, 43 (Jan.-Feb. 1998) (“It is often stated, incor-
rectly, that the Dayton Accords stopped the fighting in Bosnia. What it did, with the aid of 
60,000 U.S. and coalition troops, was freeze in place an uneasy cease-fire and prevent a 
resumption of hostilities.”). 
6. See Ante Čuvalo, Historical Dictionary of Bosnia and Herzegovina 48 (1997) (“None 
of the three sides is happy with the idea of a multiethnic state and each side considers the 
Dayton treaty as a temporary solution”); Boyd, supra note 5 at 43–44, 49 (noting that Day-
ton’s “dubious objective” was the “creation of a nation where no common sense of national 
community existed . . . requir[ing] inclusion of two ethnic groups . . . who did not then and 
do not now wish to live as minority peoples in a state dominated by the larger Muslim 
group,” and noting expectations that further fighting is expected if NATO withdraws). 
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Within this wider context, one of the most complicated aspects of 
the Bosnian conflict is the range of disputes over real property. 
Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced from their 
homes, which have, in many cases, been occupied by others simi-
larly uprooted from elsewhere.7 Yet the situation is by no means 
anarchical. There are legal and quasi-legal structures in place in all 
areas of the country that shape the actions of the various parties—if 
only to shape the ways in which policies of eviction and ethnic 
cleansing can be pursued. 
Resolution of the property question in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
closely linked, therefore, to the issue of the return of refugees, 
which the Accords were supposed to facilitate.8 Any eventual return 
of displaced persons to their homes will necessitate a resolution of 
the conflicts inherent in a situation of multiple occupants and claim-
ants.9 Even if most people give up their right to return, they will 
still seek compensation for their property. Moreover, investment 
that is critical to any meaningful reconciliation between the still 
hostile and separated groups will remain low as long as title is un-
certain.10 So far, the Dayton mechanisms have proven singularly 
incapable of creating any meaningful resolution of outstanding 
property issues, let alone the return of individual refugees. 
 
                                                                                                              
7. See, e.g., United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Sarajevo Office of the Spe-
cial Envoy [hereinafter UNHCR], Analysis of Compliance/Non-Compliance with Chapter 1 
of Annex 7, 1 (undated, appended letters variously dated September and October 1996) (“In 
Eastern Herzegovina . . . [t]he homes of displaced Bosniacs from areas such as Nevesinje, 
Trebinje, Gacko, Lubinje and Bileća are being occupied by Serbs from the Neretva valley 
south of Mostar, [which is] controlled by Croats (HVO) who will not permit Serb returns.”). 
Following increasingly common usage, in this Article I refer to the Muslim population as 
“Bosniacs.” “HVO” is the Croatian abbreviation for Croatian Defense Council, the title used 
by ethnic Croatian military forces during the conflict. 
8. “Even if there were no other problems, property alone would present a huge hurdle to 
would-be returnees. Refugees live in the houses of other refugees, forming endless chains of 
squatters, at least one of whom is bound to balk at going home.” Brotherhood and Disunity, 
in Survey of the Balkans: A Ghost of a Chance (special section), Economist, Jan. 24, 1998, at 
9. [hereinafter Brotherhood and Disunity]; see also Elena Popović, The Impact of Interna-
tional Human Rights Law on the Property Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Post-War 
Protection of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina 141, 154 (Michael O’Flaherty & 
Gregory Gisvold eds., 1998) (noting that the Dayton Peace Accords establish, in Annex 7, “a 
mechanism to deal solely with one particular right—property[,]” and that “[t]hereby, the GFA 
recognizes the importance of property rights in finding durable solutions for uprooted peo-
ple.”). 
9. “The illegal suspension of the property rights of innocent people was one of the major 
weapons with which ethnic cleansing was accomplished . . . . Part of the normalization proc-
ess is property.” The Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refu-
gees [hereinafter Property Commission], The Commission for Real Property Claims of Dis-
placed Persons and Refugees (information sheet issued by the Property Commission) [here-
inafter The Commission for Real Property Claims]. 
10. “If there is no definitive mechanism to resolve ownership, every new or repaired hous-
ing unit that is made available becomes a source of further confusion and conflict.” Id. 
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In this Article, I examine the modes of resolving property dis-
putes enforced by the various ethnically based governments that 
have and/or continue to operate on Bosnian territory: the Serb-
dominated Republika Srpska (RS), the Muslim-dominated Republic 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RBiH), the Croat Republic of Herceg-
Bosna (H-B), and the joint Muslim-Croat government of the Fed-
eration of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Fed. BiH, or the Federation). In 
so doing, I will illustrate the disparities between the practical opera-
tion of these domestic legal regimes and the aspirations for the in-
ternational mechanisms established at Dayton. Specifically, I examine 
the legal and quasi-legal structures that exist for resolving disputes in-
volving the massive amount of abandoned property in the country. 
What are the rules that have actually shaped the disposition of 
property disputes in Bosnia? What is the relationship between the 
international community’s imposed solution—the Dayton Ac-
cords—and the systems actually operating in the country? What do 
those domestic systems tell us about the essential nature of the re-
gimes operating there: their aspirations, their modes of legitimation, 
their purposes for being? 
In answering these questions, I will explore the degree to which 
the nature and resolution of property disputes in Bosnia today can 
be considered evidence, not merely of violations of certain rights, 
but of a wholly different constitutional conception of what society 
and the polity should be. Bosnia’s domestic regimes, as I shall 
show, are fundamentally—constitutionally—at odds with the com-
mitments imposed upon them in the Dayton Accords; they are there-
fore a great challenge to policymakers and scholars in the West who 
have placed their hopes for the restoration and reconstruction of 
Bosnia in the Accords. 
Examining protection of property rights to illustrate the disparity 
between the legal regimes of the para-states now in existence on the 
territory of Bosnia and the constitutional order envisioned in the 
Dayton Accords seems apt. No other subject is more clearly linked 
to the issues over which the war itself was fought than property. 
The many terrible human rights abuses committed were not the 
purpose of the war, but only one means of prosecuting it.11 Property 
 
                                                                                                              
11. They were, of course, an integral part of strategy: the logic of ethnic cleansing was 
aimed at least in part at ensuring that no one returned, and thus horrible abuses were deemed 
necessary as a way of permanently scaring off members of other ethnic groups. Even in this 
context, however, human rights violations are still a means to the end of a territory populated 
with and controlled by members of one ethnic group; they were not an end in themselves. See 
Tihomir Loža, A Civilization Destroyed, in Balkan War Report: Bulletin of the Institute for 
War and Peace Reporting [hereinafter War Report], at 1, cited in Why Bosnia? Writings on 
the Balkan War xiv–xv (Rabia Ali & Lawrence Lifschultz eds., 1993) [hereinafter Why Bos-
nia?]. 
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systems, on the other hand, are designed to control resources, and 
control of resources and land was the motivation behind the war’s 
outbreak and behind the way it was conducted.12 To the degree a 
coherent property system exists, it should reflect the parties’ core 
conceptions about how the naked desire for power is channeled into 
a system the international community would recognize as “legal.” 
This distinction is important for understanding why the interna-
tional community has largely failed to achieve its stated goals be-
yond military stabilization. Although it has committed enormous 
resources to resolving the conflict, the international community has 
adopted a legalistic and rhetorical approach to the domestic politi-
cal systems that has limited its ultimate effectiveness. The interna-
tional community has sought to assess the legitimacy of the various 
parties by international legal standards and to impose human rights 
norms on them without reference to the parties’ internal dynamics 
of legitimacy.13 However salutary such aspirations may be, the 
method has proven less than effective. A more textured understand-
 
                                                                                                              
12. This was true not just in Bosnia, but in the whole range of conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia: “Until [the signing of the accord on Eastern Slavonia], the war in the former 
Yugoslavia ha[d] been about territorial conquest.” Zoran Daskalović, Dealing for Slavonia, 
War Report (formerly Balkan War Report: Bulletin of the Institute for War and Peace Report-
ing) (Nov.-Dec. 1995), at 11. 
13. Consider, for example, this analysis: 
The challenge in the evolving Western orthodox model of legitimacy to non-
intervention and state dominance of the legitimate use of force as part of the basis of or-
der is indicative of the importance of liberal values and the declining relevance of a 
clear division between domestic and international order for those within the consensus. 
The domestic-international link, rather than divide, both in the way Yugoslavia lost le-
gitimacy and the effort to legitimize the international response, is indicative of this. . . . 
 The Western orthodox model was able to make headway into the emerging vacuum of 
legitimacy, but only as far as the consensus on the Western model as a viable alternative 
to the socialist legitimacy of the Titoist system extended. In the face of alternatives 
based on ethno-nationalism and an anti-Western version of Yugoslavia, the Western or-
thodox model was unable to make much progress. 
 The international response to Yugoslavia’s collapse seems to show, on the other hand, 
how much progress liberal political values have made within their Western heartlands. 
In particular, its cosmopolitan aspects have come through more clearly. . . . 
 Without consensus on the inclusion of liberal values in legitimacy and the absence of 
the civic-territorial nationalism it seemed to assume, the EC’s proposals to save Yugo-
slavia on the basis of a reformed confederation had minimal chance of success. The le-
gitimacy of the EC and the legitimacy of the Serb-led proposals rested on different ver-
sions of the legitimacy of liberal political institutions and procedures. That liberalism 
has great difficulties with nationalism and the issue of identity made it impossible for 
the EC to deal coherently, consistently, and adequately with this challenge to the basis 
of their proposals. 
John Williams, Legitimacy in International Relations and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia 
167–68 (1998); Cf. generally Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice 
266–67 (1989) (“Human rights are ultimately a profoundly national, not international, is-
sue. . . . [E]ven if we do attribute unrealistically pure motives and unbelievable skill and 
dedication to external powers, a regime’s ultimate success—its persistence in respecting, 
implementing, and enforcing human rights—will depend principally on internal political 
factors.”).  
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ing of these regimes’ relationship to the rule of law is therefore im-
portant because, to the degree that these systems can be character-
ized as legal and even internally legitimate, it must also be ac-
knowledged that their legitimation is independent of the norms out-
siders might seek to impose on them. Indeed, outsiders must even 
consider whether their present social and political organization is 
compatible at all with the substantive human rights goals the inter-
national community seeks to advance. I will argue that in failing 
adequately to address these issues when seeking to implement hu-
man rights norms in Bosnia, the international community risks ei-
ther the complete irrelevance of those norms, or a dangerous and 
compromising co-optation. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly lays out the back-
ground to the conflict and the present environment. Part II analyzes 
the civilian provisions of the Dayton Accords, showing how they 
form a radical blueprint for the future of Bosnia as an integral soci-
ety. Parts III and IV lay out the laws and practice of the domestic 
regimes regarding property, showing how they stand in sharp con-
trast to Dayton. Part V then discusses concepts of the “rule of law” 
and “constitutionalism” and suggests that the usual definitions of 
those concepts seriously limit the ability to develop truly meaning-
ful critiques of societies that violate human rights within what are 
internally consistent and legitimate legal systems. Then, applying 
this theoretical construction to Bosnia, the section derives the em-
pirical rules concerning the resolution of property disputes there as 
evidence of the unwritten, yet effectively existing, constitutions of 
the domestic regimes. Part VI then argues that the international 
community’s efforts to resolve the conflict in Bosnia suffer from an 
irresolvable contradiction: they seek to ensure liberal human rights 
on a foundation of illiberal, ethnically exclusive states. In conclu-
sion, I suggest that this contradiction poses a serious conceptual and 
moral challenge to scholars and policy makers: ensuring the main-
tenance of peace in the former Bosnia will likely require partition 
and consolidation of ethnic status, but that will in turn subordinate 
the very values and commitments that have inspired much of the 
human rights community’s hopes for the country’s future. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE POST-WAR SITUATION 
Explanations for the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia 
vary widely, from historically grounded interpretations14 to models 
positing elite manipulation of a very recent provenance.15
 
                                                                                                              
14. See, e.g., Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (1993); cf. 
David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West 256 (1996) (noting that 
1999 / The Dayton Accords and Bosnian Property Disputes 7 
 
                                                                                                              
Kaplan’s book, “which recapitulated the ancient-ethnic-hatreds version of contemporary 
Bosnian history[,]” was an important source of information for President Clinton). 
15. See, e.g., Philip J. Cohen, The Complicity of Serbian Intellectuals in Genocide in the 
1990s, in This Time We Knew: Western Response to Genocide in Bosnia 39 (Thomas Cush-
man & Stjepan G. Meštrović eds., 1996) [hereinafter This Time We Knew] (“The war against 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s was planned by Serbian intellectuals and au-
thorities long before the first Serbian attacks.”) “The critical fact is that Serbian war crimes 
and atrocities were systematized and centrally orchestrated, and they served as an instrument 
of state policy.” Id. at 53. “As they did in World War II, a critical mass of Serbian intellectu-
als have willingly embraced and promoted Nazi-like ideology, exerted political leadership, 
and mobilized the masses to a genocidal campaign.” Id. at 56. See generally Thomas Cush-
man & Stjepan Meštrović, Introduction, in This Time We Knew, supra, at 25–28 (summariz-
ing common perspectives on the origins and conduct of the wars in Croatia, Slovenia, and 
Bosnia); see also Wayne Bert, The Reluctant Superpower: United States’ Policy in Bosnia, 
1991–95, at 36–43 (1997) (surveying various authors on the origins of the conflict). The 
argument in this Article does not rely on any particular view of the conflict’s genesis; rather, 
it relies on a recognition that the presently realized ethnic division is highly salient and 
unlikely to recede to any meaningful degree. 
Although Bosnia has figured in the geographical and political consciousness of southeast-
ern Europe since at least the Middle Ages, its appearance in roughly the form in which it is 
presently recognized as a state dates to the late Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian 
protectorate established in 1878. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at 2. Although it had no distinct 
political character within interwar Royal Yugoslavia, Bosnia appeared as a constituent repub-
lic of Communist Yugoslavia following World War II. See id. at 36. 
The country’s population has been heavily mixed, including large populations of Orthodox 
Christians, Catholics, and Muslims since at least the first century following the Ottoman 
conquest in the 1500s. See id. at 10, 15; Peter F. Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman 
Rule, 1354–1804, at 54 (1977). Although scholars dispute the origins of particularized na-
tional identity in the region, by the 19th century, Bosnia’s Catholics and Orthodox Christians 
had become firmly identified with their neighboring co-religionist Croats and Serbs, respec-
tively. Muslim identity, as a national phenomenon in Bosnia, developed more slowly. See 
Čuvalo, supra note 6, at 25–26. 
Following the extreme fratricidal violence of the Second World War, Yugoslavia’s presi-
dent, Josip Broz Tito, created a regime that enjoyed considerable legitimacy and achieved a 
measure of stability. The relationship of the Communist regime to the ultimate dissolution of 
the country, however, remains controversial. Many analysts trace the immediate origins of 
Yugoslavia’s dissolution crisis to the political events and economic changes leading to the 
promulgation of the 1974 Constitution, which greatly expanded the political and economic 
power of the republics and autonomous regions. See Mihailo Crnobrnja, The Roots of Yugo-
slavia’s Dissolution, in Why Bosnia?, supra note 11, at 269–70; Susan Woodward, Balkan 
Tragedy 47 (1995) (tracing international economic changes as the root of Yugoslavia’s disso-
lution). 
The death of Tito in 1981 weakened the central government, which was now headed by a 
rotating collective presidency. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xxvii, 37–38. The increasing 
paralysis of the center and the economic crisis that gripped Yugoslavia in the 1980s increased 
the autarkic tendencies of the republics and provinces and led to a reaction by Serbian intel-
lectuals and political leaders, who argued that increasing decentralization threatened Serbs 
outside of Serbia proper, most especially in Kosovo, which became a flashpoint for Serbian 
grievances. Beginning with the “1986 Declaration” by a group of Serbian intellectuals, see 
Cohen, supra, at 39–40, this nationalist reaction broke the surface of political life in Yugosla-
via, and rapidly became the dominant political force in Serbia, Montenegro, and Serbia’s two 
autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina, whose autonomy was effectively nullified in 
1989. Increasingly, federal institutions, such as the army, came to identify their interests, and 
that of Yugoslavia as a whole, with those of ethnic Serbs. The other republics, especially 
Slovenia, feared that they, too, would be subordinated to Serb interests, and demanded a 
looser confederation. When their demands were left unmet, the republics moved towards 
independence. In response, in 1991 ethnic Serbs in Croatia demanded their own autonomy or 
independence, and were supported by the Yugoslav army. Full-scale war broke out in Slove-
8 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 40 
 
                                                                                                              
nia and Croatia in 1991. Slovenia succeeded in gaining control of its territory after a brief 
conflict. Croatia also succeeded in establishing itself as an independent state, but large areas 
of its territory were held by the Serb minority. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xxviii; Mihailo 
Crnobrnja, The Destruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina, in Why Bosnia? supra note 11, at 249–
52. 
A similar pattern followed in Bosnia later in 1991, when the Muslim and Croat leadership, 
increasingly fearful of domination by a Serb government, demanded independence from 
Belgrade, and the Serb leadership used these demands to justify its own program of partition. 
By early 1992, paramilitary forces working in cooperation with the Yugoslav army were 
already developing positions in various parts of the Bosnian countryside; in some areas, 
fighting had already broken out. On April 6, 1992, following a referendum that overwhelm-
ingly favored independence but was boycotted by the Serbs, Bosnia declared its independ-
ence and was quickly recognized by the European Community (EC) member-states and the 
United States. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xxx, 41. Fighting broke out on a wide scale, and 
Serb forces, backed by the federal army, seized most of eastern and northern Bosnia, while 
Muslims retained control of the center of the country and the extreme northwest (the Bihać 
pocket), as well as three isolated towns in the east (Srebrenica, Žepa, and Goražde). The 
Croats held the southwest and various pockets of land in the center of the country. The Serb 
advances, in particular, were marked by large-scale atrocities and wholesale expulsion of the 
non-Serb population. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at 42. Many Serbs fled from areas of the 
country held by Muslims and Croats, but the scale of violence against them was not compa-
rable. 
The Muslims and Croats were ostensibly allied against the Serbs, but their relationship was 
tense from the beginning. From the start of the conflict, they were effectively two separate 
communities organized on their respective portions of Bosnia’s territory. By 1993, full-scale 
war had broken out between Croats and Muslims, and their communities fully separated. See 
Woodward, supra, at 268. There was also fighting between one Muslim group in the north-
western Bihać area and the Sarajevo-based Muslim government. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at 
xxxiii, 44. 
International attempts to resolve the conflict, meanwhile, were generally seen as ineffec-
tive, especially during the first two years of the war, when the United Nations (UN) led the 
effort. Outside involvement became vigorous only after 1994, when NATO began to inter-
vene militarily.  
In June 1991, then-Secretary of State James Baker had reassured the Yugoslav leadership 
that the United States supported the territorial integrity of the country, signaling the intention 
of the United States to take a secondary role in the conflict. See Bert, supra note 15, at 136, 
138. The UN and the EC were therefore initially the most active players. The UN positioned 
lightly armed military units, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), between the Croats and 
Serbs in Croatia in February 1992. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xxix. The Security Council 
imposed sanctions against Yugoslavia in May, and in June extended the mandate of UNPRO-
FOR to include securing humanitarian assistance inside Bosnia; in September, the General 
Assembly expelled Yugoslavia. See id. at xxx–xxxi. In October, the Security Council im-
posed a ban on military flights over Bosnia. See id. at xxxi. In April and May 1993, the Secu-
rity Council declared six “safe areas” in Bosnia, including Sarajevo and Srebrenica. See id. at 
xxxii. 
The EC was also prominent in the early stages. Following Germany’s earlier lead, a move 
often criticized as having enflamed the situation in Bosnia, on January 15, 1992, the EC 
recognized Slovenia and Croatia. See Woodward, supra note 15, at 276–78; Bert, supra note 
15, at 137. In February, talks were initiated in Lisbon under EC auspices. At the negotiations, 
the first of several proposed cantonization plans were put forward, but they were rejected by 
the Bosnian government leadership which proceeded to declare independence on March 3, 
1992. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xxix. 
The UN and the EC also cooperated in trying to broker a peace deal. A joint mediation 
team presented a second cantonization plan in October (the Vance-Owen plan), but the 
United States pushed for changes, and, by January 1993, the Serb leadership rejected it. See 
Bertrand de Rossanet, War and Peace in the Former Yugoslavia 126 (1997). In June 1993, 
another highly confederal plan (the Owen-Stoltenberg plan) was rejected by the Muslim 
government leadership. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xxxii; de Rossanet, supra, at 126–27. 
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While there remains intense debate about both the origins and the 
depth of divisions between the various populations, few dispute that 
the ethnic divisions, whatever their provenance, have now attained 
an undeniable salience. The course of the war itself, less controver-
sial though more shocking, has been extensively documented, in-
cluding the extreme depravities committed by the warring parties, 
particularly the Serbs and to a lesser degree the Croats and Mus-
lims.16 Few indeed are the actors or observers who suggest that it is 
possible to return to the status quo ante in which ethnic differences 
were, depending on one’s view of history, either unimportant, re-
pressed, or ignored. 
Of greater importance than arguments about origins is an appre-
ciation of the present situation. The Dayton Accords, signed under 
considerable pressure in late 1995, provided for the military stabili-
zation of the country and the progressive disarmament of the main 
combatant forces by a heavily armed NATO force, referred to as the 
Peace Implementation Force (IFOR; later renamed the Stabilization 
Force (SFOR)). It also provided for the political reorganization of 
the country into a federal government of “Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH)” composed of two “entities,” the Republika Srpska and the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Federation was further 
divided into “cantons” roughly corresponding to ethnic enclaves of 
Croats and Muslims. A new constitution for the highly decentral-
ized country was promulgated by the agreement, providing for mul-
 
                                                                                                              
Beginning in 1994, the United States and NATO became more involved in pressing for a 
resolution. In February 1994, NATO threatened air strikes if the Serbs did not comply with a 
heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo, and in the following months engaged in 
limited air strikes and attacks on Serb aircraft. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xxxiv–xxxv. In 
March, the United States brokered a fragile peace between the Croats and Muslims, who 
entered into a federation. See id. at xxxiv. Although they remained separate, hostile, and 
suspicious, they did succeed in turning their military force against the Serbs. See id. at xxxvii. 
In April, the United States, several European states, and Russia formed the Contact Group to 
coordinate policy, see id. at xxxv, which proposed a 49-51 split of the territory between Serbs 
and a new federation of Croats and Muslims. The Serbs rejected the plan in July. See id. at 
xxxvi. In November 1994, the United States stopped enforcing the UN arms embargo, which 
had existed since the beginning of the war. See id. at xxxviii; Rieff, supra note 14, at 228. 
Beginning in early 1995, the conflict intensified, and the Western states’ policies became 
more interventionist. Muslim and Croat forces made significant advances; the Croatian army 
retook most of the Croatian territory held by Serbs in two offensives in spring and summer 
1995, see Bert, supra note 15, at 46–47, with the tacit approval of the United States. See 
Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xlv; Bert, supra note 15, at 223. At the same time, Serb forces over-
ran two Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia, including Srebrenica, killing thousands of cap-
tured Muslim men. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xlii–xliii. In the late summer and early fall, 
the Croats and Muslims pressed a second round of offensives in Bosnia that resulted in a rout 
of the Serbs. See id. at xliv–xlvi. These, in conjunction with a massive bombing campaign by 
NATO finally brought the Serbs to agree to a ceasefire in October. See id. at xlvii. American-
sponsored negotiations led by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke near Dayton, 
Ohio followed in November. See id. at xlviii. 
16. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, vols. I & II 
(1997). 
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tiple levels of governance and administration, and including exten-
sive guarantee for human rights and for the right of refugees and 
displaced persons to return to their homes anywhere in the country. 
The military provisions of the agreement have been successfully 
implemented, but the civilian provisions, though somewhat invigo-
rated by increased international intervention during 1998, have 
largely remained unenforced. The federal institutions of govern-
ment barely function, and federal legal instruments, including the 
federal constitution itself, are ignored in all areas of the country; the 
internationally recognized government in Sarajevo governs only the 
Muslim sector. Local institutions representing ethnically exclusive 
constituencies continue to hold power over their respective parts of 
the country, which is, essentially, partitioned. The Serbs and Croats 
remain practically committed to strategies of obfuscation, partition, 
and secession, and while the Muslims favor reunification, all three 
parties remain, to varying degrees, hostile to and defiant of the 
stated intentions of the international community to effect the return 
of refugees.17 For most of the last three years, the international 
community’s attempts to implement the civilian aspects of Dayton 
have been almost totally frustrated by the abiding power of the lo-
cal, ethnic governments that effectively control the country despite 
the presence of tens of thousands of NATO and other troops. 
Although there have been generally positive developments in 
Bosnia in the past year18—particularly in the disposition of the Serb 
 
                                                                                                              
17.  
Announced as the year of repatriation, 1998 seems to be over as there is no real strategy, 
Zdravko Todorović, president of the Serb Republic Helsinki Committee, said. The au-
thorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina want to protect ethnically clean territories, and the fail-
ure of the Sarajevo declaration on returns [issued by an international conference of aid 
donors and refugee relief organizations on February 3, 1998] as well as the situation in 
Drvar [a Croat-controlled municipality in western Bosnia] confirm this Helsinki Com-
mittee’s view, Todorović said, adding that there was no serious possibility of exercising 
the right to return. 
2 July 1998, Bosnia: Official Says Human Rights Violations Continuing in Bosnian Serb 
Republic, Sarajevo, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts, BBC Monitoring Ser-
vice: Central Europe and Balkans (July 2, 1998). The Office of the High Representative’s 
(OHR; see infra page 535) initiative for 1998 to be the “Year of Return” was “launched be-
cause the provisions on refugee returns had been among the least respected in terms of the 
1995 Dayton peace accords, particularly in the area of minority returns . . . . “ Gabriel Partos, 
Return in Slow Motion, 6 Transitions 42 (Mar. 1999). 
18. Some of the most important developments since late 1997 include: the active interven-
tion by SFOR forces in the rift between two factions of the ruling party in Republika Srpska, 
leading to the election of a new prime minister with the votes of delegates from all three 
nationalities and with open Western support; the announced introduction of common license 
plates and a common currency; and increased diplomatic pressure on the Muslim government 
to allow returns of refugees to Sarajevo. See generally Zoran Pajić, Protectorates Lost, War 
Report (Feb.-Mar. 1998), at 26; and Jane M.O. Sharpe, Dayton’s Unfinished Business, War 
Report (Feb.-Mar. 1998), at 27–28. 
However, these changes have largely come to nothing, or have since been reversed; in the 
September 1998 elections, nationalist candidates won sweeping victories. “Bosnian Serb 
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government—and a newly assertive posture on the part of the inter-
national community, there have not been, as yet, any clear signs of 
substantive change in the core issues of refugee returns and political 
reintegration. Returns of refugees across ethnic divides remain al-
most non-existent (less than ten percent of all returns19), and the 
much heralded breakthroughs since the 1997 elections have been 
either cosmetic or have not been inconsistent with the maintenance 
of the present ethnic division: 
[A]t one level progress in establishing the institutions of the 
joint state has been made. However, real cooperation between 
the still dominant nationalist parties has been slight and grudg-
ing, while progress on the ground, in terms of the return of 
refugees, freedom of movement and the arrest of indicted war 
criminals, has been minimal. Not only has there been consider-
able resistance to reintegration by the RS, but Muslim- and 
Croat-controlled areas of the federation also remain effectively 
 
                                                                                                              
President Biljana Plavšić has acknowledged losing her bid for reelection to ultranationalist 
Nikola Poplašen, AP reported on 21 September . . . . Poplašen, leader of the chauvinist Ser-
bian Radical Party (SRS) and an ally of indicted war criminal Radovan Karadžić, said he will 
follow the Dayton agreement ‘to the letter, nothing more and nothing less.’” Pete 
Baumgartner, Plavšić Concedes Election Defeat, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline 
(Sept. 22, 1998) <http://www. rferl.org/newsline/1998/09/220998.html>. Even the more 
cosmetic changes have met with resistance: one local paper reported that replacement of 
license plates and drivers licenses had “hardly begun” in Croat-majority counties with only 
five days to go before the deadline for conversion. Jožo Pavković, Ili uzmite moje tablice i 
ćirilične vozačke ili autom ne možete u Europu (Either Take My License Plates and Cyrillic 
Driver’s License or You Can’t Drive to Europe), VEČERNJI LIST, May 25, 1998, at 2 (author 
trans.). 
19. Partos, supra note 17, at 43. See also Brotherhood and Disunity, Economist, supra 
note 8, at 9 (“So far, minority returns have been negligible. By December 1997, just 35,000 
of the 400,000 displaced Bosniacs who returned home had gone to areas where their ethnic 
groups constituted a minority. Most of them were old people going back to Muslim-
controlled areas. Hardly any young non-Serbs have returned to the Serb Republic. Without a 
breakthrough, Dayton’s promise of the right to return will come to nothing.”) The Sarajevo 
Declaration called for the return of 20,000 non-Muslim refugees to Sarajevo during 1998. 
International Crisis Group issued a report assessing its progress:  
The most glaring shortfall in the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration are the re-
turn figures. Although some 7,100 minority families have registered to return, according 
to UNHCR, only 1,292 minority persons (504 Croats, 692 Serbs and 96 “Others”) 
moved into Sarajevo in the first seven months of 1998. In comparison, according to 
UNHCR figures, several municipalities during this period attracted a greater number of 
minorities in relation to their total populations. In all, 5,204 minorities returned to the 
Federation (current population 2.3 million) during this period, compared with only 859 
minorities to Republika Srpska (current population 1 million). 
Since the end of the war, 20,426 minorities moved to Sarajevo, 44 percent of all minorities 
(46,294) who moved to areas in the Federation; and 3,078 minorities moved to Republika 
Srpska. Taking into account the differential in overall population numbers, the return rate of 
minorities to the Federation has been nearly three times the return rate to Republika Srpska.  
International Crisis Group, Too Little, Too Late: Implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration, 
Part 1, section entitled Paltry Return Figures (Sept. 9, 1998) <http://www.crisisweb.org> 
(citations omitted) [hereinafter Too Little, Too Late]. 
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under separate administrations, making for an enduring three-
way division of the country, which renders uncertain prospects 
for BiH’s survival as a unified state.20
The Bosnian war produced extremely high levels of displace-
ment, as well as destruction of property.21 The 1991, prewar popula-
tion 4.36 million was reduced to perhaps 3.2 million in 1996.22 As 
many as 250,000 people had been killed, and hundreds of thousands 
more fled from one side of the country to the other, or to third coun-
tries. As of late 1995, when hostilities ended, more than three mil-
lion people had been displaced from their pre-war residences, and 
some two million still do not have “durable solutions.”23 In Mostar, 
for example, more than sixty percent of the population has been 
dispossessed of its prewar property.24 In addition, 200,000 to 
300,000 refugees from other parts of former Yugoslavia, mostly 
Serbs but also some Muslims, have fled conflicts elsewhere and 
now live in Bosnia.25 Some towns have nearly doubled in popula-
tion, while large rural areas have been depopulated, particularly in 
central Bosnia and Republika Srpska.26
Remaining minorities in the country had been reduced to insig-
nificant numbers. For example, the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 20,000 Muslims and 
Croats remained in Republika Srpska as of October 1996, all of 
them in the western part of the entity.27 As of mid-1998, these num-
bers had changed only slightly, and overall ethnic homogeneity has 
 
                                                                                                              
20. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bosnia and Hercegovina/Croatia 1997-
98 (1997), at 5. One journal covering the region noted that in 1998, “OHR and other interna-
tional agencies decided against putting pressure on the authorities in Republika Srpska to 
take back non-Serbs. That policy was designed to avoid undermining the position of Prime 
Minister Milorad Dodik and his coalition of pragmatist Serb parties, particularly in the run-
up to September’s elections. A large-scale return of Bosniaks [sic] and Croats to Republika 
Srpska might have provided hard-line Serb nationalists with a popular rallying point.” Partos, 
supra note 17, at 43. To the degree that returns represent the core of the international com-
munity’s vision for Bosnia’s future, such a policy suggests that the many changes that have 
occurred have not significantly changed the disposition of power. 
21. “About a tenth of Bosnia’s housing stock was destroyed during the war; another 25-
30% is uninhabitable.” Brotherhood and Disunity, Economist, supra note 8, at 9. 
22. In 1997, the World Bank estimated the two entities’ populations as: 2.3 million in the Fed-
eration, 900,000 in Republika Srpska. Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 20, at 3, 14.  
23. Brotherhood and Disunity, Economist, supra note 8, at 8. 
24. Interview with Sefket Hadžihasanović, Federation Ombudsman, in Mostar, Fed. BiH 
(Jan. 10, 1997). 
25. Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 20, at 14.  
26. Id. at 15. 
27. See UNHCR, supra note 7, at 7. The report refers to “Northern Bosnia,” a designation 
that would generally be understood to refer to the half of the Serb entity from Brčko west-
ward; however, the report mentions, in the same paragraph, minority communities in 
Zvornik, which is in the half of the Serb entity east (and south) of Brčko, although geo-
graphically it is indeed in the north of the country as a whole. 
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actually increased since the war.28 Those who have attempted to 
return, or to reclaim lost property, have met with opposition ranging 
from administrative obstacles29 to armed mobs on all sides.30 De-
struction of refugees’ property, including abandoned property, is 
common, especially if the houses show any signs of repair that 
might suggest an attempt to return. 
The great majority of expulsions and expropriations occurred 
during the war, governed, if at all, by wartime legislation, though 
most often subject to a more immediate and compelling law. At the 
end of the war, another layer was added: the international commu-
nity’s vision of a just and integrated settlement as expressed in the 
Dayton Accords, and with it a new posture regarding the role of 
law, even in the domestic regimes. Let us now turn to the civilian 
provisions of Dayton, with an eye towards those affecting the dis-
position of property, to see what they promise for Bosnia and its 
peoples. 
 
                                                                                                              
28. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 5, at 48 (“[T]here are now at least 70,000 fewer people liv-
ing in ethnically mixed areas than when the accord was signed.”); “Bosniacs accounted for 
94.5 percent of all people who moved into Sarajevo [in 1997], including 19,623 who had not 
previously lived there.” International Crisis Group, Too Little, Too Late, supra note 19, sec-
tion 5 entitled Abuses in Allocation of Available Housing (noting also that the percentage in 
1998 has been lower, though Sarajevo is still overwhelmingly monoethnic). 
Figures on the number of returns to predominantly Serbian Banja Luka, situated in the 
moderate half of Republika Srpska, give a sense of how little return has occurred. One offi-
cial of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) estimated that “ap-
proximately 200 Bosniaks [sic] and another 100 Croats have returned to the Banja Luka 
Municipality, exclusively family reunification (i.e., they have a house, with space waiting for 
them—which hasn’t been allocated to Serb DP/Refs. [displaced persons/refugees]). Perhaps a 
handful of cases where the original owner returned to his prewar home by arranging some 
sort of deal with the Serb DP currently inside.” Private communication with OSCE officer 
(Mar. 25, 1998). 
29. A UNHCR report notes that “separate legislation and legal systems within each of the 
two . . . areas, particularly in property laws, discriminate against minorities and many catego-
ries of refugees/returnees.” UNHCR, supra note 7, at 4. 
There are other problems as well: unemployment among returning refugees may be as high 
as 92%. Brotherhood and Disunity, Economist, supra note 8, at 9. Unemployment outside the 
agricultural sector is estimated at more than 40% in the Federation and at almost 70% in 
Republika Srpska. Partos, supra note 17, at 44. 
30. One report notes 
Resettlement of minorities in rural Bosnia is resisted about equally by the majority 
groups in the three respective sectors, although Muslim cities such as Sarajevo and 
Tuzla, secure in their dominance, are less resistant to minority settlers. Notwithstanding 
anecdotal evidence about this or that Croat woman who wants her pre-war Muslim 
neighbor to return, there seems to be a clear consensus that the hatred generated by the 
war must fade before any real mixing of the groups can take place without resistance.  
Boyd, supra note 5, at 47–48. 
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III. DAYTON’S PROMISE: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
The first, longest, and most detailed section of the Dayton Ac-
cords naturally deals with military stabilization,31 given the need to 
achieve peace and stability before any reconstruction could begin. 
The remainder, however, addresses the so-called civilian aspects of 
the settlement. These sections include: the constitution of the new 
federal government of Bosnia and Herzegovina; provisions dealing 
with human rights, refugees, and displaced persons; political par-
ticipation; the role of various international agencies; and transi-
tional provisions for transferring powers to the various levels of 
government over time. Out of these provisions, many of them quite 
narrow and technical in nature, emerges a vision of a radically 
transformed and internationalized society. 
A. General Civilian Provisions 
The Dayton Accords acknowledge each of the parties as “sover-
eign equals,”32 and recognize two entities, the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, as well as the federal 
government at the national level.33 The new Constitution of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is incorporated as the fourth annex to the Accords. 
The preamble to the constitution declares its desire to protect pri-
vate property, its commitment to “the sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity, and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in ac-
cordance with international law,” its inspiration by “the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Civil 
and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
and the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, as well as other hu-
man rights instruments,” and identifies “Bosniacs, Croats, and 
Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others) and citizens of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.”34
The Constitution commits Bosnia to be a democratic state under 
the rule of law.35 Citizenship is both national and entity-level, each 
regulated by its respective level,36 and neither citizenship can be 
revoked due to “language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, association with a national minority, prop-
 
                                                                                                              
31. GFAP, supra note 4, Annexes 1A, 1B, & 2, 35 I.L.M. at 92, 109, 112. See infra Part 
VI. 
32. GFAP, supra note 4, art. I, 35 I.L.M. at 89. 
33. Id. Annex 4, art. I, § 3, 35 I.L.M. at 118. 
34. Id. Annex 4, Preamble, 35 I.L.M. at 118. 
35. Id. Annex 4, art. I, § 2, 35 I.L.M. at 118. 
36. Id. Annex 4, art. I, § 7, 35 I.L.M. at 118. 
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erty, birth or other status.”37 Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
can hold other citizenships subject to a national parliamentary 
agreement with the other state,38 a provision included to allow 
Serbs and Croats dual citizenship. 
Elaborate human rights guarantees are incorporated into the con-
stitution. The European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), including its Proto-
cols, is directly applicable law and has priority over all other law at 
both the national and entity level.39 An extensive annex of conven-
tions is also incorporated as law.40 Relevant enumerated rights in-
clude: 
. . .  
(e) The right to a fair hearing in civil . . . matters.  
 . . .  
(g) Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. 
 . . .  
(k) The right to property. 
 . . .  
 
                                                                                                              
37. Id. Annex 4, art. I, § 7, cl. b, 35 I.L.M. at 118. 
38. See id. Annex 4, art. I, § 7, cl. d, 35 I.L.M. at 118. 
39. See id. Annex 4, art. II, §§ 2 & 6, 35 I.L.M. at 119. 
40. The rights enumerated in the following agreements are secured to all persons in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, see id. Annex 4, art. II, § 4, 35 I.L.M. at 119, and the country is to 
remain or become a party to all of the same agreements, see id. Annex 4, art. II, § 7, 35 
I.L.M. at 119. 
1. 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; 
2. 1949 Geneva Conventions I-IV on the Protection of the Victims of War, and the 
1977 Geneva Protocols I-II thereto; 
3. 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1966 Protocol thereto; 
4. 1957 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women; 
5. 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness; 
6. 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation; 
7. 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1966 and 1989 Op-
tional Protocols thereto; 
8. 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 
9. 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; 
10. 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment; 
11. 1987 European Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment; 
12. 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child; 
13. 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families; 
14. 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; 
15. 1994 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. 
Id. Annex 4, art. I, 35 I.L.M. at 126. 
Annex 6 includes an identical list, except that it also includes the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols. See id. Annex 
6, Appendix, 35 I.L.M. at 136. This convention is incorporated directly into the text of the 
Constitution and thus does not appear on its annexed list. 
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(m) The right to liberty of movement and residence.41
A specific non-discrimination clause guarantees that all enumerated 
or annexed human rights “shall be secured to all persons in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina without discrimination on any ground such as . . . 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social ori-
gin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status.”42
B. Constitutional and Political Division of Power 
The political system established by the constitution is highly con-
federal, with a weak central government retaining power over for-
eign policy, customs, monetary policy, inter-entity transportation 
and criminal enforcement, and, more relevant to this paper, immi-
gration and refugee policy.43 The national executive and legislative 
organs are so finely balanced among the three ethnic groups as to 
practically ensure effective paralysis at the whim of any of the 
three. 
The lower levels of government have correspondingly more 
power and autonomy. Although few powers are enumerated, all 
powers not expressly granted to the national government belong to 
the entities,44 and the effective ethnic paralysis of the national insti-
tutions created by the Constitution further ensures that the entities 
and cantons will not be checked from above.45 The entities have 
broad police powers46 and, although not specifically mentioned, the 
regulation of property rights is understood to be a power of the enti-
ties—or, in the Federation, of the ten cantons into which that entity 
is further divided.47 The entities may also enter into ill-defined 
 
                                                                                                              
41. Id. Annex 4, art. II, 35 I.L.M. at 119. These rights are repeated in a separate annex 
specifically addressing human rights. See id. Annex 6, art. I, 35 I.L.M. at 130. 
42. Id. Annex 6, art. II, § 4, 35 I.L.M. at 131. 
43. See id. Annex 6, art. III, § 1, 35 I.L.M. at 131. 
44. See id. Annex 6, art. III, § 3, cl. a, 35 I.L.M. at 131. 
45. The central government has no independent taxing power and is dependent on the en-
tities and international support. See Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 20, at 13. 
46. See GFAP, supra note 4, Annex 4, art. III, § 2, cl. c, 35 I.L.M. at 120. 
47. The system of cantons was created by the so-called Washington Agreement, which 
established a federation between the warring Muslim and Croat communities. The Agreement 
reads in pertinent part:  
Framework Agreement for the Federation 
. . .  
II Division of Responsibilities 
 . . .  
2. The Central Government and the cantons have responsibility for: 
-human rights 
. . .  
-infrastructure for communications and transport 
. . .  
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“special parallel relationships with neighboring states consistent 
with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herze-
govina.”48 At the same time, however, any law or act of an entity 
inconsistent with the Constitution is superseded.49
C. The Judicial System 
An implicitly ethnically mixed Constitutional Court50 has exclu-
sive jurisdiction in any dispute arising under the Constitution be-
tween the entities or between Bosnia and an entity, including de-
terminations about the constitutionality of entity constitutions and 
laws and of any “special parallel relationship with a neighboring 
state.”51
No provision, however, is made for other levels of courts,52 and 
the proceedings of existing courts and administrative agencies are 
continued under the transitional provisions annexed to the Constitu-
tion,53 as are “[a]ll laws, regulations, and judicial rules of procedure 
. . . to the extent not inconsistent with the Constitution.”54 The es-
 
                                                                                                              
-use of natural resources. 
As appropriate, these responsibilities may be exercised jointly or separately, or by the 
cantons as coordinated with the central government. 
3. The cantons shall have all responsibility not expressly granted to the central govern-
ment. They shall have, in particular, authority over the following: 
. . .  
-housing 
. . .  
-local land use (zoning) . . . . 
Framework Agreement for the Federation, in Letter Dated 3 March 1994 from the Permanent 
Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to the United Nations Addressed to 
the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/1994/255, Attachment I, 4–5. There are no cantons in 
Republika Srpska. 
48. GFAP, supra note 4, Annex 4, art. III, § 2, cl. a, 35 I.L.M. at 120. 
49. See id. Annex 4, art. III, § 3, cl. b, 35 I.L.M. at 120. 
50. Four members are selected by the House of Representatives of the Federation, two by 
the Assembly of Republika Srpska and three by the President of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, with these last not being citizens of Bosnia or any neighboring state. See id. 
Annex 4, art. VI, § 1, cl. a-b, 35 I.L.M. at 123. This formula ensures that at least the Serbs 
and the Muslims can vote in members if they maintain ethnic solidarity in their parliaments. 
The implicit deal is that the Federation’s four seats would be divided two and two between 
Muslim and Croat candidates. Note that the inclusion of three international members allows 
any one ethnicity’s representatives, together with the internationals, to constitute a majority, 
or for any two ethnicities’ representatives to constitute a majority with even a single interna-
tional vote. There are no provisions for an ethnic veto or opt-out, and the court’s decisions 
are final and binding. See id. Annex 4, art. VI, § 4, 35 I.L.M. at 123. 
51. Such as Republika Srpska has attempted to do with Yugoslavia. See id. Annex 4, art. 
VI, § 3, cl. a, 35 I.L.M. at 123. 
52. Except to note that the Constitutional Court has appellate jurisdiction over issues un-
der the Constitution arising out of judgments of other courts in Bosnia, however constituted. 
See id. Annex 4, art. VI, § 3, cl. b, 35 I.L.M. at 123. 
53. See id. Annex 4, art. II, § 3, 35 I.L.M. at 126. 
54. Id. Annex 4, art. II, § 2, 35 I.L.M. at 126. 
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tablishment of courts is effectively left within the purview of the 
entities and cantons. 
D. Provisions Relating to Refugees and Property 
Because questions of property and returns are so central to the 
conflict and to any prospects for its resolution, the Accords give 
them extensive attention. The Constitution specifically addresses 
the rights of those who fled or were expelled during the war: 
They have the right . . . to have restored to them property of 
which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 
1991 and to be compensated for any such property that cannot 
be restored to them. Any commitments or statements relating to 
such property made under duress are null and void.55
Moreover, an entirely separate Annex deals specifically with the 
rights of refugees and displaced persons. All refugees and displaced 
persons are guaranteed the right “freely to return to the homes of 
origin” and to receive back their property or be compensated for 
it.56 They are free to choose their destination, and the parties must 
“facilitate the flow of information necessary for refugees and dis-
placed persons to make informed judgments about local conditions 
for return.”57
The parties acknowledge the importance of “early return”58 and 
undertake to allow return “in safety, without risk of harassment, 
intimidation, persecution, or discrimination, particularly on account 
of their ethnic origin, religious belief, or political opinion.”59 They 
specifically agree to repeal discriminatory legislation, suppress in-
citement of ethnic or religious hostility and acts of retribution by 
public or private individuals or forces, protect minority populations 
and provide access to them by international agencies, and prosecute 
or dismiss officials responsible for violating human or minority 
rights.60 Dayton gave UNHCR a special role in developing repatria-
tion plans for “an early, peaceful, orderly and phased return of refu-
gees and displaced persons, which may include priorities for certain 
areas and categories or returnees.”61
 
                                                                                                              
55. Id. Annex 4, art. II, § 5, 35 I.L.M. at 119. 
56. See id. Annex 7, art. I, § 1, 35 I.L.M. at 136. 
57. Id. Annex 7, art. I, § 4, 35 I.L.M. at 137. 
58. Id. Annex 7, art. I, § 1, 35 I.L.M. at 136. 
59. Id. Annex 7, art. I, § 2, 35 I.L.M. at 136. 
60. See id. Annex 7, art. I, § 3, cl. a–e, 35 I.L.M. at 136. 
61. Id. Annex 7, art. I, § 5, 35 I.L.M. at 136. This provision has sometimes been criticized 
as subjecting the ostensibly absolute right of return to conditions, but as it is impossible to 
return so many people simultaneously under even ideal political conditions, the practical 
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The Accords require deeper levels of social commitment and re-
structuring because the security necessary to reassure returnees ex-
tends beyond mere formal legal guarantees. Accordingly, the parties 
“undertake to create in their territories the political, economic, and 
social conditions conducive to the voluntary return and harmonious 
reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, without preference 
for any particular group.”62
E. The Property Commission 
The parties must also establish an independent Commission for 
Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees, or Prop-
erty Commission, to determine “any claims for real property” in-
volving involuntary loss.63 It aims to create an atmosphere of legal-
ity in which returns can proceed: “As the refugees learn that there is 
a formal mechanism which offers the possibility of return . . . the 
levels of confidence among refugees as to their future in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina will gradually increase.” 64
The commission has extensive powers to gain access to re-
cords,65 determine lawful title and value,66 and dispose of prop-
erty.67 Acts of the commission are final.68 In developing its “rules 
and regulations, the Commission shall consider domestic laws on 
property rights”69 and strive to strengthen the local legal system. A 
list of its guiding principles states: 
The Commission will seek to restore the integrity of the prop-
erty law system as it stood in 1991. The Commission will dis-
regard any wartime legislation which violates international 
human rights standards; 
 
                                                                                                              
necessity of planning phased returns need not be seen as a limit, but rather as a means of 
implementing that right. 
62. Id. Annex 7, art. II, § 1, 35 I.L.M. at 138. Responding to a very specific concern, the 
same article also bars the parties from discriminating in military conscription and even re-
quires them to “give positive consideration to requests for exemption from military or other 
obligatory service based on individual circumstances . . . .” Id. Annex 7, art. II, § 2, 35 I.L.M. 
at 138. A subsequent article establishes an amnesty for all crimes unrelated to the conflict 
committed since January 1, 1991. See id, Annex 7, art. VI, 35 I.L.M. at 138. 
63. Id. Annex 7, art. XI, 35 I.L.M. at 139. 
64. Property Commission, The Commission for Real Property Claims, supra note 9. 
65. See GFAP, supra note 4, Annex 7, art. XI, § 1, 35 I.L.M. at 139. The commission may 
also delegate other agencies to conduct such investigations. See id. 
66. See GFAP, supra note 4, Annex 7, art. XI, § 4, 35 I.L.M. at 139. 
67. See id. Annex 7, art. XI, § 5, 35 I.L.M. at 139. 
68. See id. Annex 7, art. XI, § 7, 35 I.L.M. at 139. However, “Annex 7 . . . contains no de-
tailed provisions regarding the execution and enforcement of such decisions. This may prove 
to be a serious obstacle to the work of the Commission, and may undermine not only the 
credibility of the Commission, but also the peace process as a whole.” Popović, supra note 8, 
at 155.  
69. GFAP, supra note 4, Annex 7, art. XV, 35 I.L.M. at 140. 
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The Commission will seek to restore rather than replace do-
mestic legal institutions. Wherever possible, the Commission 
will seek to have its decisions enforced by domestic institu-
tions, but will co-ordinate with other international institutions 
to apply international pressure where these domestic mecha-
nisms fail.70
F. Summary 
The picture that emerges from the Dayton Accords provisions is 
of a highly confederal state, with the bare minimum of authority 
and sovereignty at the center, and the concomitant maximum of 
power and autonomy at the entity and cantonal levels—the very 
levels that correspond to the ethnic and military division of the 
country. Counterbalancing this, however, are explicit and extensive 
guarantees for individual human rights and equally explicit rejec-
tions of any exclusion or discrimination on the basis of those very 
characteristics by which the population was divided during the war. 
One of the most significant features of the Dayton Accords is that 
they create institutional monitoring and implementing mechanisms 
of considerable scope and power. It is not merely a hortatory docu-
ment or one that creates a tiny straw commission to deal with a 
global problem. The Property Commission, for example, is assigned 
a specific and highly intrusive mandate dealing with property. In 
addition, the Accords introduce other institutional bodies, such as 
the Office of the High Representative (OHR),71 the Human Rights 
Chamber and the Ombudsman,72 and the International Police Task 
Force;73 intergovernmental organizations such as UNHCR and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are 
given specific and broad-reaching mandates to involve themselves 
in activities closely related to refugee returns and human rights is-
sues;74 and the parties themselves are enjoined to create or partici-
pate in other independent bodies with important monitoring and 
adjudicative functions. 
The whole effect is to move radically beyond the demands of 
such instruments as the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, which proclaims more rights than it founds mechanisms. 
 
                                                                                                              
70. Property Commission, Report to Donors on Operations: 1 April 1996 to 30 November 
1996 (information sheet issued by the Property Commission) (undated). See also Property 
Commission, Joint Inter-Agency Appeal for the Year Ending 31 December 1997 (information 
sheet issued by the Property Commission) (undated). 
71. See GFAP, supra note 4, Annex 10, 35 I.L.M. at 146. 
72. See id. Annex 6, arts. II-XII, 35 I.L.M. at 131–34. 
73. See id. Annex 11, 35 I.L.M. at 149. 
74. See, e.g., id. Annex 6, art. XIII, 35 I.L.M. at 135. 
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There is perhaps no state in the world more closely linked to the 
web of international instruments guaranteeing various human 
rights, nor any state required to institutionalize those rights to a 
greater degree, nor any that must give greater access to the interna-
tional community to ensure the realization of those rights. 
This is the formal framework, created by the United States75 and 
acceded to by the governments of the various ethnic communities. 
It may be fairly understood as a comprehensive and radical vision 
for the future of Bosnia as an integral society. It is both a promise 
and a blueprint for the realization of that promise. The laws prom-
ulgated by those governments, however, and their operation as ex-
pressions of ethnically exclusive standards, mean that the reality on 
the ground in Bosnia hardly reflects that vision. The promise of 
Dayton has been stillborn. 
IV. THE ETHNIC COMMUNITIES’ LAWS AND PRACTICE 
DEALING WITH ABANDONED PROPERTY 
All three communities—Serbs, Croats, and Muslims—
incorporated large parts of the legal structure developed under 
Communist Yugoslavia into their new legal systems. Property law, 
however, was subject to broad-reaching revision from the very start. 
Control of property—of territory—was fundamental to the political 
and military aims of all three sides, and consequently all three 
sought to solidify their military gains and stabilize their new ethnic 
states with reformed property laws that institutionalized ethnic 
preference, though in tacit fashion. 
One of the unique forms of property that all the sections of the 
former Yugoslavia, including all three of the communities in Bos-
nia, inherited was the occupancy right. This form of property is of 
particular importance in contemporary Bosnia. Relatively few prin-
cipal dwellings in the former Yugoslavia were privately owned; the 
majority were owned by state corporations or enterprises, which 
granted rights of occupancy and use to employees or members of 
certain categories of citizens.76 In the late Yugoslav period, the pri-
 
                                                                                                              
75. See Pajić, The Dayton Constitution, supra note 5, at 188 (noting the “strong American 
influence in drafting the Constitution. . . .”); and Boyd, supra note 5, at 43 (noting that “Day-
ton [is] the centerpiece of U.S. policy. . . .”). 
76. Another report by the OHR describes the right this way:  
The occupancy right, which is greater than a tenancy right and less than full ownership 
must be considered as a sui generis right: the right to quasi-ownership. There is no 
precedent in comparative law or in the practice of international human rights organisa-
tions (notably in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights) on which 
one could rely in order to determine its legal nature. 
 In the official ideology and the legal doctrine of the former Yugoslavia, the occu-
pancy right was conceived as a basic right in the field of housing, which was gradually 
to replace the private property [sic]. It was also protected as such by the Constitution. As 
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vatization of socially owned apartments began, but this process was 
largely halted in Bosnia because of the war. Consequently, though 
the amount of socially owned housing remains uncertain,77 it is 
likely that most of the housing remains socially owned, especially 
in cities. It is unsurprising then that the legal instruments that have 
come in for greatest criticism deal with regulating abandoned so-
cially owned property. 
During the war, the three ethnic groups each had their own politi-
cal and legal institutions in place and operated as sovereign gov-
ernments or as effective appendages of neighboring mother states. 
Dayton was supposed to have reorganized those systems, severing 
the connections with neighboring states and bringing some func-
tions back under the control of a national government, while requir-
ing changes in other functions that remained under sub-national 
institutions. Despite these provisions, the three ethnic groups con-
tinued to implement their own laws well after Bosnia’s national 
institutions had, in theory, begun to function—and therefore, well 
after all authority to pass and implement such laws had been subor-
dinated to the confederated structure. 
The two entities’ main property laws purport to solve the practi-
cal problems facing each entity in finding housing for hundreds of 
thousands of displaced persons, while at the same time protecting 
the original owners’ rights. In practice, however, the laws of both 
entities make permanent the expropriation of the property of those 
who have fled and accelerate the departure of those minorities who 
still remain. 
During the past two years, the various factions have been under 
considerable pressure from the international community to produce 
laws conforming to international, or at least European, norms and 
standards. Both entities’ abandoned property laws were declared 
inconsistent with the principles of the Dayton Accords and were to 
be rewritten in a collaborative effort between the Office of the High 
Representative and the entities.78 New legislation dealing with 
 
                                                                                                              
a consequence, the volume of the privately-owned apartments was negligible when 
compared to the quantity of apartments to which the holders had occupancy rights. 
OHR, Bosnia and Herzegovina Law on Abandoned Apartments: Compliance with the Provi-
sions of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the European Convention on Human Rights 5–6 
[hereinafter Law on Abandoned Apartments: Compliance (RBiH)]. 
77. See Open Society Institute Forced Migrations Project [hereinafter Open Society Inst.], 
Property Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina 14 (Mar. 1996). 
78. See OHR, Opinion of the Legal Adviser to the High Representative, (concerning the 
Law on Abandoned Property of Republika Srpska) (undated) (unofficial translation) (unpagi-
nated) [hereinafter Opinion of the Legal Adviser to the High Representative (RS)], see discus-
sion infra Part II.A; OHR, Opinion of the Legal Adviser to the High Representative (concern-
ing the Law on Abandoned Apartments of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RBiH)) 
2 (undated) [hereinafter Opinion of the Legal Adviser to the High Representative (RBiH)], see 
discussion infra Part II.B. The laws of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna are per se invalid 
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abandoned property was to have been submitted by November 1, 
1996; the Federation passed a new law in early 1998 and Republika 
Srpska in late 1998.79
Following are discussions of the provisions of the principal prop-
erty laws in each of the three domestic systems, with commentary 
relating to specific important provisions. When these provisions 
have been laid out, I will then enumerate the principles found oper-
ating through them. As I will demonstrate, while all three domestic 
laws are generally neutral on their face, as actually applied in the 
context of the Bosnian war and its aftermath, they produce almost 
universally consistent results in favor of the dominant ethnic group, 
and to such a degree that they must be recognized as evidence of a 
constitutional orientation, not merely a pattern of violations. 
A. Republika Srpska Property Law 
The Law on the Use of Abandoned Property, the principal law 
dealing with abandoned property in Republika Srpska, was promul-
gated on February 27, 1996,80 several months after the end of the 
war and the signing of the Dayton Accords. The stated purpose of 
the law is to regulate “the conditions and modes of abandoned 
property utilization with the aim of refugees and displaced persons 
accommodation . . . as well as the protection and preservation of the 
property.”81 The law covers both real and movable property,82 as 
well as “objects of historical, cultural, artistic, and scientific impor-
tance.”83 It does not distinguish between private and socially owned 
property, but seems to apply to both.84
The definition of abandonment of property is rather circular, de-
claring that “the real estate and the movable property which had 
been left by the owners, which has to be proved in any concrete 
 
                                                                                                              
as Herceg-Bosna itself was never recognized and in any event ceased to exist legally after the 
creation of the Federation. See note 47, supra. In this paper, I consider the law of Herceg-
Bosna as well, despite its non-validity in the eyes of the international community, because the 
law continues to be applied in fact. See infra part III.B.2, section on the real property law of 
Herceg-Bosna. 
79. See discussion infra Part IV.A and IV.B.3. 
80. Law on the Use of Abandoned Property, reported in Republika Srpska Official Ga-
zette, year V, no. 3 (Feb. 27, 1996). 
81. Id. art. 1. The sense of the phrase “refugees and displaced persons” does not refer de-
finitively or exclusively to the same persons who have abandoned the property; it can equally 
well refer to other, incoming refugees or displaced persons. 
82. See id. art. 2. 
83. Id. 
84. See OHR, Law on the Use of Abandoned Property: Compliance with the Provisions of 
the General Framework Agreement for Peace and the International Instruments Referred 
Therein (concerning the Republika Srpska Law on the Use of Abandoned Property) 4 (un-
dated) [hereinafter Law on the Use of Abandoned Property: Compliance (RS)]. 
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case by record, during the inventorying and keeping of a file on 
abandoned property.”85 OHR notes that 
The abandoned property under this Law is practically unde-
fined. The definition amounts to say that the abandoned prop-
erty is the property that has been abandoned. No further criteria 
or conditions are set in order to determine or to limit the scope 
of this definition. 
 . . . Such an imprecise, even negligent, manner of regulating 
an issue such as a loss of a vested right . . . infringes directly 
upon one of the most fundamental, generally recognized prin-
ciples of law—the principle of “legal certainty.” This principle 
is an integral part of the legal systems of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina and the Entities.86
Subsequent articles do provide some clarification: persons 
granted use of property under Article 1 may be assigned commer-
cial properties that have not been used for more than thirty days;87 
residential and agricultural properties may be assigned if they have 
been abandoned (or are not in use), without any specified delay.88 
Article 15 lays out the formal list of priorities for the allotment of 
abandoned residential property: 
Abandoned apartments, houses and other abandoned residen-
tial area [sic] shall be handed out exclusively to refugees and 
displaced persons, and persons lacking accommodation owing 
to combat activities, according to the following priorities: 
 
1. families of the killed soldiers 
2. war invalids with physical injuries of category I–IV 
3. war invalids with physical injuries of category V–X 
4. educated staff of which there is a lack in the Republika 
Srpska.89
 
                                                                                                              
85. Law on the Use of Abandoned Property art. 2, reported in Republika Srpska Official 
Gazette, year V, no. 3 (Feb. 27, 1996) (English translation improved). Listing the responsibil-
ity of two separate offices in each community: the local geodetic records office lists aban-
doned private property, while the housing and jobs administration lists abandoned property to 
which the government holds title. Id. art. 7. 
86. See OHR, Law on the Use of Abandoned Property: Compliance (RS), supra note 84, at 
5. 
87. See Law on the Use of Abandoned Property art. 11, reported in Republika Srpska Of-
ficial Gazette, year V, no. 3 (Feb. 27, 1996). 
88. Id. In addition, agricultural lands and open land are subject to additional criteria for 
determining abandonment: the commission may ascertain that agricultural land and other 
land is abandoned if the owner or user has settled at another place; if he has not farmed the 
land; or if he has not paid taxes or fulfilled other unspecified obligations. Id. art. 29. 
89. Law on the Use of Abandoned Property art. 15, reported in Republika Srpska Official 
Gazette, year V, no. 3 (Feb. 27, 1996). Some other articles add modifications to this list: 
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Article 17, dealing with the assignment of space in occupied 
dwellings, is the most criticized provision in the Law. It provides 
that refugees and displaced persons who cannot be accommodated 
in abandoned property be temporarily housed in occupied resi-
dences that have extra space. Under this provision, each person in 
residence is accorded the right to use of 15 square meters of space; 
additional space can be expropriated, without compensation, to 
house one additional person for every additional 15 square me-
ters.90 Article 17 accommodations are temporary, “until provision 
of other appropriate accommodation is made.”91
Article 17 does not simply declare that all extra space shall be 
expropriated, however. It employs a priority system that is, if any-
thing, more directed than that in Article 15; it prioritizes the as-
signment of residences “according to the following order: 
—in the apartments and other kinds of accommodations whose 
owners or users have not complied with their military duties or 
work obligations; 
—in the apartments and other kinds of accommodations of 
owners or users whose household members have left the Re-
public; or 
—in other kinds of accommodation in which there is free 
room.”92
Why the Law should establish this system of priorities is not dif-
ficult to see. Most of the abandoned property in predominantly Ser-
bian territory belongs, by title or use, to non-Serbs, while all the 
refugees and displaced persons in that territory are Serbs. As long 
as the real title-holders (or any other non-Serb refugees) are kept 
 
                                                                                                              
Article 13 stipulates that refugees from urban areas be given priority to urban residential 
properties; Article 30 lays out a more detailed priority list for allotment of agricultural prop-
erty which partly follows the priority list for residential property “according to the next pri-
orities: 
1. agricultural households of the killed soldiers of the Republika Srpska 
2. agricultural households having the status of refugees 
3. agricultural households of invalids of the war 
4. other agricultural and non-agricultural households which use them temporarily and 
can work on the abandoned land which will be given in lease” [also, enterprises which 
had rights of usage to presently abandoned residences may receive 30 percent of that 
property to be distributed among their staff, “according to article 15 of this law . . . .”]  
Id. art. 12. 
90. Id. art. 17 (English translation improved). Thus, an 89 square meter house with three 
original inhabitants could receive two additional DP residents: the original three get 15 
square meters each, for a total of 45; this leaves 44—that is two times 15 square meters, with 
14 square meters left over. 
91. Id. art. 17 (English translation improved). 
92. Id. art. 17 (English translation improved). Refusal to accommodate persons in extra 
space can result in fines from 100 to 1000 dinars (roughly 16 to 160 dollars). Id. art. 43. 
26 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 40 
out by other means, then a prima facie neutral priority list can be 
applied without ethnic complications. That is to say, the law itself 
need not be discriminatory or applied in a discriminatory fashion, if 
the essential discriminatory act has preceded it or occurs elsewhere 
in the political or legal sphere. However, when the issue is the ex-
propriation of housing from residents who are still present—and 
there are still a few thousand non-Serb families living in Republika 
Srpska—then ensuring that the brunt of expropriation falls most 
heavily on those non-Serbs can only be achieved by unequal appli-
cation, or by a priority list that has a greater impact on those non-
Serbs. 
The priority list in Article 17 clearly adheres to that latter strategy 
(although unequal application is also employed). Among those who 
have not “complied with their military duties” are many non-Serbs 
who were not allowed to serve in the military as they were deemed 
untrustworthy. “Work obligations,” an ambiguous phrase, surely 
includes, inter alia, mandatory civilian work details to which many 
non-Serbs were subjected, such as trench-digging for military units; 
such work was imposed as an intimidation tactic. The second prior-
ity category, while including some Serbs, is overwhelmingly com-
posed of non-Serbs who left because of the war and the intimida-
tion and terror tactics by Serb authorities and irregular units. 
Articles 39 through 42 deal with the return of the original owner 
or occupancy rightholder. Articles 39 and 40 establish “the right of 
fair compensation” as an alternative to the restoration of the prop-
erty; these provisions “are to be applied on the basis of reciproc-
ity,”93 a term for which no definition is given. Though the text is 
obscure, it has been interpreted as meaning that in the case of a so-
cially owned apartment, the user may not move back in if the pre-
sent occupant is unwilling to move out.94 OHR notes that 
 
                                                                                                              
93. Id. art. 42. 
94. Human Rights Coordination Centre, OHR [hereinafter Hum. Right Coor. Cen.], Prop-
erty Issues: Guidelines for Action 3 (undated). OHR notes that Article 40  
[S]ubjects the right to return to a set of conditions, on which . . . the owner has no influ-
ence. If the real property has been allocated for temporary use, the restoration of the 
property to its owner will be subject to both:  
-willingness of the temporary occupant to leave the property and return to [his] own 
property 
-willingness of the Federation of BH or Republic of Croatia to restore or compensate the 
property to this temporary user. 
These conditions limit substantially the possibility and the right to return and to have 
one’s property restored.  
OHR, Law on the Use of Abandoned Property: Compliance (RS), supra note 84, at 6. Also: 
“Articles 39 and 40 prioritize the rights of the temporary occupant over those of the original 
owner.” OHR, Opinion of the Legal Adviser to the High Representative (RS), supra note 78, 
at 1. 
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Article 40 further prescribes the conditions for the restoration 
of the property to its owner upon his return. If the real property 
is not occupied by a temporary use, it will be restored to its 
owner within fifteen days. On the other hand, if it has been al-
located for temporary use to a person whose property remained 
on the territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or 
the Republic of Croatia, the restoration of the property to its 
owner is foreseen in a longer term:  
 —within 30 days after the temporary user returns to his 
property or apartment 
 —within 60 days from the day of payment to this person of 
the compensation for the property he had deserted and the 
compensation of possible expenditures he had as a user.95
The Law also voids all contracts for “renting, using[,] and guard-
ing abandoned apartments, other premises and property concluded 
after 6 April 1992 between the owners or users who left the territory 
of the Republika Srpska and third parties.”96 However, contracts for 
the exchange of property between the present property-holder and 
the original owner of real property dated before the promulgation of 
the Law remain valid.97
The Law closes with a general exemption of veteran invalids, 
war widows, and war orphans from its provisions98—all categories 
adversely affected by the duty of defending the regime. 
Following increased pressure that the international community 
applied to Republika Srpska throughout 1998,99 coupled with the 
 
                                                                                                              
95. OHR, Law on the Use of Abandoned Property: Compliance (RS), supra note 84, at 2. 
96. Law on the Use of Abandoned Property art. 49, reported in Republika Srpska Official 
Gazette, year V, no. 3 (Feb. 27, 1996). Likewise, property placed in the control of proxies 
after April 6, 1992 (the beginning of the war in Bosnia) by persons who no longer reside in 
the territory of Republika Srpska cannot be alienated (with exceptions for the families of 
soldiers who have been killed, persons who are not military conscripts, and citizens of Re-
publika Srpska who are temporarily working abroad and who have fulfilled their obligations 
towards Republika Srpska). Id. art. 53. Wills concluded after April 6, 1992 are null and void, 
if they transfer property in Republika Srpska to persons not living in Republika Srpska. 
However, this Article shall not prejudice persons who inherit because a family member was a 
combatant killed in the war, or persons who are “citizens of the Republic who are temporarily 
staying abroad as migrant workers and who have fulfilled all their obligations towards the 
Republic.” Id. art. 52 (English translation improved). 
97. Id. art. 51. The contract must have been for property that the present holder owns and 
which was situated on the territory of the Federation or other republics of the former Socialist 
Republic of Yugoslavia—that is to say, not in Republika Srpska. Id. art. 51.  
98. “The provisions of this law are not to be applied to the families of combatants killed in 
the war as well as to the families of war military invalids . . . who had not resolved their 
accommodation status before 6 April 1992 and who, until this law enters into force, have 
resolved their accommodation matters on some kind of legal basis.” Id. art. 61 (English trans-
lation improved). 
99. Western efforts came to the fore when the Peace Implementation Council, the body 
representing the states overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Accords, issued a state-
ment in Luxembourg in June 1998 requiring that Republika Srpska pass new property legisla-
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increased influence the West exerted through the administrations of 
Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, a new property law finally promul-
gated in December 1998.100 To date, there is little evidence about 
implementation of the new law. 
B. Property Law of the Federation Communities 
The following three Sections deal with the laws of the two prin-
cipal communities in the other entity, the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. These laws were promulgated during wartime and, 
despite being declared invalid by organs of the international com-
munity, continued in force during the Dayton period until a new 
Federation property law was promulgated in 1998. I will deal first 
with the provisions and practice of the wartime laws, and then see 
what changes, if any, have come about since the new law was en-
acted. 
1. Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Property Law 
For most of the post-Dayton period, a wartime Republic of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina property statute from 1992 was applied in the 
Muslim areas of the Federation. The Law on Abandoned Apart-
ments was first promulgated in 1992 and frequently amended, with 
a consolidated version being issued on 1 September 1995;101 thus 
the consolidated version appeared before the signing of the Dayton 
Accords but after the point at which a settlement, or a major victory 
for the Croats and Muslims, seemed likely. That version remained 
in force until early 1998. 
 
                                                                                                              
tion by August 31, 1998. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina [hereinafter OSCE], Weekly Report, June 1998 22–28, 1998 (inter-
nal memo to OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, Austria; on file with author). 
100. “The Republika Srpska parliament approved a bill on 2 December that confirms the 
right of former occupants to their homes and gives the government 30 days to respond to 
demands by Muslims and Croats for the return of their apartments and houses. [Republika 
Srpska President Nikola] Poplašen’s Radicals opposed the measure, but legislators belonging 
to Karadžić’s Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) voted for it. SDS spokesmen told AFP that 
they backed the bill as ‘the lesser of two evils’ because it allows Serbian refugees living in 
Muslims’ and Croats’ former homes to appeal their eviction and requires the Bosnian Serb 
government to rehouse them if they lose. The SDS officials added that they feared that the 
international community’s Carlos Westendorp would impose a ‘far worse’ law if the parlia-
ment voted down the draft.” Patrick Moore, Bosnian Serbs Pass Property Laws, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (Dec. 3, 1998) 
<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/12/031298.html>. 
101. Law on Abandoned Apartments, reported in Official Gazette of the Republic of Bos-
nia & Herzegovina no. 6/92, as amended in Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina nos. 8/92, 16/92, 13/94, 36/94, 9/95, and 33/95 (volume numbers and dates not 
available) (unofficial translation by OSCE Human Rights Department) [hereinafter Law on 
Abandoned Apartments, reported in Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia & Herzego-
vina no. 6/92]. 
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The laws promulgated by the Muslim community’s leadership 
during the war had a somewhat different status from those of the 
Croats or Serbs, as they were the laws of the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (RBiH), a government effectively identical to the 
internationally recognized country and government. However, al-
though the government purported to be making laws for the entire 
country, its effective reach was only over Muslim-populated territo-
ries; moreover, its repeated use of exclusionary formulations about 
the “aggressor” necessarily limited their beneficial effect mostly to 
Muslims. 
Article 1 incorporated the occupancy right102 created under laws 
of the Yugoslav period,103 but added a provision that such rights 
would temporarily expire if the holder and his household had aban-
doned the apartment after April 30, 1991.104 Article 2’s definition of 
an abandoned apartment was just as circular as the Republika 
Srpska law’s definition, but also included occupied homes in which 
unlicensed weapons were found or illegal activities were being 
conducted.105
Article 3 provided some illuminating clarification: an apartment 
is not considered abandoned if the rightholder and his household 
“had to leave it due to the aggressor’s compulsion intended to exe-
cute the ethnic cleansing of a population from certain areas or in the 
course of accomplishing the aggressor’s goals[;]” or “if it was de-
 
                                                                                                              
102. Private property and socially owned property are dealt with in separate laws, though 
there is considerable, and ambiguous, overlap. The Decree with the Force of Law on Tempo-
rary [sic] Abandoned Real Property under Private Ownership during the State of War or the 
State of Immediate War Danger, reported in Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina no. 11/93 (Apr. 3, 1998) (unofficial translation by OHR), was the principal 
regulating agent for private property during the war. However, the Law on Abandoned Apart-
ments extended all its provisions to private property as well. “The provisions of this Law are 
also to be accordingly applied to apartments privately owned by citizens.” Law on Aban-
doned Apartments art. 12, Law on Abandoned Apartments, reported in Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 6/92. In addition, several other laws regulate property 
rights in Muslim sections of the country, and there is some inconsistency between the various 
enactments. Open Society Inst., supra note 77, at 5. 
103. The relevant law is the Law on Housing—Consolidated Version, reported in Official 
Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia & Herzegovina nos. 14/85 and 12/87 (volume 
numbers and dates not available), cited in Law on Abandoned Apartments, reported in Offi-
cial Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 6/92. 
104. Law on Abandoned Apartments art. 1, reported in Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 6/92. 
105. Id. art. 2. Presumably, unlicensed weapons and illegal activities would encompass the 
actions of any non-Muslim who had attempted to organize for combat or even home defense 
prior to fleeing. Also: 
Article 2 of the Law further restricts the right to return by failing to designate a fixed 
time period during which apartments may be declared abandoned. As a result, even after 
the Cessation of the State of War, apartments continued to be declared abandoned, de-
spite the fact that the conflict was the basis of the justification for the determination of 
abandonment. 
OHR, Opinion of the Legal Adviser to the High Representative (RBiH), supra note 78, at 2. 
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stroyed, burnt, or in direct jeopardy due to war activities (life-
depriving threat, physical torture, expulsion by the aggressor and 
other similar grounds).”106
These exclusions effectively defined the relevant polity to in-
clude first Muslims, and to a less certain degree, patriotic non-
Muslims (i.e., those non-Muslims who remained in Sarajevo and 
other areas held by the government faction). Many of the military 
exigencies that might force a person from his home would have 
been equally applicable to Croats and Serbs fleeing before military 
operations of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(ABiH—the Muslim forces), but these individuals are perforce ex-
cluded from claiming an exemption under Article 3 because only 
the aggressor’s military operations or acts of ethnic cleansing estab-
lish an exemption, a term presumably not including the ABiH. 
Another condition listed in Article 3 garnered the most criticism 
from the international community: 
An apartment will not be considered as abandoned if the holder 
of the occupancy right [ ] is located on the territory of the Re-
public of BaH [sic] and who, [ ] with members of his/her 
household, commences to use the same apartment within seven 
days after this Law comes into force; or within fifteen days af-
ter this law comes into force, for the holder of the occupancy 
right who is located outside the territory of the Republic of 
BaH [sic].107
Here the rule was framed as an exemption from the rules on 
abandonment; in Article 10, however, the exceptional nature of this 
exemption was made more positive: 
If the holder of an occupancy right cited in Article 1 does not 
commence to use his/her apartment again, in the term cited in 
Article 3 after the date of the Decree on the Cessation of the 
State of War is passed, it is to be considered that he/she has de-
serted his/her apartment permanently. 
 On the day of the expiration of the term cited in paragraph 1 
of this Article the holder of the apartment occupancy right 
loses that right for his/her apartment and that fact will be stated 
by the decision of the competent authority.108
 
                                                                                                              
106. Law on Abandoned Apartments art. 3, reported in Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 6/92 (English translation improved). 
107. Id. art. 3 (English translation improved). 
108. Id. art. 10 (English translation improved). 
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The “Cessation of the State of War” was proclaimed on Decem-
ber 22, 1995, meaning that returns had to occur by December 29 for 
displaced persons, or January 6, 1996 for refugees.109 Thus these 
provisions, added just before the cessation of the war in Bosnia, 
effectively gave several hundred thousand Croat, Serb, and Muslim 
refugees who held occupancy rights to apartments on Muslim-
controlled territory just over two weeks to return to the country 
from abroad (or one week, if they were living across the cease-fire 
line) to reclaim their apartments. At that time, of course, the politi-
cal and military reality prevented this; almost no one was able to 
return in time to claim an occupancy right.110 No hearings were re-
quired; loss of right was automatic and immediate. 
Many Muslims were also effectively stripped of their occupancy 
rights by these provisions; this might seem to belie any direct ethnic 
animus. The argument is more complex, however. First, because the 
law—though promulgated for the entirety of Bosnia—had effect 
only in Muslim-controlled areas, the great majority of those af-
fected were non-Muslims who had fled. Only Muslims who had 
wished to escape the general privations of the war—but not ethnic 
cleansing—would have left from areas under Muslim control; their 
numbers were far fewer. 
More importantly, the beneficiaries of the provision—those dis-
placed persons presently occupying socially owned apartments who 
might be forced to vacate if the owner were to return—were almost 
exclusively Muslims who had stayed throughout the conflict. Thus 
the effect of the provision in Article 3 was to strip almost all Serbs, 
Croats, and “non-patriotic” Muslims, of their occupancy rights, and 
to transfer those same almost exclusively to patriotic Muslims; a 
dual animus—against other ethnicities and against insufficiently 
patriotic Muslims—motivated the exclusion, and the two instances 
of animus are of a piece.111
 
                                                                                                              
109. OHR, Law on Abandoned Apartments: Compliance (RBiH), supra note 76, at 3. 
110. See Hum. Rights Coord. Cen., Information Sheet on the New Federation Property 
and Housing Laws (Apr. 3, 1998) <http://www.ohr.int/property/htm>. 
111. Consider this interpretation:  
Article 10 . . . infringes upon the right of return set forth in Annex 7 (Article I) and An-
nex 4 (Article II § 5) of the GFAP by imposing an arbitrary and discriminatory time pe-
riod in which refugees and displaced persons are required to return and reoccupy their 
apartments . . . . In addition, given that war is itself a temporary state and that the Law in 
question was passed to address the consequences of abandonment in a war-time context, 
permanent loss of property rights (including rights regarding socially owned property) is 
both unjustified and violates the right to property provided for in Article I of Annex 7 
and Articles II(3)(k) and (5) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex 4).  
OHR, Opinion of the Legal Adviser to the High Representative (RBiH), supra note 78, at 1. 
Elsewhere in the same document, however, this interpretation of the problem as one of arbi-
trariness is given over in favor of a more directed animus:  
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The Law then created a new hierarchy of rightholders. First listed 
were “an active combatant against the aggressor as well as . . . a 
person who is left without an apartment due to hostilities.”112 The 
article also noted that apartments distributed through the Ministry 
of Defense were to be given “for temporary use by members of the 
Army of the Republic BiH as well as to members of families of 
combatants who lost their lives in combat against the aggressor on 
the Republic.”113
These rights of occupancy were temporary, but their termination 
depended on the government’s determination that the threat of war 
has ceased. The occupancy right lasted for up to one year after the 
formal cessation of the threat of war,114 which, despite hostilities 
having ended in November 1995, still has not been declared. Any 
loss to the original owner was final:115 “According to the Dayton 
Agreement . . . where the restoration of property is impossible, a 
fair compensation must be provided. The Law on Abandoned 
Apartments, however, d[id] not foresee even such a possibility.”116
2. Herceg-Bosna Property Law 
Laws and Decrees passed by the Croatian community are in a 
somewhat different position than those of the Serbs and the Mus-
lims. The Serbs’ laws have become the recognized law of Repub-
lika Srpska, while the Muslims’ laws have become, for the most 
part, the laws of the Bosnian federal government or the Federation, 
 
                                                                                                              
Under Article 1(3)(a) of Annex 7 [of the GFAP], the parties are required to ‘repeal do-
mestic legislation and administrative practices with discriminatory intent or effect.’ Re-
gardless of the intent which motivated the Law . . . its discriminatory effect in current 
circumstances is evident. The administrative and material burdens implicit in order to 
comply with the provisions of Article 10 . . . present an almost insurmountable barrier to 
return which affects primarily the rights of refugees and displaced persons. In addition, 
the law has frequently been applied in a manner which has a disproportionately harsh 
impact on non-Bosniaks [sic].  
Id. at 2. 
112. Law on Abandoned Apartments art. 7, reported in Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 6/92. 
113. Id. A similar provision in the same article grants priority for Interior Ministry apart-
ments to its employees and to family members of employees who were killed, presumably in 
connection with the war effort, though this is not explicitly stated. 
114. Id. at art. 8. It should be noted that this is not the same as the previously mentioned 
declaration of the state of war. 
115. UNHCR notes 
The BiH property laws, in intent, discriminate against refugees and displaced persons 
who fled their place of origin for reasons other than ethnic cleansing or direct war dam-
age. More than 80,000 apartments in the Sarajevo area have been declared ‘abandoned.’ 
These properties have been either systematically allocated by the authorities to displaced 
persons, members of the ABiH or their families or illegally seized.  
UNHCR, supra note 7, at 5. 
116. OHR, Law on Abandoned Apartments: Compliance (RBiH), supra note 76, at 7. Nor, 
of course, do the other two communities’ laws. 
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though duly ignored on Croatian territory. For their part, the Croats’ 
laws were not recognized by the international community, because 
their entity, the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, is not recog-
nized, having officially dissolved into the American-brokered Fed-
eration.117 Therefore, the nearly identical provisions that the Croat 
law shared with the Muslim law on termination of occupancy rights 
and on the maintenance of new temporary rights under a regime of 
war emergency did not generate the same level of criticism. Indeed, 
there has been almost no analysis of Croat legislation by the rele-
vant international institutions.118 However, the laws and institutions 
of Herceg-Bosna continue to be applied in Croat areas.119
 
                                                                                                              
117. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xxxiv. 
118. And, therefore, the abandoned property legislation of Herceg-Bosna was never re-
viewed on its own merits by OHR. If it were, it would almost certainly be found to be incon-
sistent with Dayton. Cf. Popović, supra note 8, at 152 (“Real property regulations of the 
Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna [sic] represent a flagrant disregard of the GFA inasmuch 
as they practically impede the right of displaced persons to return to their homes. As such, 
they represent a final act of the policy of ethnic cleansing. . . . [T]hese ‘Herzeg-Bosna’ [sic] 
Decrees also violate the ECHR [European Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights].”). 
119. “Although formally dissolved, the self-proclaimed Croatian Republic of Herzeg-
Bosna [sic] continues its existence and functions, including its self-styled legal system. This 
system maintains a comprehensive set of decrees and regulations concerning real property, 
and in particular regarding expropriation and confiscation.” Id. at 151. The regime in Herceg-
Bosna continues to operate and to control the civil administration of its territory, though 
largely as a province of neighboring Croatia. It also maintains its own army, which, on paper, 
is integrated into the Federation forces together with the Muslim Army of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH), but in reality is entirely separate. For a brief discussion of 
the low level of real integration of the Croat and Muslim sections of the Federation, see Ču-
valo, supra note 6, at 48–49 (calling the Muslim-Croat federation one of “the two fundamen-
tal post-Dayton problems”); for a thorough overview of the problematic situation in the early 
Dayton period, see generally Thomas Ambrosio, The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
A Failure of Implementation, in State and Nation Building in East Central Europe: Contem-
porary Perspectives 225–41 (John Micgiel ed., 1996) (identifying the critical elements of 
disjuncture—the division of Mostar, the essentially separate nature of the two national armed 
forces—which remain salient in 1998). 
Indeed, the continuing relevance of Herceg-Bosna is best proven by the continuing efforts 
of the international community to confirm its non-existence: “William Dale Montgomery, the 
U.S. ambassador to Croatia, said in a statement in Zagreb on 16 April [1998] that Croatia 
must help dismantle the Herzegovinian quasi-state of Herceg-Bosna, which continues to exist 
in contravention of the Dayton agreement. ‘We look to the government of Croatia to use its 
influence to see that these parallel institutions are dismantled and that responsibility is ceded 
to the joint Croatian and Muslim federal government in Sarajevo.’” Patrick Moore, U.S. 
Demands End to ‘Herceg-Bosna,’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (Apr. 17, 
1998) <http://www.rferl.org/ newsline/1998/04/170498.html>. 
Compare also this interview with Jacques Klein, Senior Deputy High Representative: 
[Interviewer]. . . . What do you think about the mistake that the Croats did not get their 
own entity in Dayton? 
 
[Klein] Croatia joined the Federation of B&H before Dayton. That is why they do not 
have the right to an entity. They probably are now looking toward Banja Luka asking 
themselves why the Serbs can have their own symbols, flag, etc. I have to point out that 
it would probably have been much easier to work with the Croatian residents in Bosnia 
if they had their own entity and culture. This could even be achieved within the Federa-
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The Decree on Abandoned Apartments was first promulgated 
when the de facto separate Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna 
was still formally a constituent element of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina.120 It was very similar to the Muslim law discussed above, em-
ploying identical language for several articles. These similarities 
nicely highlight the parallel purposes of the two bodies of law, 
which aimed to exclude the return of members of other ethnic 
groups. The generic language can be the same; only the identifica-
tion of “the aggressor” need be changed to create the desired effect. 
Article 1 was nearly identical with that in the Muslim law, extin-
guishing the occupancy right of anyone who abandons his apart-
ment.121 Article 2 gave the same criteria for defining an abandoned 
apartment as the Muslim version: failure of the rightholder or his 
family to use the property; discovery of unlicensed weapons or 
ammunition; or, use of the apartment for illegal activities. It also 
added one criterion not found in the Muslim version: an apartment 
left vacant, without the occupancy right having been acquired or a 
rental contract signed.122
In any event, the list of exemptions was considerably shorter than 
the comparable list in the Muslim law, and notably did not make 
reference to “the aggressor”: “An apartment is not to be considered 
as abandoned if the holder of the occupancy right and members of 
his/her household had to leave due to physical force intended to 
execute ethnic cleansing of a population from certain areas or to 
accomplish other goals[,]”123 or if the property was damaged or the 
 
                                                                                                              
tion of B&H. Croats in Bosnia & Herzegovina have to embrace the international com-
munity and closely cooperate with us because we can influence the necessary changes, 
all in their protection. However, this can only be achieved through cooperation with the 
international community.  
 
[Interviewer] In that sense, have there been any positive moves made in that direction? 
 
[Klein] I think we are on our way. From my talks in Zagreb I have the impression that 
the political leadership is interested in an open and constructive dialogue and coopera-
tion of the B&H Croats with the international community.” 
Jožo Pavović, Lakše bi bilo da su Hrvati dobili svoj entitet (It Would Have Been Easier if the 
Croats Had Been Given Their Own Entity), in VEČERNJI LIST, Jan. 27, 1999, at 7 (author 
trans.). 
120. Decree on Deserted Apartments, reported in National Gazette of the Croat Commu-
nity of Herceg-Bosna no. 13/93, as amended in National Gazette of the Croat Republic of 
Herceg-Bosna no. 5/95 (volume numbers and dates not available) (unofficial translation by 
OHR) [hereinafter Decree on Deserted Apartments, reported in National Gazette of the Croat 
Republic of Herceg-Bosna no. 5/95]. The Herceg-Bosna “para-state” was declared in July 
1992. Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 20, at 6. By the time the decree was amended, 
the community styled itself the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna. 
121. Decree on Deserted Apartments art. 3, reported in National Gazette of the Croat Re-
public of Herceg-Bosna no. 5/95. 
122. Id. at art. 2. This effectively requires non-Croats to have transferred their property to 
a Croat who remains in the area to ensure any chance of reclaiming it later. 
123. Id. 
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rightholder threatened by the war.124 And, in a variant of the most 
severe restriction in the Muslim law, “[a]n apartment will not be 
considered as deserted if the holder of the occupancy right or mem-
bers of his/her household who live with him/her commence[ ] to 
use the same apartment/reoccupies [it] within 7 days after this De-
cree enter[s] into force.”125 As in areas under Muslim control, al-
most no one was able to return in time to reclaim an occupancy 
right; the immediate beneficiaries of that failure to return were al-
most all Croats. 
Article 7 laid out a limited hierarchy of new recipients: Member 
of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO), the ethnic Croat military 
forces, or “other participant in combat against [the] enemy as well 
as to person[ ] who was left without [an] apartment[ ] due to the 
war activities (refugee, expelled person, or displaced person).”126 
As in the Muslim law, new occupancy rights were temporary—but, 
as noted above, most former rightholders have been stripped of 
their rights, so there is no party to raise a claim against the new oc-
cupant.127
3. 1998 Federation Law 
In early 1998, following the successful installation of a new, 
more pro-Dayton leadership in Republika Srpska, the international 
community encouraged the Muslim and Croatian leaderships to 
produce new property laws.128 Negotiations on a new draft had 
been underway for over two years, a process one participant com-
pared to “hitting your head against a wall.”129 Though evidently the 
product of compromises,130 the new Law on the Cessation of the 
Application of the Law on Abandoned Apartments seems to com-
 
                                                                                                              
124. Id. at art. 3. Because the words “the aggressor” are missing here, it is theoretically 
possible that an expelled Muslim or Serb could successfully argue that his occupancy right 
had not been extinguished because he had fled to avoid “physical force intended to execute 
ethnic cleansing of a population from certain areas or to accomplish other goals,” or even 
more compellingly because his house had been destroyed due to war activities of the HVO. 
In practice, of course, this interpretation has not won out. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at art. 7. 
127. Id. at art. 8. 
128. See Patrick Moore, Bosnian Merry-Go-Round, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
Newsline (Feb. 27, 1998) <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/02/270298.html>. 
129. Interview with UNHCR official, in Sarajevo, Fed. BiH (Jan. 1997) (Name and pre-
cise date withheld to protect anonymity of source.). 
130. The International Crisis Group noted 
In response to threatened sanctions in the Sarajevo Declaration, Federation authorities 
did eventually amend the entity’s property legislation in line with the demands of the 
Office of the High Representative (OHR). Although the amendments remove most legal 
obstacles to return, Federation authorities refused to make further reforms, citing the 
failure of Republika Srpska authorities to amend their property laws.  
International Crisis Group, Too Little, Too Late, supra note 19, at Executive Summary. 
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port with the requirements of the international community concern-
ing opportunities for refugees to return and reclaim property rights. 
Although it establishes elaborate claiming procedures, tolerates 
long delays, and allows the ultimate extinction of occupancy rights, 
the Law—together with a law addressing private property and other 
new legislation—does represent, on paper, a significant improve-
ment for members of other ethnic groups trying to reclaim their 
property in hostile territory. 
The new Law, relating to abandoned socially owned property, 
specifically voids both the Muslim Law on Abandoned Apartments 
and the Croat Decree on Abandoned Apartments and bars, in gen-
eral terms, any Federation authorities from making any further dec-
larations of abandonment.131 All decisions taken under those laws 
to terminate occupancy rights are likewise declared void, and any 
new occupancy rights created under those laws are continued only 
until canceled in accordance with the new Law.132
Anyone who abandoned his property after April 30, 1991 is pre-
sumptively held to have the right to return under Annex 7 of the 
GFAP, absent a showing that they abandoned the property for rea-
sons unrelated to the war.133 If the rightholder’s apartment is pres-
ently unoccupied, he may reoccupy it immediately. If it is occupied 
illegally—that is, without color of any of the pre-existing law—he 
may seek an immediate eviction.134 Otherwise, the returning 
rightholder “shall be entitled to claim the repossession of an apart-
ment,”135 and must file a claim for repossession within six months 
of the entry into force of the new Law, or lose his prior right per-
manently.136 Thus, any Annex 7 claimants who fail to file by Octo-
 
                                                                                                              
131. Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Abandoned Apartments art. 1, 
reported in Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina 11/98 (Apr. 3, 1998) 
(unofficial translation by OHR). 
132. Id. at art. 2. 
133. Id. at art. 3. 
134. Also, the authorities are not obliged to provide emergency accommodation for the 
evicted squatter. Id. Such provisions have long been a pretextual justification for local au-
thorities’ refusals to evict squatters in favor of rightholders. 
135. Id. at art. 4. 
136. Id. at art. 5. Furthermore, the claimant must plan to reoccupy the apartment within 
one year, Id. at arts. 4, 12, unless he has good cause, defined to include, inter alia, “well-
founded fear of persecution,” continuing occupation of the apartment following a request for 
eviction by the rightholder, or if “security measures are being applied to the occupancy right 
holder.” Id. at art. 12. 
In parallel fashion, the Law on Taking Over the Law on Housing Relations art. 3, reported 
in Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 11/98 (Apr. 3, 1998) (vol-
ume number not available) (unofficial translation by OHR), amends the Communist-era Law 
on Housing Relations, reported in Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia & 
herzegovina, 14/84, 12/87, and 36/89 (volume number and dates not available), which al-
lowed social housing to be reallocated if it is not used for six months; this new law exempts 
property abandoned during the war from this six-month rule, so long as the rightholder is a 
refugee or displaced person covered under Annex 7. 
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ber 4, 1998 lose their occupancy right.137 This deadline was later 
extended by the High Representative until April 1999.138
Claimants must present documentary evidence to support their 
claim to an occupancy right, such as contracts for exchange, court 
or administrative decisions,139 or “other evidence,” such as utility 
bills or witnesses’ statements.140 In any event, the municipal au-
thorities “shall accept claims whether or not the necessary docu-
mentation is supplied,” confirming the claim through their own inde-
pendent records searches.141
Municipal authorities have to issue a decision within thirty days 
of receiving a claim,142 after which any temporary occupant must 
vacate the apartment within ninety days.143 In “exceptional circum-
stances,” the temporary occupant may stay up to one year, but only 
on presentation of “detailed documentation” of a lack of available 
housing, as determined by the cantonal authorities in accordance 
with the European Convention on Human Rights “and its Proto-
cols.”144 If necessary, eviction of the temporary occupant shall be 
carried out at the request of the rightholder.145 Appeals to the can-
tonal authorities are possible,146 as are appeals to the Property 
Commission.147 Finally, rightholders have the right to purchase 
their apartments, subject to certain residency requirements and lim-
its on alienation.148
The Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Tem-
porarily Abandoned Real Property Owned by Citizens, promulgated 
the same day, applies to private property, and likewise voids the 
previously applicable law.149 This law contains similar provisions, 
save that private property owners may file claims for return at any 
 
                                                                                                              
137. Hum. Rights Coord. Ctr., Property Information Sheet No. 2: How to Claim Repos-
session of Your Apartment (May 11, 1998) <http://www.ohr.int/property/htm>.  
138. See Patrick Moore, Westendorp Extends Deadline on Apartments, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (Sept. 16, 1998) 
<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/09/160998.html>. 
139. Instruction on the Application of Article 4 of the Law on the Cessation of the Appli-
cation of the Law on Abandoned Apartments, Doc. D/02-021-1139/98, § 7 (Federation Min-
istry for Urbanism and Environment, Apr. 30, 1998) <http://www.ohr.int/property.htm>.  
140. Id. § 8. 
141. Id. § 9. 
142. Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Abandoned Apartments art. 6, 
reported in Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina 11/98 (Apr. 3, 1998). 
143. Id. at art. 7. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at art. 11. 
146. Id. at art. 8. 
147. Id. at art. 14. 
148. Id. at art. 15. 
149. Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Temporary [sic] Abandoned 
Real Property Owned by Citizens art. 1, reported in Official Gazette of the Federation of 
Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 11/98 (Apr. 3, 1998). 
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time, without restriction or loss of right;150 procedures for claiming, 
appealing, seeking the eviction of the present occupant, as well as 
for delaying the return of the apartment for up to one year are 
largely the same as in the law on socially owned property.151
In addition to promulgating the provisions themselves, the Fed-
eration authorities are called upon to take full measures for their 
implementation, including “a broad public information campaign” 
and “[e]ffective monitoring of the implementation of the laws.”152
C. Conclusion 
In all, though these laws contain different provisions and differ-
ent political emphasis, they are surprisingly consistent in their 
scope and style. All three laws hew to a formalistically neutral 
drafting, but are rife with provisions revealing their pragmatic pro-
ject, which is to entrench and enforce the ethnic division and hier-
archy that violence engendered. All three are indirect, relying on 
law’s neutrality to maintain distinctions already established by other 
means. And all three act to seal and solemnify, lifting up law’s 
atemporal, universal hand to smooth the rough ground ripped open 
by war. 
V. PRACTICES OF COURTS, MINISTERIAL AND MUNICIPAL 
AUTHORITIES, AND POLICE 
The rhetorical and legislative thrust of the principal property laws 
is compelling enough as evidence of the true constitutional nature 
of the extant regimes; more compelling still is the evidence of how 
the rules of property are actually implemented through the courts, 
administrative organs, and police. The picture that emerges is of a 
legal system still surviving and operating, though reduced in scope 
and replaced by a web of fiat and ethnocentric adjudication; but 
withal, one that consistently comports with an integral legal and 
social vision, however unpalatable, of an ethno-majoritarian state. 
A. The Courts 
One of the most important practical changes that occurred during 
the war with respect to many property cases was the large-scale 
 
                                                                                                              
150. Id. at arts. 4, 11. 
151. Compare Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Temporary [sic] 
Abandoned Real Property Owned by Citizens arts. 7-16, reported in Official Gazette of the 
Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 11/98 (Apr. 3, 1998), with Law on the Cessation of 
the Application of the Law on Abandoned Apartments arts. 3, 4, 7, 8–11, 14, reported in 
Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 11/98 (Apr. 3, 1998). 
152. Hum. Rights Coord. Ctr., Information Sheet on the New Federation Property and 
Housing Laws (Apr. 9, 1998) <http://www.ohr.int/property/htm>. 
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transference of authority from the judiciary to ministry and munici-
pal administrative boards. In all sectors, the judiciary was stripped 
of jurisdiction over abandoned property by legislative acts enacted 
early in the war, with that authority vesting instead in administra-
tive boards.153
There is nonetheless a tentative sense that the courts, having been 
almost totally eclipsed in the war years, are again a source of 
independent (if still ineffective) justice, as evidenced by the 
frequency with which recourse to the courts is sought. For example, 
in the northern Serbian areas, over 4000 cases were filed before the 
Banja Luka court in 1996, far more than in the preceding years; an 
official of the OSCE dealing with property issues estimated that the 
great majority of these are property-related cases.154
 
                                                                                                             
It is still possible to seek restoration of property or clarification 
of title through the courts by relying on older Yugoslav laws or 
other legislation. In predominantly Muslim Vareš, for example, 
some Croats approached the local court seeking restoration of their 
property, after their application was rejected by the local adminis-
trative board, and received favorable judgments.155
The courts, however compromised and delimited in their jurisdic-
tion and practical scope of operation by the prevailing ethnic ortho-
doxy, are probably the one area of official action that has main-
tained some independent base of operation and a philosophical pos-
ture not entirely bent to the ethnic will.156 Those seeking evidence 
of the principles underlying the civilian half of Dayton will find 
proof, however weak, in the courts.157 As I will describe below, the 
 
153. See infra Part V.B. 
154. Interview with OSCE human rights official, in Banja Luka, RS (Jan. 1997) (Name 
and precise date withheld to protect anonymity of source.). Popović states that 70% of all 
cases pending in Banja Luka in 1996 concerned property. Popović, supra note 8, at 142. 
155. In three such cases, dating from late 1996, Croat owners returned to their houses, 
refurbished them, and then were evicted under auspices of the abandoned property act. The 
Croats brought complaints under the Law on Owners’ Relations, a Yugoslav-era law which 
had been confirmed as valid law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The court decided in favor of 
the Croat plaintiffs, ordering the return of their privately owned apartments to them. The 
Croats actually received their former homes. This process had already begun before the cases 
reached the court, and the judge did not believe that the court decisions had affected that 
process one way or the other. In an interview, the judge characterized this development as an 
agreement among politicians to respect private property rights, and noted that other Croats 
had received their property back without approaching the court, because the municipality had 
extra flats available. Interview with judge, in Vareš, Fed. BiH (Jan. 1997); Interview with 
OSCE official, in Vareš, Fed. BiH (Jan. 1997) (Names and precise dates withheld to protect 
anonymity of sources.). 
156. “The courts are more than puppet theater—there was a highly developed legal system 
here, and people don’t want to be considered as barbarians.” Interview with UNHCR officer, 
supra note 129. “The problem isn’t with what comes into this court, but what doesn’t come 
in. I am a judge, but I can’t do anything about bringing a complaint . . . When there is a com-
plaint, I apply the law.” Interview with judge in Vareš, Fed. BiH, supra note 155. 
157. That is, proof of the underlying principles, not the formal rhetoric and rights guaran-
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other principal organs—the municipalities and the police—have not 
demonstrated any reserve at all. Indeed, as the organs most respon-
sible for restricting the courts’ remaining independence to act effec-
tively on non-ethnic principles, they have shown themselves to be 
fully and completely instruments of the new states and the new or-
der. 
B. Ministry and Municipal Officials 
With the near eclipse of the courts, ministries and municipal 
agencies have acquired almost exclusive authority over abandoned 
property. Various commissions are responsible for finding housing, 
for determining the status of property, and for distributing it to dis-
placed persons. In addition, there are numerous ad hoc formations 
to respond to various property-related initiatives from the interna-
tional community. The responsible agencies—most commonly mu-
nicipal-level branches of ministries—are constituted in a variety of 
fashions, and there is no consistency even within ethnic sectors.158 
Indeed, these are the institutions about which the least information 
is available. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that in Repub-
lika Srpska, the commissions have targeted the homes of remaining 
minorities in their search for excess housing space,159 while in the 
Federation, the extremely short timeline for returns has likewise 
been used to target minorities.160
 
                                                                                                              
teed under Dayton itself. The Human Rights Chamber established by the Dayton Accords 
does take cognizance of the European Convention on Human Rights and other international 
conventions in its decisions. Interview with former Human Rights Chamber official, in Cam-
bridge, Mass. (Sept. 1998) (Name and precise date withheld to protect anonymity of source.). 
Nevertheless, I know of no domestic court that is applying the various conventions which are 
made supreme law in Bosnia, and many judges have only the most rudimentary awareness, if 
any, of the human rights or property provisions of Dayton. Interview with judge, in Banja 
Luka, RS (Dec. 1996); Interview with judge, in Doboj, RS (Dec. 1996); Interview with judge 
in Uskoplje/Gornji Vakuf, Fed. BiH (Jan. 1997) (Names and precise dates withheld to protect 
anonymity of sources.); Interview with judge, in Vareš, Fed. BiH, supra note 155. 
158. Each municipality in Republika Srpska, for example, has a Commission for the Re-
settlement of Refugees and the Administration of Abandoned Property, attached to the entity-
level Ministry of Refugees. In the Banja Luka region, property abandonment is determined 
by one of two municipal departments of Republic (entity)-level ministries: the Ministry of 
Urban Planning for socially owned property, and the Republic Administration for Geodetic 
Issues, Cadaster, and Legal and Compensation Issues Concerning Property. 
159. See, e.g., OSCE Doboj Field Office, Weekly Report, Nov. 14, 1996 (internal memo; 
on file with author.) (describing the use of “creeping evictions” employing Article 17 against 
remaining non-Serbs in Doboj and Prnjavor, as well as lack of access to files of the Ministry 
for Refugees and Displaced Persons); OHR, Human Rights Report, May 4–5, 1997 (OHR 
occasional bulletin) (unpaginated) (reporting harassment of Muslims in Teslić by local Serbs 
quartered in their homes under Article 17, with apparent complicity of the local Commission 
on Abandoned Property). 
160. BiH Ombudsman Reports on Vareš Property Case, in OHR, Human Rights Report, 
Apr. 11–12, 1997 (OHR occasional bulletin) (unpaginated) (noting the use of the time limit 
provisions in Article 3 to evict or terminate the occupancy rights of Croats from Muslim-
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The authorities responsible for questions of property do not 
merely utilize existing legal regulations to further an ethnic agenda; 
they also subvert internationally sponsored procedures to which 
they are a party.161
 
                                                                                                              
controlled Vareš). 
161. See, e.g., OSCE Field Office Doboj, Weekly Report, Nov. 21, 1996 (internal memo; 
on file with author). The memo notes that five Muslim-owned houses in the Doboj region of 
Republika Srpska which were destroyed in night-time explosions in a single weekend had all 
been on a list of applicants for return under a program to resettle displaced persons in their 
original homes. The list had been made available to local officials earlier that day. In fact, the 
level of destruction became so extreme, and the targeting of houses so clearly linked to the 
application process to which local officials had access, that the program was canceled after 
only a few weeks. Id. Similar problems occur in other parts of the country as well: 
Arson Attacks against Serb Homes in Drvar: International monitors report that 25 Serb 
homes were damaged by fire in a village outside of Drvar [in Croatian-held territory] 
during the night of 2-3 May, and an additional 25 homes were vandalized (roofs, doors, 
and windows removed). This destruction directly followed a meeting concerning returns 
to Drvar held by Federation Mediator Christian Schwarz-Schilling on 2 May, in which 
local authorities agreed to permit returns on a case-by-case basis.  
OHR, Human Rights Report, May 3-4, 1997 (OHR occasional bulletin) (unpaginated). 
There have also been instances of Croat-owned houses being destroyed in Muslim-
controlled Bugojno and Serb-controlled Prijedor following attempts by the owners to repair 
their houses, and in many other communities throughout the country. 
The following excerpt describes a series of returns to a predominantly Croat area. It is 
typical of situations in which “success” has been claimed by the international community. 
Note, however, how that “success” is minimal, and achieved despite the efforts of local offi-
cials—all the supporting officials in this instance belong to canton- or entity-level offices 
controlled by Muslims, while the local officials are all Croats:  
In Prozor-Rama, despite the fact that opposition to minority returns remains strong, the 
pace of returns has been increasing since the beginning of the year. UNHCR estimates 
that, between January and May 1998, 89 Bosniacs returned to Prozor-Rama, and that 
since then more than 50 Bosniac heads of household have returned. 
 In March 1998, the Prozor-Rama authorities came under heavy international pressure 
to submit a list of villages to which return could begin immediately as part of the can-
tonal plan for return. Reluctantly, the municipality complied . . . . 
 Bosniac returns began in April 1998 from Bugojno and Konjić to the village of Here 
. . . The Prozor-Rama municipal authorities called the return “illegal,” arguing, wrongly, 
that each individual returnee had to be accepted for return in advance by the Municipal 
Returns Office (MRO). 
 Despite these objections, some 40 Bosniac heads of family returned. SFOR units in 
the area report that reconstruction is proceeding slowly and that most Bosniac families 
are not living in the village full-time. Returnees have encountered occasional harass-
ment, but there have been no serious incidents.  
 On 28 May, more than 170 Bosniacs from Bugojno, Konjić and Jablanica visited Pro-
zor-Rama town. 40 heads of families remained in their homes overnight. The return, 
which proceeded without obstruction, was supported by the Federal Ministry for Social 
Affairs, Refugees and Displaced Persons, which brought in 12 trucks of building mate-
rials, food, and basic supplies for the returnees.  
 In June there were also returns outside the return plan to the village of Borovnica, 
where 50 people were working on their houses on a daily basis. While ten stayed over-
night in three houses to do repairs, the rest commuted from Bugojno. Bosniac returns 
will likely continue throughout the summer as families join heads of household who 
have already returned. Bosniac returnees are well-organised and supported by Bosniac 
officials at local, cantonal and federal levels. 
International Crisis Group, The Western Gate of Central Bosnia: The Politics of Return in 
Bugojno and Prozor-Rama, section entitled Prozor-Rama (July 31, 1998) 
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These commissions demonstrate considerably less respect for the 
notion of the rule of law than do the courts.162 There is little oppor-
tunity for review or for transparency in the decision-making proc-
ess.163 Most importantly, the anecdotal evidence suggests that their 
 
                                                                                                              
<http://www.crisisweb.org>. Note also how low a threshold is required in order for a “return” 
to be counted as such, which suggests that the “real” level of returns is in fact far lower than 
even present estimates acknowledge. 
162. The following is an extract from a complaint filed with an OSCE office by a Croat 
couple seeking to have their house restored to their use (names have been omitted or replaced 
with letters), which demonstrates the practical operations of municipal authorities in cases 
involving remaining minorities and displaced persons; it also suggests the limited role of the 
courts:  
Summary: . . . The Xs own a house in Doboj and some property nearby. In July 1994 a 
refugee couple S began to use the upper floor of the house, apparently per a decision is-
sued by the municipality. 
 On 11 September 1995, a second refugee family T occupied part of the first floor; the 
Xs retained use of 1 1/2 rooms, including a 9 meter2 room and part of a 16 meter2 room. 
On the following day, the Ts forbade further use of the larger room; T threatened the Xs 
with a gun. T also asked that they sell him their car for 200 DM; the Xs gave the car as a 
gift, and signed a contract to that effect. That same evening, a soldier, R, came into their 
room and forced them to sit down. The husband was called out of the room . . . and in 
his absence, the soldier mistreated and raped Mrs. X. After the rape, the Xs left the 
house, and have not returned since. They have been living in one room at the husband’s 
sister’s apartment since 15 September 1995. 
 . . . The S family living upstairs had a certificate authorizing them to share the upper 
floor—the Xs say they saw this certificate, but were not given a copy or any other 
documentation. They also report that, after they left their apartment, the Ss got a new 
certificate to have exclusive use of the upper floor as abandoned property. 
 The T family showed some form of document on 11 September 1995, but the Xs re-
ceived no copy; they believe that the document authorized the Ts to use one room, but 
added that they saw it for too short a time and were in shock at the arrival of the Ts, who 
came accompanied by six other people, including soldiers. 
 The Xs have twice requested some form of documentation from the Geodetic Minis-
try and the MRDP [Ministry for Refugees and Displaced Persons] regarding the status 
of their house and of the refugees living in it. At the end of October 1995, the Xs asked 
orally, and on 23 November in writing. On 24 November 1995 they received an answer 
to their oral request, showing that five members of the Ts had been awarded use of an-
other house on 15 March 1995 (document [number deleted]). However, in May 1996, 
they were given, from an anonymous source, a copy of another decision which gave the 
Ts use of their house as abandoned property and dated 4 October 1995. This second 
document is apparently forged and backdated, as it bears the exact same document ID 
([number deleted]) as the original decision from March 1995, and is dated one week be-
fore T, the husband, died at the front. 
 The Xs applied to the court on 1 December 1995 . . . and had their first hearing on 29 
December . . . . A second hearing was scheduled for 31 May 1996, but was also post-
poned until 5 July 1996. At that hearing, the court decided to ask for a report from the 
MRDP regarding the house. The next hearing, on 15 August 1995, was also postponed, 
and no new date has been set. 
OSCE, Doboj—Prnjavor Field Office Complaint Log (internal memo, undated, probably 
December 1996). 
163. Consider this comment on the RS procedures for determining abandonment of prop-
erty:  
No standards are articulated for the determination of abandonment; Article 2 of the Law 
provides for this determination on a case-by-case basis. Additionally, the Law does not 
specify parameters for adjudication of decisions, nor identifies a competent authority. 
The lack of clarity on the procedures for implementation of the Law leaves significant 
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decisions are far more consistent in their ethnic alignment than are 
the courts’.164 This hardly seems surprising, given the more recent 
provenance of these commissions, created as they were during the 
war crisis with the specific purpose of dealing with property prob-
lems, which reflect the state of ethnic relations. 
C. The Police Forces 
Of all the government organs involved in civilian affairs, the 
most severely and consistently ethno-national in focus and practice 
are the police forces. Their role in the disposition of property, while 
theoretically only to implement other institutions’ decisions, is in 
practice the most decisive, since they are the engine by which fur-
ther cleansing occurs, through evictions, and also the principal bar-
rier to implementation of decisions that would comply with the 
provisions of Dayton.165
 
                                                                                                              
room for arbitrary or discriminatory interpretation; we have received reports that the law 
has been applied in a manner which has a disproportionately harsh impact on non-Serbs. 
OHR, Opinion of the Legal Adviser to the High Representative (RS), supra note 78. 
164. Consider, for example, the following reports. 
Laws passed in both the Federation and Republika Srpska during the war to deal with 
abandoned property have been amended and enforced in a way that seems to deny peo-
ple the ability to return to the homes they lived in before the war. Local authorities 
sometimes wrongfully enforce the laws and other regulations in a discriminatory or arbi-
trary way—often deciding in favor of a particular group, based on ethnicity or legal 
status (e.g., war veteran, displaced person, etc.). As a result, many returning refugees 
find themselves unable to re-enter their pre-war homes, and other persons are under 
threat of eviction.  
Hum. Rights Coord. Cen., Property Issues: Guidelines for Action, supra note 94, at 1.  
Senior Officials in Republika Srpska publicly state that there can not be return and there 
will be no return of Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats to their territory. There can be no re-
turn because of the large number of displaced persons occupying every available dwell-
ing. There will be no return until Serbs from the Krajina can return to Croatia. These 
sentiments are echoed by most local officials.  
UNHCR, supra note 7, at 1.  
Evictions of Bosniaks [sic] from their apartments continue in [Croat] West Mostar, even 
for some who have legal proof of ownership, and there is no legal redress. ‘I have never 
heard of an expelled person going to the court,’ said an EU housing official. ‘People are 
simply too afraid to make complaints. The legal system does not exist here. We hoped to 
find a judge or lawyer to work with us but no one wanted the job.’ Croats with money or 
political power, or those designated as war heroes, are awarded temporary permits for 
flats that they are not even living in, effectively preventing the return of Bosniaks [sic]. 
Diane Paul, High Noon: The Good Sheriff has Been Run Out of Town, War Report (May 
1996), at 7. The picture is somewhat more mixed in Muslim areas; see, e.g., UNHCR, supra 
note 7, at 2 (“In Bosniac (ABiH) controlled territory there is more tolerance for return in 
certain municipalities; in others, there is resistance.”); see also infra notes 168–172 and ac-
companying text. 
165. Local police frequently stand by passively when orchestrated mob violence intimi-
dates returnees. This report from predominantly Croat Jajce in 1997 is atypical only in that it 
occurred in the context of what international officials have claimed as a “successful” return 
operation:  
 Returns accelerated . . . as returnees heard that the security situation was stable and 
that SFOR was registering returnees . . . . On 1 August 1997, the illusion of security was 
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The police in each entity166 are the sole recognized enforcement 
arm for both the municipality and the judiciary. In practice, the po-
lice operate largely independently of the judiciary, neither carrying 
out court-ordered evictions nor actively protecting minorities in the 
their homes.167 There are also many instances of policemen ille-
gally evicting individuals, as well as evictions by paramilitaries, or 
secretive groupings within the police and military.168 According to 
one estimate, seventy percent of human rights violations in Bosnia 
are committed by the various police forces.169
With a few internationally enforced exceptions,170 the various po-
lice forces are monoethnic: “[in the Federation] recruitment into 
 
                                                                                                              
shattered. Crowds, witnessed passively by Croat police, gathered at several road junc-
tions. Over the next several days, mobs threatened Bosniac villages, attacked several re-
turnees, and intimidated the rest, almost all of whom were evacuated.  
 International agencies were quick to respond to the violence . . . A month after the 
August violence, IPTF published a report that described the police response as “wholly 
inadequate and in some instances deliberately negligent”. The report also found that: 
“Bosnian Croat officials themselves acknowledged that the demonstrations were being 
directed by the local Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] party organisation . . . . 
 Nonetheless, the response to the Jajce evictions provides an important model for fu-
ture such incidents. The combination of high-level and immediate political intervention, 
active military steps to recreate a secure environment, and a definitive investigation by 
IPTF, succeeded in restarting the return process. The high-level attention devoted to 
central Bosnia after the evictions contributed to broader progress in the Middle Bosnia 
Canton.  
International Crisis Group, A Tale of Two Cities: Return of Displaced Persons to Jajce and 
Travnik, sections 2.1.1. entitled Uncertain Return, and 2.1.2. entitled Responding to Violence 
(June 3, 1998) <http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/bosnia/reports/bh34main.htm> (citations 
omitted). This was, as noted, a “successful” instance—indeed, one quarter of all cross-ethnic 
returns have occurred in this one municipality alone. Id. In most cases attempted returns are 
generally reversed by such violent action. 
166. Control of the police is at the entity, not municipal, level. 
167. One human rights officer with OSCE noted that while the process in court works in a 
fairly correct fashion; it is during the execution of evictions, by the police, that the system 
fails to work according to its stated goals. Interview with OSCE human rights officer, supra 
note 154. 
OHR reports similar problems: 
Minority Reinstatements Blocked in Banja Luka: International organisations have been 
intervening with the RS authorities concerning their failure to enforce court decisions 
providing for the reinstatement of some 11 minority families to their homes in Banja 
Luka in the past week. Twenty-nine of the approximately 300 minority families that had 
been forcibly evicted from their homes during the war but have remained in the Banja 
Luka area have received favourable decisions from the court to be reinstated into their 
homes. However, the reinstatements of the first 11 families that were scheduled for this 
month could not be carried out due to the police’s failure to show up. International ob-
servers note that in a number of these cases, the current occupants of the properties are 
RS police officers and their families. 
OHR, Human Rights Report, Apr. 11–12, 1997, supra note 160. 
168. For an example of the influence of paramilitary cells in Republika Srpska, see Hu-
man Rights Watch, The Continuing Influence of Bosnia’s Warlords (Dec. 1996). 
169. A Precarious Peace, in Survey of the Balkans: A Ghost of a Chance (special section), 
Economist, Jan. 24, 1998, at 8. 
170. The strategically located town of Brčko, the most contested piece of territory in the 
post-Dayton environment, is under a special international administration and has an inte-
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local police forces is along ethnic, or majority, lines: Croat police 
constitute the vast majority of units in HVO controlled areas and 
Bosniacs in ABiH controlled areas.”171 Although corruption and a 
praetorian sensibility are widespread among the police forces, af-
fecting both minority and majority peoples alike, there is a layer of 
ethnic animus to the actions of the police that transcends, or at least 
operates independently from, other ethnically neutral principles. 
The Mostar-based Ombudsman, while noting the problem of ex-
treme corruption, nonetheless feels that the police treat two parties 
to a conflict who are of the same ethnicity normally, and does not 
consider such cases as matters for his office. The problems his of-
fice deals with concern Croat property in the East, and Muslim 
property in the West—that is to say, inter-ethnic property disputes. 
Intra-ethnic disputes “are something the court takes care of; this 
office perhaps just asks them to speed it up.”172
D. Practice under the New Federation Property Laws 
There is less evidence of judicial and administrative practice un-
der the new Federation laws. However, one report from June 1998 
noted that “adherence to the [new property] laws is problematic 
throughout the Federation,” and cited illegal summoning of claim-
ants to administrative hearings, the charging of fees, delays in issu-
ing decisions, and “problems with getting the authorities to accept 
and process claims,” as well as a “[l]ack of awareness of the laws 
[being] reported from various areas of the country.”173
The example of Sarajevo canton is instructive. Despite being the 
recipient of tremendous amounts of money and the focus of most 
international efforts this year, Sarajevo remains an almost wholly 
Muslim city (though it is at the same time one of the most inte-
grated cities in the country). In February 1998, the international 
community had called for 20,000 minority returns to Sarajevo in 
 
                                                                                                              
grated police force; a similar regime operates to some degree in Mostar, which spent several 
years under European Union administration. 
171. UNHCR, supra note 7, at 4. 
172. Interview with Sefket Hadžihasanović, Federation Ombudsman, supra note 24. 
173. OSCE, Weekly Report, June 22–28, 1998, supra note 99; see also International Crisis 
Group, Too Little, Too Late, section 4.2 entitled Refusal to Accept Proper Claims, supra note 
19: 
Claim forms were printed in newspapers, for wider distribution, at the expense of the 
OHR and in co-operation with UNHCR and other organisations, yet some housing offi-
cials have illegally refused to accept these copies. Some have, incorrectly, required that 
occupancy-rights holders reclaim their property in person, rejecting claims submitted on 
behalf of others. Some housing officials have also refused claims unless accompanied 
by certain documents, even though none are required by law, and potential returnees 
from Republika Srpska have been required to submit documentation to which they do 
not have access. 
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1998, but by July, “[Sarajevo] city authorities ha[d] processed only 
600 out of 7,000 requests by former residents of Sarajevo to return 
to their old homes . . . [,]”174 and only 859 had actually returned;175 
by the end of the year, the United States and the European Union 
even suspended their aid to Sarajevo’s municipal government be-
cause it had “failed to even approach the target of 20,000 minority 
returns in 1998.”176 Observers placed the blame on the shoulders of 
recalcitrant domestic officials.177
Elsewhere in the Federation, the situation has been, if anything, 
less favorable to refugee returns. Local officials often openly refuse 
to initiate evictions of illegal occupants, making it difficult for re-
turnees to reoccupy their homes;178 in so doing, they continue to 
raise issues of reciprocity in returns.179 As for Republika Srpska: it 
 
                                                                                                              
174. Patrick Moore, Westendorp Decrees Privatization Law, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty Newsline (July 23, 1998) <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/07/230798.html>. 
175. See 16 July 1998, Bosnia: EU, US Aid to Sarajevo Suspended over Delay in Non-
Muslims Return, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts, BBC Monitoring Service: 
Central Europe and Balkans (July 16, 1998) (reporting Deputy High Representative Hanns 
Schumacher’s July statement that “so far only 365 Croats, 447 Serbs, and 47 ‘others’ had 
returned”).  
176. Partos, supra note 17, at 43–44. 
177. See, e.g., International Crisis Group, Too Little, Too Late, supra note 19, at Executive 
Summary, (“Sarajevo officials have applied the laws regarding socially owned apartments so 
as to favour Bosniacs who remained in Sarajevo over minorities and even over Bosniacs 
displaced from elsewhere in the country.”). 
178. One report says 
The mayors of some municipalities also bear some responsibility for obstructing evic-
tions. In July 1998, according to international observers, the mayors of Novo Sarajevo, 
Stari Grad, and Novi Grad (all of which are split, with some territory in Republika 
Srpska) declared that illegal occupants would not be evicted unless alternate accommo-
dation could be found. Such a policy flies in the face of the current law which provides 
that pre-war home owners and occupancy right holders have the right to reclaim their 
homes immediately if illegally occupied; they are required to wait for the occupants to 
find alternate accommodation only if the occupants had been lawfully granted occu-
pancy rights.  
Id. at section 5.3, entitled Bodies Responsible for Housing Matters in Sarajevo. 
179. Muslim-majority Konjić is a UNHCR “model city”: one that is ostensibly more will-
ing to receive returning minorities than other municipalities. Despite that status, returns are 
effectively stalled due to municipal officials’ opposition:  
 Of the 101 cases of double occupancy UNHCR presented to the housing department, 
54 could be resolved immediately and would allow for the return of minorities. Housing 
authorities claimed that by the end of May 1998 there had been 31 evictions but, accord-
ing to UNHCR, as of 30 April 1998, there had been only one eviction. By the end of 
May 1998, the housing department could provide UNHCR with written confirmation of 
only ten evictions. 
 The secretary of the housing department has stated that he fears a negative reaction if 
he enforces evictions, and has claimed that he is already viewed as not defending Bosni-
acs . . . . 
 International monitors note that housing officials have raised the bogus issue of recip-
rocal returns, stating that minorities can return to Konjić when Bosniacs displaced in 
Konjić can return to their homes in Croat- and Serb-controlled areas. 
International Crisis Group, The Konjić Conundrum: Why Minorities Have Failed To Return 
To Model Open City, section 2.2.1., entitled Obstruction by the Housing Department and 
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does not have a new property law, and its practice has remained 
consistent. 
VI. THE IMPLIED CONSTITUTION: RULE OF LAW AND 
RULES OF DECISION IN BOSNIA 
There is no question that the legal systems existing in Bosnia to-
day do not operate according to norms generally recognized in 
other industrialized countries, or even in other post-communist 
countries of Eastern Europe. The social dislocation and high levels 
of criminalization that accompanied the war have co-opted or mar-
ginalized much of the former legal system. Nonetheless, the current 
legal systems in Bosnia are informed by norms. These internal legal 
systems, in turn, function far more effectively than the still mori-
bund organs of the international legal system in Bosnia. Bosnia is 
far from being a Rechtsstaat,180 and if one were forced to choose a 
single phrase to describe the state of property rights there, it would 
hardly be “ruled by law.” However, one is not limited to a single 
phrase. The state of property rights in Bosnia is far more nuanced, 
though not necessarily more positive. 
Bosnia is not ruleless. The country has been at peace, however 
uneasily, since late 1995. What is lacking in Bosnia is not the rule 
of law181, but the rule of a particular kind of law that enshrines the 
rights of the individual. 
Definitions of the rule of law vary widely, but most involve pro-
cedural notions of fair, consistent treatment and predictability.182 In 
addition, several definitions share an emphasis on the importance of 
the individual and his or her rights.183 Indeed, many observers con-
 
                                                                                                              
Delays by Other Authorities—Double-Occupancy Cases (June 19, 1998) 
<http://www.crisisweb.org>. 
180. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1/2 EJIL/JEDI 4 (1990) 
(defining Rechtsstaat as a “Rule of Law state”). 
181. The rule of law encompasses norms of fair and equal treatment, not simply correct 
promulgation. I am not referring simply to a “legal enactment” standard, according to which 
the bare fact of procedurally correct enactment of regulations satisfies the requirements of the 
rule of law. Cf. J. Dugard, Human Rights and the South African Legal Order 43 (1978), dis-
cussed in James L. Gibson & Amanda Gouws, Support for the Rule of Law in Emerging 
South African Democracy, 152 Int’l Soc. Sci. J. 173, 176 (1997). 
182. One scholar has argued that 
[s]ome have traced the modern ideal to Aristotle, who equated the Rule of Law with the 
rule of reason; . . . In another famous account—perhaps the most influential of the past 
half-century—Lon L. Fuller argued that the Rule of Law requires publicly promulgated 
rules, laid down in advance, and adherence to at least some natural-law values.  
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (1997) (citation omitted). 
183. “Within the Anglo-American tradition, perhaps the most famous exposition [of the 
rule of law] came from a turn-of-the-century British lawyer, A.V. Dicey, who associated the 
Rule of Law with rights-based liberalism and judicial review of governmental action.” 
Fallon, supra note 182, at 1 (citation omitted); id., at 1–2, n.4 (noting scholars who have 
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sider a notion of rule of law that incorporates individual rights 
fairly uncritically as a good and an end in itself.184 Certainly it is 
both appealing and reassuring to make that linkage, and if that is 
what is meant by rule of law, then it is most assuredly absent in 
Bosnia. “Collectivizing, ethnically based group law” better charac-
terizes the legislation passed during and since the war, although 
almost never is it so explicitly stated. 
In fact, however, what has come to be understood as the rule of 
law in Western academic discourse includes both legal process and 
legal content,185 but the two aspects are analytically unrelated. 
Some elements of the common conception—consistent and neutral 
application, coherence, and transparency—are probably universal 
attributes of any meaningful conception of the rule of law.186 How-
 
                                                                                                              
“identified the rule of law with natural law or respect for transcendental rights”).  
184. See, e.g., Ellen S. Cohn & Susan O. White, Legal Socialization Effect on Democrati-
zation, in 152 Int’l Soc. Sci. J. 151, 153 (1997) (linking liberal democracy to the rule of law 
ideal, and noting the “rigidity of Western liberal legality” and that “the predominantly Anglo-
American/Western model of law under liberal democracy may be too narrow or restrictive to 
be adapted easily to less individualistic, more authoritarian, and more ethnically divided 
traditions”); see also Louis Henkin, Elements of Constitutionalism, in 60 The Review: The 
International Commission of Jurists 11 (1998). 
185. See Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in The Authority of Law: Essays on 
Law and Morality 210, 224 (1979) (distinguishing substantive and formalist conceptions of 
the rule of law).  
Some authors . . . make a distinction between the formal and the material Rechtsstaat. In 
the former the authorities are bound by the rules of positive law, in the latter they . . . are 
also bound by the dictates of justice. In a material Rechtsstaat the rulers must not only 
act according to the law, but the law itself must respect the rules of justice. . . . Unfortu-
nately the notion of the material Rechtsstaat is difficult to apply in practice.  
R.C. van Caenegem, An Historical Introduction to Western Constitutional Law 15 (1995) 
186. See Gibson & Gouws, supra note 181, at 174.  
[L]aw is sovereign over all authority . . . law must be clear and certain in its content and 
accessible and predictable . . . law must be general in its application . . . there exists an 
independent judiciary charged with the interpretation and application of the law to 
which every aggrieved citizen must have a right to access . . . the law must have proce-
dural and ethical content.  
Id. 
Richard Fallon lays out a proposed core description of the rule of law which is mostly pro-
cedural in nature; it identifies 
[T]hree . . . purposes—against which competing definitions or conceptions can be 
tested—[which] appear central. First, the Rule of Law should protect against anarchy 
and the Hobbesian war of all against all. Second, the Rule of Law should allow people 
to plan their affairs with reasonable confidence that they can know in advance the legal 
consequences of various actions. Third, the Rule of Law should guarantee against at 
least some types of official arbitrariness. 
 Against the background of these purposes, leading modern accounts generally empha-
size five elements that constitute the Rule of Law. To the extent that these elements ex-
ist, the Rule of Law is realized. 
 (1) The first element is the capacity of legal rules, standards, or principles to guide 
people in the conduct of their affairs. People must be able to understand the law and 
comply with it. 
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ever, many go beyond these procedural aspects to explicitly incor-
porate substantive values, such as respect for individual rights, into 
the rule of law.187
This willingness to incorporate substantive values into the proce-
dural ideal of the rule of law is part of a larger conceptual and ideo-
logical trend. This trend is a move “away from the Rechtsstaat . . . 
into a society in which social conflict is increasingly met with 
flexible, contextually determined standards and compromises . . . 
[a] turn away from general principles and formal rules into contex-
tually determined equity.”188 This urge is understandable. Valued 
moral and ideological aims can be strengthened and secured by en-
trenching them in legal institutions with their “solemnity of ef-
fects.”189 Critiques based only on procedural grounds risk missing 
strategic opportunities to confront substantive abuses.190 For this 
 
                                                                                                              
 (2) The second element of the Rule of Law is efficacy. The law should actually guide 
people, at least for the most part. In Joseph Raz’s phrase, “people should be ruled by the 
law and obey it.” 
 (3) The third element is stability. The law should be reasonably stable, in order to fa-
cilitate planning and coordinated action over time. 
 (4) The fourth element of the Rule of Law is the supremacy of legal authority. The 
law should rule officials, including judges, as well as ordinary citizens. 
 (5) The final element involves instrumentalities of impartial justice. Courts should be 
available to enforce the law and should employ fair procedures.  
Fallon, supra note 182, 7–9 (citation omitted). The purposes and elements Fallon proposes as 
a core definition may suggest certain substantive values, but they are generally procedural in 
nature. 
187. See Gibson & Gouws, supra note 181, at 173–75 (discussing scholarly efforts to dis-
tinguish South Africa’s legal system as not based on the rule of law because it violated indi-
vidual human rights). 
188. Koskenniemi, supra note 180, at 56. 
189. Stanley Hoffman comments that 
[l]aw has a distinct solemnity of effects: it is a normative instrument that creates rights 
and duties. Consequently, it has a function that is both symbolic and conservative; it en-
shrines, elevates, consecrates the interests or ideas it embodies. We understand, thus, 
why law is an important stake in the contests of nations. What makes international law 
so special a tool for states is this solemnity of effects, rather than the fact that its norms 
express common interests; for this is far too simple: some legal instruments such as 
peace treaties reflect merely the temporary, forced convergence of deeply antagonistic 
policies. A situation of dependence or of superiority that is just a fact of life can be re-
versed through political action, but once it is solemnly cast in legal form, the risks of ac-
tion designed to change the situation are much higher: law is a form of policy that 
changes the stakes, and often “escalates” the intensity, of political contests; it is a con-
straint comparable to force in its effects. 
Stanley Hoffman, The Study of International Law and the Theory of International Relations 
57 Proc. Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 26 (1963). 
190. See Koskenniemi, supra note 180, at 57.  
[I]ssues of contextual justice cannot be solved by the application of ready-made rules or 
principles. Their solution requires venturing into fields such as politics, social and eco-
nomic casuistry which were formally delimited beyond the point at which legal argu-
ment was supposed to stop in order to remain ‘legal.’ . . . Resolutions based on political 
acceptability cannot be made with the kind of certainty post-Enlightenment lawyers 
once hoped to attain. And yet, it is only by their remaining so which will prevent their 
use as apologies for tyranny. 
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reason, the core procedural conception of the rule of law has ex-
panded to include substantive values concerning the dignity of all 
human beings and the maintenance of specific human rights—to the 
point where many commentators take such values to be the very 
core of the rule of law. 
While the incorporation of substantive values into the ideal of the 
rule of law may be attractive, individual values should not be in-
cluded in the core definition of the ideal.191 An application of the 
core procedural attributes of the rule of law to the individual as op-
posed to some other subject is no more necessary to a functioning 
and internally fair legal system than a jury of one’s peers is to a fair 
trial. It is one expression—perhaps the one the Western community 
wishes to favor—but by no means the only possible, logical, or 
even reasonable one. Other forms of legal content—by which I 
mean the subject matter of the law as opposed to its processes—can 
well be envisioned: the state, the nation,192 class or caste, member-
ship in an occupation or guild, religion, race, gender,193 age, 
alienage, or category of sexual orientation.194
 
                                                                                                              
Id. See also note 187, supra, concerning scholars’ efforts to condemn Apartheid-era South 
Africa on explicit “rule of law” grounds incorporating individual rights analysis. 
191. In making this assertion, I obviously identify with conceptions of the rule of law that 
are formalist and procedural, rather than substantive and material. As I have suggested above, 
the procedural aspects of the rule of law are most closely identified with its core definition, 
while substantive aspects, though commonly included, are peripheral to and analytically 
separate from that core definition. Fallon, for example, in attempting a synthesis of various 
conceptions of the rule of law, nonetheless prioritizes the procedural: of his four ideal types 
of the rule of law, three are principally procedural or formalist in essence, and only one sub-
stantive; moreover, his synthesis purposefully places these four in a hierarchy with the sub-
stantive ideal in the last position: 
For at least two reasons, the substantive commitments of a theory of the Rule of Law 
ought to be minimized. First, in light of the persistent fact of moral disagreement, the 
Rule of Law requires a considerable willingness of public officials to “enforce the [posi-
tive] law even when it is in [their] confident opinion unjust, morally wrong, or mis-
guided as a matter of policy.” . . . Second, a pervasively substantive conception of the 
Rule of Law would risk obliteration of the analytically and politically useful distinction 
between the Rule of Law, on the one hand, and a full theory of substantive justice, on 
the other.  
Fallon, supra note 182, at 53–54 (citation omitted). But see id. at 55 (“But a sound theory of 
the Rule of Law, although emphasizing formal over substantive requirements, could not 
wholly exclude substantive content.”). 
192. See Hitler, supra note 2. 
193. American “suspect class” and “quasi-suspect class” analysis, though it does not go to 
core political rights, nonetheless accords meaningfully different legal status to individuals 
wholly based on their membership in racial or gender groups. Likewise, the distinctions made 
between citizens and aliens in American law do not seem understandable solely within the 
context of law focused on the individual—though again, the differences do not extend as 
deeply into the realm of core rights as do the differences in Bosnia. 
194. Even theories of the rule of law that incorporate substantive values, as does Fallon’s, 
do not necessarily require an application to all individuals. Fallon argues 
Perfectly realized, the Rule of Law would be rule (i) in accordance with the originally 
intended and understood meaning of the directives of legitimate, democratically-
accountable lawmaking authorities, (ii) cast in the form of intelligible rules binding on 
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A state under the rule of law is not always an admirable thing, 
nor is it always a benefit to its populace.195 More to the point, a 
state need not accord equal recognition to every individual within 
its ambit to comport with the rule of law. The British judicial tradi-
tion continued to operate throughout the apartheid era in South Af-
rica, generally applying transparent, predictable rule-based law to 
its white citizens, even while its black citizens received wholly dif-
ferent treatment.196 Even Nazi Germany exhibited the essential ele-
ments of a Rechtsstaat, by any reasonable definition of the term.197 
It had clear and codified laws, derived from declared and elaborated 
principles (the Führerprinzip, racial biology, the inherent inferiority 
and threatening nature of the Jew, the distinction between the 
Staatsangehörigen and Reichsbürger,198 the subordination of the 
individual to the Volk) that, in general, were consistently applied.199 
What matters in a system bound by the rule of law is that its sub-
 
                                                                                                              
citizens, governmental officials, and judges alike, (iii) as identified and elucidated in an 
interpretive process guided by publicly accessible norms and characterized by reason-
giving, and (iv) consistent with legitimate public purposes and sound, shared principles 
of political morality. When law, in the positivist sense, fails to satisfy any of these ele-
ments, the Rule of Law is less than completely realized, but still may (or may not) be 
more nearly approximated than it is scorned or abandoned. 
Fallon, supra note 182, at 38. Here the substantive values are revealed in the requirement of 
democratic process and in the “shared principles of public morality.” However, democracy 
may be realized internally, within the confines of a group defined by other, restrictive means. 
Likewise, a requirement concerning “public morality” is silent as to the content of that moral-
ity, requiring only that it be public, or shared. 
195. See Gibson & Gouws, supra note 181, at 173 (“[L]aw can serve repression just as it 
can serve freedom.”); id. at 175 (noting that authoritarianism is not incompatible with the 
rule of law). 
196. Many scholars deny that South Africa exhibited any traces of the rule of law. At-
tempts to distinguish South Africa’s legal system rely, however on the importation of indi-
vidual rights analysis. See Gibson & Gouws, supra note 181, at 177 (outlining the extensive 
efforts by scholars to distinguish South Africa’s legal system).  
[M]ost scholars are in agreement that the apartheid regime in South Africa had little le-
gitimate claim to rule by law. Even where laws were adopted in a procedurally correct 
fashion, they either violated fundamental rights, including the right to be treated equally 
by one’s government, or they extended so much discretion to authorities that power 
could not be exercised in a universal fashion. . . . [O]nly in the most perverse sense 
could the old regime be seen as being constrained by the rule of law.  
Id. (emphasis added). Certainly grants of discretion tend to violate core conceptions of the 
rule of law, but the criticism that the government denied individuals “fundamental rights” or 
failed to “treat equally” simply begs the questions: Who is an individual? Who is a subject of 
the law? 
197. See Gibson & Gouws, supra note 181, at 175 (noting the existence of a “Nazi juris-
prudence”); see generally Bullock, supra note 2 (discussing Nazi legal and political organiza-
tion). But see van Caenegem, supra note 185, at 247 (noting that both the Soviet and Nazi 
regimes “rejected the Rechtsstaat, or rule of law, as no individual could possibly have the 
right to stand up to the state and its ideology . . . .”). 
198. Id. at 289–90. 
199. It might be objected that the Gestapo, the SS, and the Wehrmacht committed many 
horrible acts that not even German law of the time sanctioned. Yet, even if those acts are 
discounted, the deeds executed in full accordance with Nazi law were among the most horri-
ble imaginable. Nor is it a valid objection to say that because international law and norms 
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that its subjects—however they are constituted or selected—be 
treated equally and fairly. The rule of law, as a conceptual ideal, is 
silent as to how to choose those subjects.200
If, then, rule of law is taken to mean a coherent, rational, and 
consistent set of laws equally applied to whoever is a subject before 
the law, then there is at least the core of a Rechtsstaat—however 
twisted, unappealing, and cynical—in all three parts of Bosnia. 
Those who would criticize the human rights records of the regimes 
there have to find a different register in which to lift their voices, a 
different rhetoric with which to lay bare the rotting flesh beneath 
the thin but opaque robes of law. 
 
                                                                                                              
proscribe much of what the Nazis codified, their system cannot be considered one of the rule 
of law. These norms were in part developed (or retroactively discovered) as a response to the 
actions of the Nazi regime, and to its self-evidently successful codification of its actions in 
national law. The international legal order may be treated as universal, but that does not make 
it the sole possessor of any attribute that may be deemed desirable in or necessary to a legal 
order. Indeed, this only proves that what is really meant by “rule of law” is “rule of one kind 
of law”—a humanistic law of and for the individual. The uncomfortable reality is that the 
principles of Nuremberg, and of the post-war human rights regime, only came to have “uni-
versal” authority following the military destruction of the principal opposing ideology. How-
ever noble their aspirations, they remain the fruits of the victors: they are spoils of war.  
200. The example of the antebellum United States shows this point: the United States had 
well developed judicial systems dispensing substantively and procedurally fair justice to 
those citizens included in the polity, while effectively excluding others. It would be inapt to 
say that there was no “rule of law” in that society, imbued as it was with the deepest tradi-
tions of the Anglo-American legal system. When, for example, slavery was abolished, and 
later segregation dismantled, blacks were accorded the same rights that whites already had. It 
was not the case that those rights needed to be created anew because some segment of the 
population had not until that time enjoyed them. The language of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 is illuminating in this regard. Section I provides: “[a]ll citizens of the United States 
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof 
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1982. Thus the Act assumed the existence of these rights in some perfected form and ex-
tended these rights to another group, without making any changes in them. (The Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 was “passed pursuant to the thirteenth amendment and reenacted in 1870 after 
passage of the fourteenth amendment.” Joseph William Singer, Property Law: Rules, Poli-
cies, and Practices 1002 (2d ed. 1997)). A critique of such a system must be formulated on 
substantive, not procedural, grounds. 
An excellent example of this principle is found in a different sphere in contemporary 
America: in the abortion debate. Anti-abortion advocates believe that the fetus is a human 
being and therefore entitled to the rights and protections afforded to all human beings by the 
Constitution. Pro-abortion advocates believe that the fetus is not a human being, and there-
fore not entitled to rights that trump those of women who are indisputably human beings 
protected by the Constitution. See Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes 113–
38 (1990). One strand of pro-abortion thought, however, acknowledges the humanity of the 
fetus but still maintains the social necessity and legal right to abort. This view is more diffi-
cult to reconcile with basic fairness requirements of the rule of law, but seems to operate on a 
principle that balances the rights of one human being—the woman—against those of an-
other—the fetus, and essentially adopts a position similar to the traditional rule of no duty to 
assist. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 47. 
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A. Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law 
If the subjects of law, including individual human beings and 
their rights, cannot be conceptualized on the level of the rule of law, 
where can they be conceptualized? Judgments about whom the law 
shall recognize as its subject are properly made at the constitutional 
level. “Constitutions are often battle grounds for the very societies 
whose most fundamental values they seek to embody. Questions of 
inclusion, exclusion, and legitimacy provide the skirmishes and 
encounters from which the transcendent virtues of identity, liberty, 
and democracy emerge.”201
There is a strong conceptual connection between the idea of a 
constitution—defined as the “fundamental law” of a country “regu-
lating the system of government”202—and the idea of the rule of 
law.203 Both privilege law over politics and commit their subjects to 
continue their social relations within a pre-established framework 
rather than as an open-ended contest.204 Their roles, too, are inter-
twined and complementary: the choice of a system ruled by law is 
surely a constitutional choice, while a constitution itself can be a 
commitment to law’s rule. Yet the two are distinct as well, and one 
may understand the distinction as one of substance and process: a 
 
                                                                                                              
201. Eric Harrold Wunderman, Book Note, 21 Yale J. Int’l L. 243 (1996) (reviewing Con-
stitutionalism, Identity, Difference and Legitimacy (Michael Rosenfeld ed., 1994)). 
202. Stanley de Smith & Rodney Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law 4 
(1998). A constitution may not necessarily literally regulate government: “[P]ossibly in all 
. . . constitutions, there exists a wide difference between the actual state of government and 
the theory. The one results from the other; but still they are different.” William Paley, Moral 
Philosophy, Book VI, ch. vii, in A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution 9 n.1 (1924). Obviously, the actual constitution must be addressed, not the paper 
one. 
203. See Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, Comment on Relationships Between the Human 
Rights Movement and Democratic Government, in International Human Rights in Context 
658, 660 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 1996) (noting the linkages between constitu-
tionalism, democratic governance, and the rule of law); Henkin, supra note 184, at 11 
(“[M]odern prescriptive constitutions reflect and give rise to . . . ‘the rule of law.’”); Louis 
Henkin, The Origins and the Present Interest of the United States Constitution, in The New 
Constitutional Law (International Association of Constitutional Law, Second World Congress 
1991) at 296. Henkin cites a Professor Sokolewicz’s list of  
basic values reflected in the [U.S.] Constitution [which he] commends . . . even to So-
cialist states . . . includ[ing]: The rule of law, not of men; limitations on government, 
and of democracy, even at the expense of efficiency; the separation if not of powers then 
of competence and responsibility; judicial and quasi-judicial implementation of constitu-
tional guarantees; the need to reconcile the permanence and stability of a constitutional 
text with juridical precision in its formulation; and making constitutional amendment 
difficult.  
Id. Fallon, supra note 182, at 24–26 (analyzing the use of various conceptions of the rule of 
law in American constitutional debate). 
204. Consider, for example, Fuller’s assertion that the failure of rule of law in the proce-
dural incarnation he espoused leads to the collapse of the whole legal system and to the dis-
solution of the “bond of reciprocity” between government and citizen: a constitutional conse-
quence. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 33–41 (1964). 
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constitution defines the subjects of a system, while the rule of law 
establishes procedures by which that system treats its subjects. In a 
sense, while the rule of law informs the “how,” only the constitution 
can establish the “who.” 
Constitutions are therefore by their nature politically substantive 
instruments, yet the idea of a constitution does not presume any 
particular political formulation. Instead a constitution can establish 
any form of relation between its choice of subjects. Nonetheless, 
given their close conceptual relationship, it is hardly surprising that 
scholars have also sought to imbue the idea of a constitution with 
particular substantive values analytically distinct from its core con-
ceptions, just as they have done with the rule of law:205
[I]n general, modern prescriptive constitutions reflect and give 
rise to “constitutionalism” and “the rule of law.” Constitution-
alism is nowhere authoritatively defined, but, as commonly 
used, a constitution designed to reflect constitutionalism will 
have common elements, with variations. It declares the sover-
eignty of the people and derives its authority from the will of 
the people.206
Evidently, constitutionalism, whether commonly or authorita-
tively defined, has taken on distinct qualities derived from a par-
ticular liberal and humanistic tradition.207 There is no necessary 
analytical connection, however, between these liberal and democ-
ratic values and the idea of a constitution.208
 
                                                                                                              
205. See Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, Comment on Constitutions and Constitutional-
ism, in International Human Rights in Context supra note 203 at 710, 711.  
Scholars frequently use the term ‘constitutionalism’ to describe a particular genus of 
constitutional system. This fluid term is put to many different uses; there is no consen-
sus over exact content, although most of the scholarly discourse would agree on the core 
meaning. Constitutionalism . . . refers to a constitutional system that falls within the lib-
eral tradition . . . and possesses many characteristics of the democratic state. 
Id.; see also Radhika Coomaraswamy, Uses and Usurpation of Constitutional Ideology, in 
Constitutionalism and Democracy 159, 160 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993) (“[T]he 
term ‘constitutionalism’ will be used broadly, both in its ideological sense and to imply a 
process and style of decision making specific to the genre of constitutions drafted in the 
Anglo-American tradition of jurisprudence.”). 
206. Henkin, supra note 184, at 11–12 (noting also periodic elections and bills of individ-
ual rights as elements of a constitution). 
207. See The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen art. 16 (France 1789), in 
Henkin, supra note 184, at 13 (“[A]ny society in which rights are not guaranteed, or in which 
the separation of powers is not defined, has no constitution.”); id. at 14–19; id. at 21 (identi-
fying respect for individual human rights as integral to constitutionalism); Steiner & Alston, 
supra note 203, at 711 (identifying linkages between constitutionalism and human rights). 
208. Steiner and Alston explain: 
A ‘constitution’ . . . need not follow any particular structure, impose or reflect any par-
ticular political or economic system or ideology, or prescribe any particular form of 
government. It may be democratic or authoritarian, oriented to private property and 
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The use of constitutionalism to refer solely to the liberal constitu-
tional tradition does not necessarily encumber alternative constitu-
tional forms with any negative connotations. If the term constitu-
tionalism is used, however, to implicitly critique or exclude other 
forms as non-constitutional because they do not demonstrate the 
qualities of constitutionalism so defined, it must be recognized as 
an ideologically motivated definitional hijacking.209 Just as with 
their treatment of the rule of law, when scholars include particular 
substantive values deriving from the liberal tradition in the core 
definition of constitutionalism, they “solemnize” those values and 
give to them the imprimatur of neutral truth. At the same time, these 
scholars attain a position from which they can “neutrally” critique 
legal systems that in fact comport with all the procedural elements 
of constitutionalism, but not with the scholars’ own substantive val-
ues. 
Just as with the rule of law, such an approach—whatever advan-
tages it yields in seizing the debate—takes one far from the core 
conception of what is, indeed what can be, encompassed within the 
idea of constitutionalism. If, then, a set of understandings, rules, 
procedures, and practices can be identified that serve to order a so-
ciety in much the same way as a classical, written constitution, then 
those understandings, rules, procedures, and practices should be 
engaged on their own terms. They should be acknowledged for 
what they are: an effective, though unwritten, constitution.210
B. Bosnia’s Rules of Decision 
In this section, I outline the practical norms of Bosnian property 
dispute resolution as evidence of unstated, normative constitutional 
assumptions informing the domestic systems. I refer to these fea-
tures as “rules of decision;” they are descriptive of the extant (legal) 
system of property decision, even in those aspects where they de-
part from comfortably familiar legal principles. 
 
                                                                                                              
markets or to collective ownership and central direction, multi-party or one-party, atten-
tive or not to individual rights, and so on.  
Steiner & Alston, supra note 203, at 710–11. 
209. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 182, at 23 (noting objections to a “substantive ideal” of 
the rule of law that this conception turns the rule of law into a “partisan” ideal). 
210. This is exactly what scholars do in regard to “the exception”—the United Kingdom, 
which has no written constitution. See, e.g., Coomaraswamy, supra note 205.  
There is no document or group of documents called the British constitution. But since 
Britain has a regular system of government, with a complex of rules defining the com-
position, function and interrelationship of the institutions of government, and delineat-
ing the rights and duties of the governed, Britain does have a constitution and a body of 
constitutional law, if these terms are used in a broader sense.  
de Smith & Brazier, supra note 202, at 6. 
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I argue that, taken as a whole, they constitute a kind of legal sys-
tem that, however unpalatable in its substance, does embody the 
necessary elements that the name requires: systematized, rational, 
understandable, predictable, and, to an unfortunate degree, worka-
ble, survivable and able to replicate itself. These are terms to de-
scribe separate societies, separate states; though human rights 
norms are meant to apply universally, a state’s sovereignty has 
never been reduced to a nullity in the calculation, and consequently 
the empirical recognition that some entity is effectively sovereign 
cannot be simply ignored or assumed away.211 It is an open ques-
tion whether, and how, such systems can readily absorb the added 
 
                                                                                                              
211. Cf. Donnelly, supra note 13. It might well be appropriate to discuss theories relating 
state sovereignty and human rights at this juncture, but I will only note them in passing. Even 
if one establishes the elements of an illiberal constitution in Bosnia, it might still be objected 
that international law and human rights have precedence.  
Classical theories of the state system emphasized each state’s autonomy. In the post-war 
period, however, various theories have posited a universal obligation for states to comport 
with international law, in effect limiting their sovereignty. See generally R.B.J. Walker & 
Saul Mendlovitz, Interrogating State Sovereignty, in Contending Sovereignties: Redefining 
Political Community 1 (Walker & Mendlovitz eds., 1990). Most specifically, the modern 
human rights regime is generally acknowledged to trump claims to absolute state sovereignty. 
See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary Interna-
tional Law, 84 Am. J. Int’l L. 866, 869 (1990) quoting the United Nations Charter (“[N]o 
serious scholar still supports the contention that internal human rights are ‘essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state’ and hence insulated from international law.”)  
In the present world there is no doubt that the few rules of generally recognized interna-
tional law must have supremacy over national law. The generally recognized rules of in-
ternational law must have supremacy over national law not only in regard to a new 
world order but also in regard to the modern relationship of states if this relationship 
should be a legal one.  
Felix Ermacora, General Problems of Relations between Constitutional Law and Interna-
tional Law, in The New Constitutional Law, at 270 (International Association of Constitu-
tional Law, Second World Congress, 1991).  
As a matter of theory, this seems indisputable. However, as I shall show, I am posing a 
more practical question: Given that, whatever the preeminence of international legal norms in 
theory, the states that in fact exist are not constitutionally inclined to accept those norms, how 
does one formulate a criticism of and an opposition to those states? Does it make sense to 
formulate one’s criticism within the theoretical framework—that is, to call the state into 
compliance—or outside of it—that is, to oppose the state’s very existence as being antitheti-
cal to the theoretical framework itself? Such an approach does not rely on arguments about 
law and sovereignty, but rather locates its essential critique on the plane of politics and mo-
rality—in much the same way that commentators have suggested that law-based critiques or 
responses to the Nazi regime are completely inapposite.  
In 1948, the British prosecutor at Nuremberg, Sir Hartley Shawcross, dismissed UN de-
liberations on the adoption of the Genocide Convention as a “complete delusion,” stress-
ing that “nobody believed that the existence of a convention . . . would have deterred the 
Nazis or Fascists from committing the atrocious crimes of which they had been guilty.” 
He was of the view that “genocide committed by States was punishable only by war.”  
Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on 
the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 Hum. Rts. Q. 737, 743 (1998) citing Official 
Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly Part I Legal Questions, Summary 
Records of Meetings 21 Sept.–10 Dec. 1948, U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 64th mtg., 
at 17 (1948). 
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terms of Dayton’s human rights regime, or why, in the aftermath of 
their wars of liberation, they would be willing to do so.212
1. Ethno-Patriotic Status 
The Law recognizes not only the legal merits of a case but also 
the legal status of the parties; ethnicity above all else, but also 
patriotic participation in the defense of the State, are defining 
factors in weighing the case. 
The merits of the parties to a dispute shall be considered as much 
as the merits of their cases. This is the core constitutional principle 
of the new ethno-territorial statelets. 
This military and group-oriented preference has conceptual 
antecedents in the antebellum regime.213 Consider the nature of 
socially owned property in the former regime: it was controlled by 
the state or municipality, and distributed to individual members for 
their long-term use, based on their needs and their merit. A baseline 
political acceptability was a prerequisite for getting an apartment, 
just as it was for a job or a position in university.214 It is hardly 
surprising that the successor regimes, only a few years later, operate 
along very much the same lines in distributing property. It is only a 
very small jump to extend those rules to administratively and 
judicially reviewable questions of restoration and compensation, 
and to include ethnicity as a criterion—something the old regime 
only did when it was seeking to ensure political stability and to 
stabilize the ethnic balance.215
The regulations governing distribution of abandoned property in 
all three zones specifically favor veterans and wartime invalids, or 
 
                                                                                                              
212. “How anyone can expect the participants of a vicious, genocidal war to consent to 
and participate in the creation and maintenance of a supposedly civic state is a mystery.” 
George Schöpflin, Yugoslavia and the West: Getting It Wrong, 58 War Report (Feb.-Mar. 
1998), at 19. 
213. See Williams, supra note 13, at 64–66 (discussing the use of the “ethnic key” in dis-
tributing high government positions); Pajić, The Dayton Constitution, supra note 5, at 192 
(“Preoccupation with the rights of ethnic groups reflects the transition from communist to 
nationalist collectivism, where the despotism of the ‘one and only’ ruling party is replaced by 
the despotism of presupposed (ethnic) interests.”). 
214. Interview with attorney, in Doboj, RS, BiH (Dec. 1996) (Name and precise date with-
held to protect anonymity of source.). 
215. Ethnicity was obviously never far from the minds of Yugoslavia’s former leadership, 
as evidenced by its efforts to maintain ethnic parity in the political and industrial leadership. 
These efforts did not affect the common citizenry nearly so much, and at any rate, the goal of 
nationalities policy under Tito was to contain and ultimately deracinate the ethnic issue, at 
least to the degree that it might represent an alternate source of social or political legitimacy 
or authority. See, e.g., Separating History from Myth: An Interview with Ivo Banac, in Why 
Bosnia?, supra note 11, at 142–44. Under the present regimes, contrariwise, the aim is to 
accentuate and give primacy to ethnicity as the ruling principle. 
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their families.216 This might be compared to the discounted loan 
programs available to U.S. veterans, though not favorably; here, the 
stakes are considerably higher, and include advantages in the reso-
lution of disputes before a court—a judicial advantage, not simply 
an administrative benefit or financial incentive. 
The Muslim and Croat governments in particular effectively in-
corporated this mixed ethno-patriotic posture into its legislation. 
Their use of participation in the “patriotic defense” or “the aggres-
sor’s army” as criteria for full political membership, during and 
immediately after a war mobilizing populations around ideals of 
ethnic solidarity, is tantamount to determining the polity along eth-
nic lines; the few exceptions217 only prove the rule. The Serb legis-
lation, being the most consistently ethnic in formulation, is conse-
quently also the least generous to patriotic citizens of other ethnici-
ties. 
The practice of local officials, even in the absence of statutory 
authorization, sometimes reflects the ethno-patriotic sensibility; in 
Odžak, a Croat-controlled territory, for example, “Local authorities 
will permit the return of Bosniacs if they were original inhabitants 
 
                                                                                                              
216. Law on the Use of Abandoned Property art. 15, 30, 52, 61, reported in Republika 
Srpska Official Gazette, year V, no. 3 (Feb. 27, 1996); Law on Abandoned Apartments 
(RBiH), art. 7; Decree on Abandoned Apartments (H-B), art. 8, 11; Decision on Establish-
ment of Basic Criteria for Assignment of Apartments for Use (H-B), art. 1. 
217. The most prominent example is perhaps Dražen Erdemović, an ethnic Croat who 
fought with the Serb forces which occupied Srebrenica and participated in the subsequent 
mass killings. Erdemović was later tried and convicted before the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. See Prosecutor v. Erdemović, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-96-22 (Trial Chamber Judgment Nov. 19, 
1996, Appeals Chamber Judgment remitting for re-sentencing Oct. 7, 1997, Trial Chamber 
Judgment on re-sentencing Mar. 5, 1998) <http://www.un.org/icty/cases.htm>. See also Ak-
havan, supra note 211 at 791. 
In any event, the rule as stated includes the concept of “patriotism,” and indeed each of the 
three laws includes preferences for veterans, which may—and in the case of the Muslims 
actually did on occasion—include members of other ethnic groups. (“The system is designed 
to favor those who remained and defended the country. Criteria include: looking after those 
who stayed and soldiers’ families. Ethnicity is the basis; yet, if you are a Serb who stayed, 
and you walk into the right court, you might do okay. It comes down to who you know . . . . 
If you’re a vet, you’ll do well.” Interview with UNHCR official, in Sarajevo, Fed BiH (Jan. 
1997) (Name and precise date withheld to protect anonymity of source.). This may be seen as 
a partial abrogation of the ethnic thesis; on the other hand, since the “exception” for fighters 
involves an immediate and tangible contribution to the survival of the country, which in turn 
serves the general ethnic good, it is not inconsistent in the larger context. Cf. Boyd, supra 
note 5, at 48 (“Even refugees who return to majority areas are unwelcome, branded as cow-
ards who fled in time of danger.”). 
Nonetheless, even the value of veteran status is limited in the face of consistent application 
of the ethnic logic of the regimes. Even the most multi-ethnic of the three statelets has not 
allowed patriotic service to trump the ethnic hierarchy where it matters most: “the Sarajevo 
government retired most of its top Serbian and Croatian officers following the signing of the 
Dayton agreements at the end of 1995.” Patrick Moore, Bosnian General Says Army Will Be 
Multi-Ethnic, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (Nov. 3, 1997) 
<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/ 11/031197.html>. 
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and particularly if they fought with HVO forces during the con-
flict.”218
There are limits, perhaps most evident in the disposition in court 
of suits for eviction brought by Muslims against Serb tenants in 
Banja Luka, where the court, in the cases it has decided, almost al-
ways rules in favor of the (Muslim) owner.219 Here the less activist 
role of civil law judges comes into play. Existing law is ethnically 
ambiguous on its surface, but clear enough about the path of owner-
ship rights; barring a new law that overtly states this ethno-patriotic 
rule for evictions, judges applying existing law have little choice 
but to conclude in favor of the title owner, regardless of ethnicity. 
When there is no ethnic factor, the courts are much freer to de-
cide according to the written law. The organs of the international 
community, or its fruits, also recognize that the crucial locus of law 
and policy is ethnicity in their formulation of the problems they 
confront. In an interview, for example, the Federation Ombudsman 
in Mostar noted that “when [two disputants] are both Croat or both 
Muslim, it’s a normal process—the police treat them normally . . . 
the court takes care of it [such cases] . . . . This office just perhaps 
asks to expedite the process.” 220
2. Reciprocity 
No member of another ethnic group or entity may receive back 
property presently held by a member of the dominant ethnic 
group, unless that member receives back his own property or 
its equivalent value. 
In general, members of another ethnic group or entity shall not 
receive back property presently held by members of the dominant 
ethnic group until property taken from members of the dominant 
ethnic group in areas held by the other group is returned; this prin-
ciple is not personal, but general. 
This formula, if adopted by all sides, obviously excludes any 
state-sanctioned transactions at all, except perhaps simultaneous 
 
                                                                                                              
218. UNHCR, supra note 7, at 3. This case is mostly unusual for the surprisingly moder-
ate position regarding the return of other ethnic groups; usually, citing “original residence” 
would hardly improve one’s case, as that was the basis for the initial expulsion. In another 
respect, however, the example is not singular: many Muslims and Croats fought alongside 
each other early in the conflict, especially before hostilities broke out between the HVO and 
the ABiH in 1993. 
219. Records of cases followed by the OSCE in the northern half of Republika Srpska 
show that in 43 cases involving Muslim owner-plaintiffs decided in 1996, all but one was 
decided in favor of the owner. Interview with OSCE human rights official, supra note 154. 
220. Interview with Sefket Hadžihasanović, Federation Ombudsman, supra note 24. 
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exchanges. It is certainly at least in part an intellectual ruse, a prin-
ciple adopted simply for the sake of its practical result in forestal-
ling any reform. Indeed, it is valid to ask how meaningful any of 
the parties’ “commitment” to the principle of reciprocity is. Do they 
not in fact merely speak of reciprocity as a way of forestalling any 
returns in practice—that is, do they not really mean, “no returns, 
ever”? 
Perhaps that is true for some politicians—though that would only 
strengthen the finding that there is a core ethno-patriotic logic in 
operation—but there is evidence that many political actors do not in 
fact mean “never,” that, while operating very much in the perceived 
interest of their own ethnic groups, they also conceive of the dis-
pute in terms of equal treatment and reciprocity.221 The degree to 
which administrators and legal professionals really adhere to this 
principle cannot be dismissed; alongside its cynical efficacy, the 
principle of reciprocity carries clear moral weight for many people, 
including many people in power. 
Reciprocity as a legal principle222 is an excellent example of the 
distinction between procedural and substantive rule of law. Nothing 
in the principle of reciprocity offends notions of the rule of law, 
once the substantive focus of rule of law is shifted from the indi-
vidual to the group. In application, reciprocity in a judicial (or ad-
ministrative) setting yields predictable, stable results; contesting 
parties from the same given group will receive equal treatment be-
fore the court. This tends to support the proposition that the recip-
rocity can be a constitutional principle, and not necessarily just the 
name for a set of convenience policies.223
 
                                                                                                              
221. One set of local Serb officials dealing with (Serb) refugee resettlement demonstrated 
the range of reactions: several of the men acknowledged that they would be prepared to allow 
Muslims to return to their homes if and when Serb refugees were all able to return to their 
homes in Croatia, thus freeing up housing stock. Note that the housing in question is already 
“assigned,” and there is no sense that a Muslim/enemy’s claims are actionable until morally 
prior claimants are otherwise satisfied. Another official—the director—declared angrily that 
he would not allow their return, even then. Interviews with local refugee housing officials, in 
Teslić, RS (Dec. 1996) (Names and dates withheld to protect anonymity of source.). The 
largest group of Serb refugees in Bosnia and Yugoslavia were displaced from the Krajina 
region of Croatia in 1995. 
222. “Mutuality. The term is used to denote the relation existing between two states when 
each of them gives the subjects of the other certain privileges, on condition that its own sub-
jects shall enjoy similar privileges at the hands of the latter state. . . .” From Reciprocity, in 
Black’s Law Dictionary 2170 (6th ed. 1990). See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (4th 
ed. 1997) (noting the use of reciprocity in international law and relations.). 
223. See id. (noting the pragmatic application of the principal of reciprocity in discourag-
ing states from always seeking short-term gains, as it acts as “an inducement to states to act 
reasonably and moderate demands in the expectation that this will similarly encourage other 
states to act reasonably and so avoid confrontations”). 
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Reciprocity is declared overtly as a principle of Republika Srpska 
legislation:224
Article 42 conditions the return of the property to its owners, 
on the existence of similar legislation and practice in the other 
entity and in the Republic of Croatia—that is, in the places 
from which Serbs have fled. Accordingly, even if an individual 
Muslim or Croat fulfills all the conditions for reclaiming his 
property, the general rule of reciprocity from Art. 42 can pre-
vent the former owner from repossessing his property.225
The Muslim legislation does not state a principle of reciprocity as 
such, though its practical effect has been much the same. Moreover, 
the ongoing return of several hundred thousand refugees to the 
Muslim sector will surely increase pressure on the government to 
use all available property to house its own core constituency, rather 
than to support the return of any Serbs or Croats until Muslims can 
return to areas under those groups’ control. In their dealings with 
the international community, both the Serb and Muslim authorities 
have consistently argued for a reciprocal approach to returns.226
 
                                                                                                              
224. Law on the Use of Abandoned Property art. 42, reported in Republika Srpska Offi-
cial Gazette, year V, no. 3 (Feb. 27, 1996). 
225. OHR, Law on the Use of Abandoned Property: Compliance (RS), supra note 84, at 7. 
226. A letter to UNHCR from the Republika Srpska Ministry for Refugees and Displaced 
Persons states: 
During the past period, the Republika Srpska has insisted that the parties do not interfere 
in the free and voluntary choice of return locations on the part of refugees and displaced 
persons. 
 The Republika Srpska has been against the practice to force refugees to stay in areas 
of instability and existential uncertainty. 
 The Republika Srpska is against pressures exerted on refugees and displaced persons 
to move to areas which do not provide the basic conditions for a normal life. 
 Therefore, the Republika Srpska and this Ministry have been persistent in the past pe-
riod in the protection of those principles which originate from the general declaration on 
human rights and Annexes 6 and 7 of the Dayton Agreement: 
 Rights cannot be given and realized in the case of one person or one family, if that 
jeopardizes the rights of another person or family. 
Analysis of Annex 7 of the Dayton Agreement: Agreement on refugees and displaced persons 
(Letter no. 01-05-3120/96 from Ljubiša Bladušić, Minister, Republika Srpska Ministry for 
Refugees and Displaced Persons 2 (Oct. 8, 1996) and Letter no. 01-05-3120-1/96 from Lju-
biša Bladušić, Minister, Republika Srpska Ministry for Refugees and Displaced Persons 2 
(Oct. 8, 1996) in UNHCR, supra note 7, attachment). Cf. The Federation’s response on the 
same issue: Noting what it sees as UNHCR’s and other implementing organizations’ failure 
to apply the “same, objective, persistent, even inexorable approach towards the Administra-
tion of the Serb side as they have had towards the Administration of the Federation,” the 
Federation cautions in a letter that these organizations risk “impeding the positive trend of 
returns in the federation of B&H, thus contributing to even greater unbalance in the resolu-
tion of the problems of displaced persons and refugees in the whole territory of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.” The Ministry then calls for  
[b]alance in the organization of return [which] has to be built up by synchronized action 
of the Republic [i.e. Republika Srpska] and Federation Governments . . . The Republic 
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Commenting on Republika Srpska legislation, OHR notes that 
[The i]ntroduction of the principle of reciprocity violates the 
foundations of the GFAP. Firstly, this is a principle known in 
the international law, in application among different states. It is 
unacceptable that two entities of one sovereign state base their 
relations on the principle of reciprocity.227
While it may be true, this statement merely shows that the leader-
ship of Republika Srpska, to the degree that it is thinking in legal 
and not purely instrumental terms, probably does consider itself to 
represent exactly the kind of entity that the OHR acknowledges 
does employ reciprocity: a state. To reply that Republika Srpska, 
Herceg-Bosna, or the Muslim sector standing alone are not states is 
simply to adopt a stance on a politically contested question; it is not 
a position that can be derived from principle alone. 
 
                                                                                                              
and Federation Governments have to agree with UNHCR . . . on the strategy and a strict 
sequence of activities in the procedure of repatriation. 
[This] implementation . . . implies: 
Resume: 
-A Programme of return of displaced persons and refugees needs . . . to be implemented 
simultaneously in an equal manner in the entire territory of B&H. 
-The return of displaced persons and refugees should be scheduled in such chronological 
sequence in which they became refugees and the displaced. 
 . . .  
-To stop the phenomenon of unbalanced practice and approach of various international 
organizations and host countries to the return of displaced persons and refugees by es-
tablishing of a joint strategy.  
Comments and suggestions of compliance/non-compliance with Annex 7 (Letter no. 01-
3559/96 from Ferid Alić, Minister, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Federal Ministry 
for Social Welfare, Displaced Persons and Refugees), Sept. 24, 1996, at 2, in UNHCR, supra 
note 7, attachment. 
Similarly, 
Carlos Westendorp, the international community’s chief representative in Bosnia, re-
jected Muslim leader Alija Izetbegović’s attempt to attach conditions to the [Sarajevo] 
[D]eclaration [calling for the return of 20,000 non-Muslims to Sarajevo]. Izetbegović 
argued that if the Muslims must accept returnees, the Serbs must allow refugees to re-
turn to Banja Luka and the Croats must permit Serbs to come back to Knin. U.S. envoy 
Robert Gelbard threatened to cut off financial aid to Sarajevo if property rights are not 
clarified within two weeks. 
Patrick Moore, Izetbegović Balks at Refugee Returns, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline 
(Feb. 4, 1998) <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/02/040298.html>. 
Even positive comments of return are routinely framed in terms of reciprocity: 
Milorad Dodik and Edhem Bićakčić, prime ministers of Republika Srpska and the Fed-
eration respectively, welcomed the idea of the simultaneous return of refugees. “Only in 
that way can we avoid risks of individual returns, which may be abused by those who 
are ready to exploit people’s misfortunes for their particular political aims,” said Dodik. 
Breaking Bosnia’s Refugee Circle, 5 Transitions 14 (June 1998). 
227. OHR, Law on the Use of Abandoned Property: Compliance (RS), supra note 84, at 7. 
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3. Retroactivity 
Core property rights may be retroactively voided, created, or 
redefined. 
The right to property, defined by the state and devolved to indi-
viduals in the name of the people, exists to advance the welfare of 
the whole society and may therefore be altered to ensure that it con-
tinues to serve that overriding function. 
All of the principal laws affected property rights retroactively.228 
Commenting on the Republika Srpska law, the OHR notes that 
The annulment of contracts has a retroactive effect, depriving 
therefore the persons of their vested rights, acquired under 
existing laws. Once again, this is in obvious contradiction with 
[sic] the generally accepted principle of legal certainty. 
 Furthermore, the retroactive effect of these provisions does 
not only affect the rights of the owner, but equally of the per-
sons who entered the contract with him . . . . [T]he person who 
has taken possession of abandoned real or movable property 
without a decision on the allocation of the property for use will 
be evicted . . . .229
The post hoc nullification of occupancy rights in the Croat and 
Muslim laws has much the same effect.230
Retroactivity, though generally disfavored,231 exists in at least 
some forms, most notably in international law, where it has been 
invoked to defend the validity of the Nuremberg trials; indeed, in 
 
                                                                                                              
228. “‘Retroactive’ or ‘retrospective’ laws are generally defined from a legal viewpoint as 
those which take away or impair vested rights acquired under existing laws, create new obli-
gations, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability in respect to the transactions or consid-
erations already past . . . .” From Retroactive law, in Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 222, 
at 1317. 
A retrospective law has been defined as 
[a] law which looks backward or contemplates the past; one which is made to affect acts 
or facts occurring, or rights accruing, before it came into force. Every statute which 
takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obli-
gation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or 
considerations already past. One that relates back to a previous transaction and gives it a 
different legal effect from that which it had under the law when it occurred. 
From Retrospective law, in Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 222, at 1317–18.  
229. OHR, Law on the Use of Abandoned Property: Compliance (RS), supra note 84, at 8. 
230. Law on Abandoned Apartments art. 1, reported in Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 6/92; Decree on Deserted Apartments art. 1, reported in National 
Gazette of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna no. 5/95. 
231. “[Retroactive] laws may be unenforceable because violative of the ex post facto 
clause of the U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 9, Cl. 3.” Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 184, at 
1317. 
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domestic legal systems, any change in law affects existing rights to 
some degree. Its application is not fundamentally inconsistent with 
the rule of law, although it does offend some favored aspects, such 
as transparency and predictability. 
More to the point, any project of constitutional reform, though 
generally thought of as a prospective exercise, is necessarily a sub-
stantively retrospective intrusion as well. While retroactivity itself 
is not inherently ethnic in focus, it is a necessary adjunct to a con-
stitutional project that seeks to convert a system from an ethnically 
neutral focus232 to an ethnocentric focus. 
4. State Urgency 
Laws concerning a property transaction are not construed in a 
manner that would jeopardize the defense and well-being of the 
State. The definition of “defense and well-being of the State” is 
broadly constructed. 
The present property problems in Bosnia are not only a product 
of the war; they are in part its cause. The parties, and especially the 
Croats and Serbs, having recently conducted a punishing ethno-
territorial war, are not inclined to see their positions eroded from 
within by court decisions ceding territory to their former adversar-
ies;233 moreover, there is no evidence that the judges themselves are 
otherwise inclined. The principle of judicial deference in matters of 
foreign policy and national defense is therefore quite strong, and 
extends to what is normally thought of as a largely domestic mat-
ter—property rights—which in the context of this conflict has been 
thoroughly “internationalized” (at least as between the parties) and 
“militarized.” 
The “States” referred to are not, of course, proper or recognized 
states (except to the degree that the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
 
                                                                                                              
232. Such a formulation does not describe Yugoslavia under Tito with any accuracy ex-
cept by contrast to the present regimes. 
233. Failing, or refusing, to take the domestic perspective into account produces pathways 
of analysis that diverge meaningfully from their internally consistent logic. Consider this 
comment on the Muslim legislation:  
The existence of legislation such as the Law on Abandoned Apartments may only be 
justified by a need to temporarily regulate the direct consequences of the war—to place 
displaced persons in temporarily abandoned apartments, until their resettlement is possi-
ble. There is no need nor ground to permanently deprive a person, whose departure has 
been caused by the war, of the only property right he could acquire under the former re-
gime. In the absence of any legal justification for permanent loss of such property rights, 
the Law is in violation of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR. 
OHR, Law on Abandoned Apartments: Compliance (RBiH), supra note 76, at 7. Presumably 
the actual justification, in the eyes of the legislation’s drafters, was a compelling state inter-
est, or perhaps a compelling national interest. 
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govina234 and the Muslim regime were synonymous during the war 
and remain largely so in the Dayton period): Republika Srpska is an 
officially designated entity of the federal state, while Herceg-Bosna 
is not recognized at all. Nonetheless, it is the domestic perception 
that counts, and these entities definitely consider themselves to be 
states, if only until such time as they can become provinces of their 
neighboring mother countries. Any assessment of their internal dy-
namics and legitimation, including their view of judicial deference 
to the “foreign policy” and defense apparatus, must take account of 
this deeply held domestic perspective. That is, they are de facto 
states. 
Even granted this realistic view of their state-like nature, how-
ever, the notion of judicial deference should not be pushed too far: 
unlike, say, a U.S. court that feels political and moral pressure to 
defer, courts in Bosnia may often feel more direct pressure to re-
frain from perceived involvement in security interests.235
5. Closed Consistency 
As between members of the dominant ethnic group, where there 
are no issues of political loyalty, the courts generally apply the 
law as written and without interference. In these cases, execu-
tion is generally as prescribed in the law. 
This might at first seem a specious formulation: to say that some-
thing is a certain way whenever it is not another way is tautological; 
so too, here, to say that the court shall follow the principle of legal-
ity whenever it is not told not to, seems to be nothing more than to 
say that the principle of legality is not honored. But that is exactly 
the value of this distinction, for the issue is: How often, and how 
much, is it dishonored? Are there clearly identifiable, predictable 
and coherent realms in which the principle will be upheld, and in 
which it will not? Here, the answer is mixed. The ethnic outer limit 
is a clear one: the principle of consistency does not seem to be ap-
plied outside the ethnic group, except by the judiciary in narrow 
 
                                                                                                              
234. Now only “Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 
235. Most reports question the ultimate political independence of the judiciary, and, while 
I have tried to suggest that the judiciary retains more independence than other organs of the 
government, I agree with the consensus view that that independence is deeply compromised. 
One example will suffice: OSCE organized a conference for judges in January 1997, in the 
Muslim town of Tuzla. Not a single Serb or Croat judge attended; the invited Serb judges—
perhaps 50 people—all canceled on the morning of the conference. Reports at the time made 
it clear that the judges had been instructed to decline the invitation. Interview with OSCE 
democratization officer, in Tuzla, RS (Jan. 1997) (name and precise date withheld to protect 
anonymity of source). 
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circumstances. Within the ethnic limit, however—that is to say, in 
disputes between two or more members of the ethnic majority—it is 
entirely possible that the law as written will be applied without 
prejudice. Rule of law cannot be conceptualized with respect to the 
decisions about who shall be its subject; rule of law only applies a 
posteriori to those who, by some other external and pre-existing 
process, have been selected as subjects of the law. 236 This closed 
consistency is a proof of the constitutional nature of the ethno-
territorial principle, not an exception to the rule of law. 
6. Division of Legal and Executive Results 
Except as noted above, execution of judicial judgments is a 
discretionary matter of State policy. 
Despite these various rules and limitations, judges do nonetheless 
apply the written law, much of it inherited from or modeled on the 
former Yugoslav system. Where compelling their findings to con-
form with state policy would be embarrassing or insupportable, the 
preferred policy is simply to delay or refuse execution of the judg-
ment. 
As with the previous rule, it must be asked whether this can pos-
sibly be worked into a framework of legality: Can a government’s 
refusal to heed or carry out its own judiciary’s decisions be called a 
legal rule, or is it not instead the denial of the principle of legality? 
Of course, it is precisely the latter; it seems to be the very defini-
tion of the absence of legal principles. And yet, the courts are not 
entirely subordinated or suppressed; they continue to render judg-
ments. Court judgments retain their declaratory effect, and may be 
given effect at some future date. The independence of the judici-
ary—in the sense that it is at least independent enough to issue de-
cisions that are not craven to political power, even if ineffica-
cious—is one of the classic elements of the rule of law.237 It is a 
particular feature of the legal regime in Bosnia that the courts con-
 
                                                                                                              
236. The ombudsman in Mostar, speaking of the system in Croat West Mostar, noted that 
“it’s a Croat system; it’s good only for the people who are Croats; it was born while the HDZ 
was fighting[;]” he added that the parallel situation obtained in Muslim East Mostar, where 
Croats cannot reclaim property. Interview with Sefket Hadžihasanović, Federation Ombuds-
man, supra note 24. 
237. See Geoff Budlender, Law and Lawlessness in South Africa, in 4 S. Afr. J. Hum. Rts. 
139, 140 (1988) (identifying an independent judiciary as the key element distinguishing rule 
of law from the unrestrained and arbitrary exercise of power); Gibson & Gouws, supra note 
181, at 174 (noting that in a state of law “there exists an independent judiciary charged with 
interpretation and application of the law to which every aggrieved citizen may have a right of 
access . . . ”). 
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tinue to operate, isolated from and alongside the political and ex-
ecutive processes. As one judge in Vareš, a predominantly Muslim 
town, noted, “[b]efore the war, the procedure was the same, but the 
practice different. There is no difference in regulation, only in 
will.”238
C. Constructing the Implied Constitution 
The various factions in Bosnia have been under sustained pres-
sure from the international community to produce legal structures 
that conform to international, or at least European, norms and stan-
dards. Yet this pressure is misguided: the international community 
needs to understand its work as constitutional creation with an 
avowedly political agenda opposed to the present regimes by its 
very nature, and not merely the more effective implementation of 
human rights within the existing order, the nature of which is nearly 
universally contested. 
In fact, the three domestic systems evince a deep, thorough-going 
and consistent commitment to ethno-majoritarian constitutional 
principles; the volatile political situation—specifically the threat of 
forceful intervention by quasi-occupying powers—prevents a too-
open expression of these underlying principles, but they operate 
whenever possible. Thrown into the balance on the other side are 
Annex 4, the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Annex 
6, the Agreement on Human Rights. Their combined weight hardly 
shudders the scales. The point is that the operation of these systems 
does not merely violate certain articles of the Dayton Accords’ hu-
man rights principles; these systems, at their core, constitutionally 
contradict those principles.239 Do they then contradict all of Day-
ton? 
VII. DAYTON’S COMPROMISE: ETHNIC PARTITION IN 
EXCHANGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
Although the civilian aspects of Dayton remain moribund and 
contradicted by the continued power and internal legitimacy of the 
domestic systems, the military aspects of the Accords have been 
strictly implemented. These provisions have had a two-fold effect: 
they have internationalized the military situation on the ground, and 
they have vetted and stabilized the practical ethnic partition of the 
 
                                                                                                              
238. Interview with judge, in Vareš, Fed. BiH, supra note 155. 
239. Cf. Popović, supra note 8, at 156. (“[The war-time property regulations] provide a 
quasi-legal frame for deprivation of property. As these regulations and their application are 
discriminatory, they represent a final act of ethnic cleansing. Therefore, they not only violate 
the rules and principles of international law, but the basic notions of morality and justice as 
well.”). 
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country that had already been effected by the war.240 The conven-
tional understanding is that the military provisions were given pri-
ority in order to create a stable environment in which the elaborate 
civilian and human rights mechanisms could begin to operate. 
However, in so doing, they also have given meaningful support, 
recognition, and legitimation to the very groupings whose existence 
poses the gravest constitutional questions about the ultimate effi-
cacy of the other, civilian, half of Dayton. 
The central dilemma confronting any observer of the Dayton 
process then is this: How can one reconcile Dayton’s apparent parti-
tion of the country with its firm commitments to renewed integra-
tion? Within this question lies another, more particular to our explo-
ration: How can one reconcile Dayton’s ethno-territorial partition of 
the country with its commitments to human and minority rights? 
The answer seems to be that the two parts can be conceived of, not 
as contradicting each other, but as forming two halves of a com-
promise, a quid pro quo: first, ethno-territorial partition and the 
creation of illiberal ethnic states is guaranteed, and then (only then) 
human rights standards are introduced and institutionalized. How-
ever, it is a compromise that, I argue, will ultimately founder, and, 
even if it succeeds, presents a profound conceptual and strategic 
challenge to human rights advocates. 
By far the largest part of the Dayton Accords addresses the 
phased separation and scale-back of military forces along the con-
frontation line and throughout the country, as well as the introduc-
tion of IFOR. Much of the material is technical and detailed in na-
ture, however, and the military provisions relevant to the constitu-
tional structure of the country may be summarized briefly. Each of 
the three groups retain their basic military structures, with the Mus-
lim and Croat forces eventually scheduled to operate under a uni-
fied command.241 The military forces of either entity242 are barred 
 
                                                                                                              
240. The most obvious example of this is the effective military turnabout that has occurred 
since 1995, when the Serbs first were put on the defensive. Instead of working to defeat the 
Serbs militarily, the actual effective role of international troops is now safeguarding the Serb 
entity from an increasingly powerful Muslim military. See Economist Intelligence Unit, 
supra note 20, at 10. This suggests, of course, that the present political state of affairs is not 
merely one that the West must tolerate, but rather one that it, at least in part, has structured 
and maintains. 
241. In effect, there has been almost no integration of the Muslim and Croat militaries. 
The joint federation forces are supposed to number 45,000, with three Muslim and one Croat 
corps. There is also a joint rapid reaction brigade, but its Muslim and Croat battalions have 
separate bases. The federation defense law (from August 1996) requires full integration of the 
armies only after three years. Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 20, at 10.  
242. Each of the three communities retains its own armed forces. Although the Muslim 
and Croat militaries formally compose two halves of an allied, joint fighting force, and do in 
fact receive weapons and training under the American “train and equip” program, they re-
main separated from and suspicious of each other. “The recently passed Federation defence 
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from entering the territory of the other without the consent of that 
entity and the federal presidency.243 A “zone of separation” is cre-
ated between the two entities’ military forces,244 which must be 
withdrawn into barracks and reduced in size.245 Large, heavily 
armed NATO-led forces are introduced into the country, with exten-
sive powers to patrol, monitor, and control the activities of the 
combatant forces.246 In addition, Western, principally American, 
military hardware and technical assistance is to be provided to the 
joint Muslim and Croat military forces.247
The boundary between the two entities, the Inter-Entity Bound-
ary Line248 (IEBL), basically tracks the 1995 cease-fire line, with 
some significant adjustments in favor of the Muslims near Sarajevo, 
and in favor of the Serbs in western Bosnia. The IEBL cannot be 
adjusted without mutual consent,249 except in the area around the 
strategic town of Brčko, whose status is to be decided by arbitra-
tion.250 The internationally recognized borders of the state—that is, 
of the former Yugoslav republic—are to continue, with only its in-
ternal structure being modified,251 but within that structure, two 
(and effectively three) ethnic territorial entities continue to operate 
under the security umbrella of a heavily armed international force. 
The overarching principle of the Dayton Accords is that an inter-
nationally sanctioned regime replaces ethnically exclusive, domes-
tic regimes. Where the two contradict, Dayton is authoritative and 
controlling; where Dayton is silent, the domestic regimes’ rules 
continue to have valid force. However, if one recognizes that the 
first, principal, and most successful part of Dayton is actually en-
 
                                                                                                              
law has fully confirmed the ethnic separation of HVO and ABiH forces.” UNHCR, supra 
note 7, at 4. 
243. GFAP, supra note 4, Annex 1A, art. I, § 2, cl. a, 35 I.L.M. at 92. The same clause also 
requires that “[a]ll armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall operate consistently with 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 
244. See id. Annex 1A, art. IV, § 2, cl. a-b, 35 I.L.M. at 93. 
245. See id. Annex 1A, art. IV, § 5, and Annex 1B, art. IV, 35 I.L.M. at 110. 
246. See id. Annex 1A, art. VI, 35 I.L.M. at 97. 
247. The aim of the so-called “Train and Equip” program is “to create a force strong 
enough to counter the RS army, which inherited arms from the JNA [Yugoslav National 
Army]. However, the integration of the federation’s forces has been limited in practice.” 
Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 20, at 10. See also Boyd, supra note 5, at 48–49 
(“The Train and Equip program was developed for the stated purpose of enabling the Federa-
tion, in particular the Muslims, to defend against potential Serb offensives should the peace 
process fail.”).  
248. GFAP, supra note 4, Annex 2, art. I, 35 I.L.M. at 112.  
249. See id. Annex 2, art. II, 35 I.L.M. at 112. 
250. See id. Annex 2, art. V, 35 I.L.M. at 113. The decision was to have been made within 
one year, but has been postponed three times and is still outstanding. Brčko is in Serb hands, 
although an international administration has responsibility for the territory, and has adopted a 
much more assertive set of policies than has the international community elsewhere in the 
country. 
251. GFAP, supra note 4, Annex 4, art. I, § 1, 35 I.L.M. at 118. 
70 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 40 
tirely in accord with the purposes of the domestic regimes (whether 
or not its architects themselves share those sentiments252), then it 
becomes more difficult to see those domestic systems as being 
overridden. Rather, they were, in a basic sense, reinforced by the 
Dayton Accords. On the legal plane, Dayton created the entities: 
Republika Srpska received official recognition for the first time,253 
and the presence of NATO-led troops is now its greatest guarantee 
of continued existence against Muslim revanchism.254 Despite the 
rhetoric to the contrary, Dayton very much “rewarded aggression;” 
it is the imprimatur of a status quo achieved through four years of 
conflict. If, then, the implicitly ethnic character of these regimes 
contradicts, rather than complements, individual human rights 
norms, it is in part the international community’s own doing. How 
then can the international community both construct an illiberal 
regime and simultaneously impose upon it liberal institutions? 
The structure of the Dayton Accords therefore appears internally 
contradictory, since, while assuming and requiring rule of law insti-
tutions, it also vets—indeed, legally establishes—the military and 
political divisions created by the war and ethnic cleansing cam-
paigns.255 In demanding a liberally motivated, humanistic regime 
while acceding to the maintenance of territorial divisions that are 
 
                                                                                                              
252. Certainly, this view of the process is not one that the principal players themselves ac-
knowledge. Richard Holbrooke has denied that there was any intention to allow a partition, in 
part or in whole, at the time of the Dayton Accords’ negotiation, and described the negotiat-
ing team’s goals for the entities as follows:  
The interentity boundary line was designed to be similar to, say, a boundary between 
two American states or Canadian provinces, or, for that matter, two of the republics of 
the former Yugoslavia, but everyone knew that the Serbs would not voluntarily accept 
such a concept. As expected, they are trying to turn the interentity boundary line into a 
partition line, which they would later try to turn into complete separation . . . . 
 At Dayton, the warring parties agreed to accept a single state. The parties, including 
the Bosnian Serbs, went further than vague rhetoric. They also accepted the key ele-
ments of a sovereign state: a single, clearly defined international border; an internation-
ally recognized central government and United Nations membership; a three-person 
presidency chosen by direct, free, and internationally supervised elections; a freely 
elected national assembly; a central bank and a single currency; compliance with the In-
ternational War Crimes Tribunal; a “Supreme Court”; and joint commissions for such 
matters as railroads, national monuments, and even human rights. 
 These were, I stress, only paper agreements, but they were quite clear. Furthermore, 
some critically important parts of Dayton were carried out rapidly and successfully on 
the ground. Sarajevo was united under Federation control, the contending military forces 
separated, and, above all, the war ended. 
Richard Holbrooke, Letter to the Editor, 76 Foreign Aff. 170, 170–71 (1997). 
253. Cf. Paola Gaeta, The Dayton Agreements and International Law, 7 EJIL/JEDI 147, 
158–60 (1996) (noting the creation and termination of an international legal personality for 
Republika Srpska and the Federation through the negotiations and signature of the Accords). 
254. See Boyd, supra note 5, at 48–49. 
255. I do not mean to suggest that the historical incident of borders determines, for all 
time, the nature of the polity and state those borders contain; but I do assert that these bor-
ders, for the foreseeable future, serve as a reasonable proxy for a political vision fundamen-
tally at odds with Dayton’s stated humanistic provisions and vision. 
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justifiable, even understandable, only on the most illiberal grounds, 
Dayton sets itself an impossible task: it seeks to justify both the rule 
of law and the “law of rule.” 
Although it is true that the lines drawn in the Accord would ef-
fectively ensure the maintenance of a Serb majority in Republika 
Srpska, a Croat majority in the Croat cantons, and a Muslim major-
ity in the Muslim cantons256 even if all refugees went home, large 
portions of the population would still be living as minorities in each 
of those parts. They would be dependent for their livelihoods and 
their very lives on the local ethnic majority’s goodwill and on the 
receptivity of that majority’s social, political, and legal institutions. 
This is in fact what Dayton assumes must happen and will happen. 
Yet, if that is to be the case, it is difficult to understand exactly what 
the war was fought for—at least as the parties themselves see it. It 
is equally difficult to see the purpose of what was created, or at 
least vetted, at Dayton. It is difficult, that is, to see why there are 
entities and cantons except to affirm and allow the ethnic division 
of the country, and to ensure the political supremacy—and thus the 
security—of each ethnic group on some territory of its own. To say 
that equal protection for minorities is the price of that security is to 
add a political term, not to restate an integral part of the argument. 
The state-creating aspects of Dayton are clearly and unambiguously 
ethno-territorial; protections for human and minority rights, how-
ever salutary, are adjunct, not essential, to that core project. 
A constitutional, state-creating enterprise has been, in reality, the 
West’s core practical goal.257 Despite the familiar rhetoric about 
saving multiethnic Bosnia, by 1995 there was no longer any Bosnia 
to be saved; today, it would have to be created, not maintained, 
supported, or “saved.” However, the international community’s 
rights-oriented rhetoric masks the fundamentally political act that 
the promulgation of any constitution really is: the substantive po-
litical phase that precedes the period of law.258
 
                                                                                                              
256. The cantons do not form a perfect ethnic fit; some of them, in central Bosnia, are 
“mixed,” with effectively separate Muslim and Croat sections, but administratively and ju-
ridically there is no distinction. 
257. One analyst comments: 
There are many ways in which one can read and interpret Dayton. I read it as a textbook 
of state-building from top to bottom. Everything is programmed to start from the tip of 
the pyramid. Making the central institutions function and affirming their role is crucial 
for the whole structure to work and by implication to encourage other, lower level insti-
tutions to operate according to the principles of Dayton. 
Pajić, Protectorates Lost, supra note 18, at 26. If, as in Bosnia, those “lower level institu-
tions” are the vessels of all domestic legitimacy and power, however, this formula is back-
wards indeed. 
258. Cf., on this point, Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs (1998). 
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For the local ethno-political communities, however, there is a 
continuity between their systems and their laws, which are under 
assault from the international community. Their systems, however 
substantively and morally reprehensible, are consistent on their own 
terms. They have, in however substantively perverted a fashion, a 
system and a rule of law: an effective constitutional order.259 What 
appears to the outsider as a disjuncture violative of the human 
rights—the exclusion of minorities—is properly understood within 
the country as a constituent element of the social and political order. 
It is a constitutional provision; the only question is whether or not 
that internally consistent system can be made to work with, and to 
incorporate, the rights and guarantees that constitute the other half 
of Dayton. 
Some scholars speak with hope about the internal contradictions 
within authoritarian societies, saying that they will eventually bring 
down their repressive structures.260 I am sympathetic to such hopes, 
but I suppose too that the theories must be applied consistently: in-
ternal contradictions weaken and ultimately destroy any political 
enterprise, authoritarian or democratic, benevolent or despotic. In 
Bosnia today, the contradictions are in Dayton itself, and not in its 
enemies. The choices the international community has made have 
not been consistent. Simple partition or a full-scale “de-ethnicizing” 
occupation would have been consistent; so would a full military 
occupation, the much-discussed protectorate. But Dayton, because 
it seeks to graft liberal constitutionalism and humanistic equal pro-
tection onto ethnicized, territorialized polities, is neither of those 
things. Its ultimate failure to achieve its civilian goals—quite apart 
from the obvious problems of “lack of political will”—is a conse-
quence of those inconsistencies and contradictions. Indeed, its ap-
parent contradictions may be understood as partly underlying that 
lack of will, because states—already timid enough about undertak-
ing even simple international adventures that may leave some of 
their soldiers dead261—have no appetite at all to undertake the im-
possible. 
 
                                                                                                              
259. In discussing Israel, Gad Barzilai provides a definition of the rule of law that in-
cludes human rights as an integral element, yet implicitly concedes the effectively constitu-
tional nature of that determination: “A rule of law should be founded on greater appreciation 
of human rights and civil rights preserved unconditionally for the benefit of individuals, 
groups and nations who choose to coexist.” (emphasis added) Gad Barzilai, Between the Rule 
of Law and the Law of the Ruler: The Supreme Court in Israeli Legal Culture, 152 Int’l Soc. 
Sci. J. 193, 206 (1997). 
260. See, e.g., Akhavan, supra note 211, at 810. (“Authoritarian power structures are often 
the best architects of their own demise through the internal contradictions and zero-sum 
power struggles that they generate.”). 
261. See id. at 803 (“Ambassador Sacirbey recalled a comment by an American general at 
the time to the effect that ‘[i]t is not worth risking the life of one American soldier to arrest 
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VIII. CLOAKED IN ETHNICITY’S ROBE: THE NEED TO 
SUBORDINATE HUMAN RIGHTS 
A. Human Rights’ (Illusory) Rhetorical Moment 
Consider a simple thought experiment: if basic human rights pro-
tections were both adequate in themselves and the real core of the 
project, why not have simply drafted principles and created institu-
tions ensuring human and minority rights throughout the territory of 
Bosnia, without any subdivisions, entities, or cantons? There is, of 
course, probably not a single observer who imagines that would 
work, even if the international community were to arrest, prosecute, 
and punish all those guilty of atrocities. The arguments against do-
ing so—irreversible ethnic mobilization, rational choice in condi-
tions of fear and uncertainty, the economic incentives of continued 
obfuscation, ancient hatreds and cycles of revenge—are well re-
hearsed, and, though themselves contested as to their details and 
moral qualities, they surely amount to a firm refutation of the no-
tion that rights alone can patch up the damage already done. 
Why, then, would an analogous formula work within each ethnic 
territory? The answer—partial, partially contradictory, and almost 
wholly unsatisfactory—must be that it has a better chance of work-
ing because it contains an implicit trade-off, an ethnic quid pro quo: 
if the rights and safety of the majority are secured, it must in return 
ensure the rights and safety of the minorities living among it. It is a 
formula that does not require any promises or protections of the 
other until the safety of the self has been secured. It is political, not 
principled. 
This is the calculus of Dayton, if there is any. But what guarantee 
is there that this trade-off will produce the results the international 
community desires in the long-term? There is certainly no good will 
in the formula, so it must rely on continuing external pressure, insti-
tutionalization, or the exhaustion of alternatives to operate. 
It is here that the rhetoric of rights had its moment. If ever there 
was an opportunity to create the kind of human rights regime that 
activists and scholars want, it was in Bosnia. At the least, the oppor-
tunity was there to take an uncompromising, principled rhetorical 
stance. Although the domestic parties drove hard bargains, they ul-
timately signed on to extraordinarily invasive and intrusive meas-
ures and institutions; there is no country on earth more beholden to 
the principles of the international human rights movement, on pa-
per, than Bosnia and Herzegovina today.262 That would seem to be a 
 
                                                                                                              
[Radovan] Karadžić . . . .’”). 
262. See Michael O’Flaherty & Gregory Gisvold, Introduction, in Post-War Protection of 
Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 8, at ix (noting the “unprecedented and 
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victory for the rhetoric, but that rhetoric is contradicted by and 
premised upon a substratum of political division and security guar-
antees that makes the principles and the promises conditional in a 
way that is not at all conventionally comfortable.263
In practice, the domestic legal regimes continue to operate, and 
have a considerable degree of internal acceptance and legitimacy.264 
The international mechanisms, in contrast, barely function. A do-
mestic observer, considering the bifurcated Dayton Accords and his 
own ethno-territorial regime, could easily conclude that the odd 
man out is not his system, but rather the paper guarantees of human 
rights and cross-IEBL institutions. As an empirical matter, he would 
be right indeed. 
 
                                                                                                              
highly elaborate provisions” in the Accords, which “comprise one of the most complex re-
gimes for the protection of human rights by law ever devised.”). 
263. Here is one institutional expression of the felt contradiction between the ethnic con-
stitutions and the human rights norms: 
On 5 May [1997] the Human Rights Ombudsperson for BiH, Gret Haller, issued her 
first annual report at a press conference in Sarajevo (Fed). She stressed that the concept 
of ethnically clean states or ethnically clean areas is completely incompatible with the 
concept of human rights. “As long as there are still politicians that promote the idea of 
creating ethnically clean states . . . this country can not become a country based on hu-
man rights, and so it will not be able to join the family of European states,” she added. 
Dr. Haller underlined the importance of progress in human rights and freedom of 
movement before Bosnia can become a member of the Council of Europe. “A society in 
which people do not want to have neighbors belonging to other ethnic groups is one that 
can never be based on human rights, democracy, and rule of law—the three pillars of the 
member states of the Council of Europe. The Ombudsperson then explained that the 
governments of BiH, Republika Srpska, and the Federation are not living up to their 
commitments vis-à-vis her office. For instance, the governments of the Federation and 
state BiH level rarely respond to her requests for observations on cases. The Office of 
the BiH Ombudsperson provides an important avenue for individuals to lodge com-
plaints, especially in the current environment characterized by a lack of confidence in 
the authorities and the ability of the judicial system.  
OHR, Human Rights Report, May 6-7, 1997. (OHR occasional bulletin) (unpaginated). 
264. More to the point, to the degree they are viewed by the populace as illegitimate, it is 
more a recognition of the corruption of the domestic political powers, rather than any accep-
tance of the overarching authority of Dayton, which acts to undermine faith in their legiti-
macy. Biljana Plavšić successfully campaigned for president of Republika Srpska on an anti-
corruption platform, not a pro-Dayton or anti-Serb platform. Knowing that one’s leaders are 
corrupt in no way need vitiate one’s commitment to the ideal project—here, the protection of 
the nation and its individuals. Other analysts, however, disagree: 
The battle for power in Srpska between President Plavšić and former President Karadžić 
is not central to the long-term peace in Bosnia, although the United States is treating it 
as if it were. Rather, it is a symptom of the central problem: the uncertainty of the mi-
norities about their right to national identity and self-determination. 
 Everything we know about Plavšić points to the conclusion that she is as extreme in 
her nationalism as Karadžić but is skillfully playing the Dayton card to gain U.S. sup-
port against him. 
Boyd, supra note 5, at 51. 
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B. The Choice of a Constitutional or a Rhetorical Critique 
As a consequence, the international community has failed to ap-
prehend—or, despite apprehending, has failed to address—the real 
conceptual challenge facing it: that this is a project of formation, 
not reform; that it is constitutional, and not legal, in nature, and in 
so being, it is fundamentally political in a way that does not easily 
admit of a rhetorical posture of rights and legality.265 Yet this is pre-
cisely the mode in which the international community has pro-
ceeded. Most obviously, because it wishes there to be a single uni-
fied country called Bosnia, it has proceeded as if that country al-
ready existed, when in fact it has been complicit in the constitu-
tional formation of illiberal states opposed by the terms of their 
creation to the civilian requirements of Dayton. 
The international community has not acknowledged to itself, nor 
even recognized, that the disparate elements in the Dayton settle-
ment—the ethno-territorial partition and the demand for human 
rights—can only be realized either as contradictions or as compro-
mises. If realized as the former, they are doomed to failure or ir-
relevance; if realized as the latter, their success can only come at 
the price of accepting, legitimating, and cooperating with regimes 
whose very constitution and nature is opposed to the operation of 
those principles. 
The international community has had its greatest successes when 
it has followed one of two strategies: first, when it has presented 
clear political demands backed by swift military intervention, and 
second, when, as with the military aspects of Dayton, its preferred 
outcomes actually comported with the core interests of the domestic 
parties.266 There is no reason to expect that the civilian aspects of 
the conflict and settlement—and the central issue of property in 
particular—occupy a different position in this basic formula. This 
means a choice between active intervention and a recognition, 
whether de facto or de jure, that the extant regimes are the effective 
actors. Yet the international community, despite having massive 
military formations in the country, has consistently refused to 
shoulder the burden of occupation that the real constitutional trans-
formation of the country would require.267 In refusing, it has left 
 
                                                                                                              
265. Cf. Ken Jowitt, Dizzy with Democracy, 40 Problems of Post-Communism 3, 3–7 
(1996) (offering similar arguments in its critique of institutionalist and path dependency 
thinking concerning the post-socialist states). 
266. See Boyd, supra note 5, at 44 (“Military aspects of the accord are being implemented 
successfully partly because a robust Stabilization Force (SFOR) demands and gets compli-
ance from all parties on matters for which it is responsible, but also because the coalition’s 
mission of separating the antagonists reflects the desires of the antagonists themselves.”). 
267. See Haselock Dismisses Protectorate, Odraz B92 Open Serbia (J. Ellis-Mrdjenović et 
al. eds., 14:00 CET, Oct. 30, 1997) <http://www.b92.net/vesti/>. 
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itself only the leverage of half-measures and a rhetoric empirically 
at odds with the state of affairs on the ground. 
The publicly recognized legal order notwithstanding, it is surely 
more accurate empirically to say that members of the various ethnic 
groups are now in effect citizens of their ethno-political territorial 
states within the former Bosnia, and not citizens of that defunct 
country as a whole. The rhetoric of the international community 
rebels at such a suggestion, but sense and experience confirm that it 
is so. The rhetoric is just as rousing, and the substantive moral cri-
tique retains all its vigor, but they are weak weapons indeed against 
the acknowledgment that these are states with a very different 
agenda, a very different reason for being. 
Yet surely there is real value in adopting and maintaining a rhe-
torical commitment to legal standards that comport with one’s sub-
stantive political values. If consistently and broadly applied, such 
rhetoric might limit other actors’ ability or willingness to openly 
assert standards or values to the contrary, and might, it is sometimes 
hoped, ultimately contribute to a change in perceptions and atti-
tudes that will translate into real political change as well.268
There are two principal objections to this view, which serve at 
the least to temper its native optimism. One is that actors are re-
markably capable of persisting in behavior contrary to their own 
public pronouncements, and thus there is little evidence that a con-
version effect, or a political version of cognitive dissonance theory, 
actually obtains. Second, and more interestingly, there is a cost, as 
well as a benefit, to choosing a legal rhetorical mode: such a choice 
tends to change the chooser’s own perceptions and attitudes, and to 
bias them towards the very kinds of postures he is advocating. This 
may seem at first a highly positive thing: advocating commitment 
to legal standards may in fact increase one’s own commitment to 
those standards, as well as that of one’s target. As a matter of effec-
 
                                                                                                              
Spokesman for the international community’s High Representative in Bosnia Simon 
Haselock on Wednesday rejected claims that the High Representative was considering 
the possibility of introducing a protectorate over Bosnia-Herzegovina if the Bosnian 
Ministerial Council continued to block the adoption of important laws. Haselock said 
that if the obstruction continued High Representative Carlos Westendorp would need 
more authority to ensure that these laws are passed. Haselock denied that the suggestion 
of a protectorate was ever considered. 
Id. 
Likewise, NATO adamantly refuses to use the word “occupation” to discuss its role in 
Bosnia. 
268. Indeed, I have argued this optimistic view myself. See Timothy Waters & Rachel 
Guglielmo, “Two Souls to Struggle With . . . .”: The Failing Implementation of Hungary’s 
New Minorities Law and Discrimination against Gypsies, in State and Nation Building in 
East Central Europe: Contemporary Perspectives, supra note 119, at 190–91 (arguing for the 
transformative potential of human rights rhetoric when adopted by state actors currently 
engaged in human rights abuses). 
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tiveness, however, it may be that a commitment to legal standards is 
not as effective as political engagement or advocacy. The rhetoric 
of legal standards compels the rhetorician to abstain from both 
overly political postures, and from becoming too clearly an advo-
cate for substantive change.269 If, however, the core problem is po-
litical, and not legal—if, in other words, the very terms of a dualis-
tic deal preclude the realization of one of those terms, which is the 
provisions on minority rights—then that rhetorician has handi-
capped his own effectiveness. Such is the case in Bosnia. 
C. The Illusion of Complementarity 
Given that the international community is patently unprepared to 
shoulder the burden of a truly substantive transformation, and has 
instead effectively provided military guarantees to the ethnic re-
gimes, some scholars have sought to identify the conceptual com-
mon ground on which human rights and minority-based autonomies 
can coexist and reinforce each other. They rightly recognize the 
challenge that minority regimes pose to the universal voice of hu-
man rights, but they seek to join the two, or to find the underlying 
universal purposes in a particularistic program of autonomy.270 
There is also a moderate position, which outlines how autonomies 
and group-based power-sharing can complement and advance indi-
vidual human rights, and notes that, inasmuch as such schemes may 
sometimes be the only practical way of preventing bloodshed, they 
may represent “a ‘least worst’ solution to threats of ongoing vio-
lence and systemic denials of human rights.”271
 
                                                                                                              
269. One way to understand the reticence of the international community to act is to as-
cribe to it a belief that more intrusive action is not politically possible, either because it 
would provoke a counterproductive reaction, or because there is insufficient political will on 
the home front to bear the costs of stronger intervention, an argument which implicitly in-
cludes the former variant. Another way to understand that reticence, however, is to observe 
that it is an implicit part of the Dayton deal that there be some level of baseline support from 
the international community for the ethno-territorial division of the country represented by 
the entities and cantons, and that this minimum level of support translates into a posture of 
greater neutrality than is necessary to realize the human and minority rights provisions of 
Dayton. 
270. See, e.g., Patrick Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-
Determination, in Modern Law of Self-Determination 101–38 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 
1993); cf. Asbjørn Eide, In Search of Constructive Alternatives to Secession, in id., at 139–
76. See also Henry J. Steiner, Freedom of Settlement in Ethnically Divided States: A Human 
Rights Analysis, in The Thatched Patio (Nov.-Dec. 1993), at 49 [hereinafter Freedom of Set-
tlement] (noting that many human rights have “an implicit and complementary group charac-
ter”); Henry Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle over Autonomy Regimes for 
Minorities, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1539 (1991) [hereinafter Ideals and Counter-Ideals] 
(summarizing similar views, without necessarily concurring with them). 
271. Steiner, Freedom of Settlement, supra note 270, at 48–51; cf. Steiner, Ideals and 
Counter-Ideals, supra note 270, at 1557. 
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In ensuring the reduction of bloodshed, such regimes allow for 
other rights to flourish. There is, however, little in the canon of in-
dividual human rights beyond the universal goods of peace and sta-
bility that such regimes offer. They cloak their people in the em-
bracing robes of ethnicity; their benefit is to the community, and to 
the individual as a member of that community, but the rights ex-
pressed in the UDHR or the ICCPR are cut of a different cloth. 
I do not mean to suggest that every form of autonomy, even if 
ethnically based, presents so stark a choice. Power-sharing272 and 
personal autonomy all can operate well below the threshold of ulti-
mate contradiction.273 But all autonomies contain the germ of this 
contradiction, ethnic ones more so, and some cases—like Bosnia or 
Cyprus—rise to the level of presenting an ultimate challenge to the 
ideal of individual rights. In those cases, to try to reconcile ethnic 
autonomy to the canon of human rights is clearly a pointless rhe-
torical exercise; when an ethnically based autonomy is the only po-
litically feasible way to ensure peace and safety for the populace, 
then it must be embraced whether or not it contradicts any or all of 
the rights enumerated in the ICCPR or any other canonical text. 
Indeed, on the contrary, it is the text that must reconciled to the 
autonomy. 
It is an argument, in its essence, of lowered expectations: if you 
will have peace, you may not have rights. The main path to peace, 
for communities rife with ethnic strife, may be an illiberal constitu-
tion that is fundamentally at odds with universalizing individual 
liberalism; yet, it may provide the only practical means to end vio-
lence. It is not “the least worst,” but “the only possible.” If that 
characterization is accurate, it may be that a rhetorical strategy rely-
ing on a quid pro quo is doomed to failure from the start—doomed, 
at least, to achieve far less than the flourishing of rights. 
I see the Bosnian conflict, in its slow and fatal dénouement, as a 
challenge—indeed, a harsh rebuke—to the hopes of the project that 
seeks to find an uncontradicted complementarity between ethnic 
autonomy and individual human rights. Bosnia has been a jeremiad 
on our limitations, our practical and philosophical inability to en-
sure both peace and justice.274 Shameful as the West’s inaction was 
 
                                                                                                              
272. See Arend Lijphart, The Power-Sharing Approach in Conflict and Peacemaking, in 
Multiethnic Societies 491–509 (Joseph V. Montville ed., 1991). 
273. See Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accom-
modation of Conflicting Rights 474–77 (1996). See also Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals, 
supra note 270, at 1540–43. 
274. Cf. Steiner, Freedom of Settlement, supra note 270, at 63 (“Human rights norms, 
while emphasizing freedom of residence, say little about the route to be followed in bringing 
two hostile communities together. The seriousness of the problems in reunifying ethnically 
divided countries cautions against dogmatic assertions about how and when these human 
rights can be fully realized.”). 
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throughout much of the war, its inability to acknowledge, in war’s 
twilight, that it has no better doctrines or answers to offer, deserves 
as great an indictment. 
Moreover, where some scholars see the contradiction as a tempo-
ral one, trusting to time and the possibility of a “negotiated sched-
ule” for realizing human rights,275 I see a more serious challenge: 
that the day of realization will never come, because it is not in the 
nature of the system called upon to realize those rights to do so, nor 
in its fundamental interest. Denial of the right to return is not some 
temporary derogation of human rights to be “regretted” by a com-
mission: it is the purpose for which these state have come into be-
ing. 
I do not suggest that reform of such a constitutionally illiberal 
society is impossible, or that gross violations of individual human 
rights can never be eradicated or ameliorated. What I do argue is 
that it will involve fundamental changes: in effect, the transforma-
tion of the present system, and not its mere incremental improve-
ment. So long as the fundamentals of the present system abide, the 
tension between the purposes of that system’s being and the aspira-
tions of universal human rights rhetoric is untenable. One must 
give. In the Balkans today, can anyone doubt which one will? 
IX. CONCLUSION 
There is another path for Bosnia, though it is no more palatable 
to those who seek to vindicate the rhetoric of human rights. Bos-
nia’s best hope for a stable, peaceful future with respect for human 
rights may lie precisely in following the present process of ethnic 
exclusion to its conclusion. Although it is uncomfortable to per-
ceive it in such terms, the Yugoslav conflict has had the effect of 
creating nation-state polities with demographic characteristics much 
like the states of Western Europe, which had the good fortune to 
conduct their own great phase of “ethnic cleansing” before these 
modern, much-photographed, times. There is nothing in the history 
of the Bosnian communities, in the conduct of the war, or in the 
social, political, or economic fundamentals of the communities to-
day to suggest that reconvergence—a “new Yugoslavia”—is more 
likely than consolidation of separate national states that will reach 
out to each other only as sovereign equals whose identity and pur-
pose is to house and protect the nation.276 Stabilization, democrati-
 
                                                                                                              
275. Id. at 65. 
276. Though I have not addressed it directly, it seems clear that a defense of the ultimate 
complementarity of autonomies and human rights on the basis of arguments for diversity 
(see, e.g., Asbjørn Eide, In Search of Constructive Alternatives to Secession, supra note 270, 
at 166; cf. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals, supra note 270, at 1547–48) ultimately fails in 
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zation, and a willingness to tolerate the remaining “others” among 
them may be more possible once each group has its own secure ter-
ritory.277 This has been the history of modern Western Europe, 
which is only now engaging in an historical convergence after hav-
ing secured for each nation its state. Therein lies, perhaps, the only 
path of hope for the former Yugoslavia, but it is a different path in-
deed from the one envisioned in the civilian provisions of Dayton, 
though very much in accord with the real lay of the land. 
The observer who perceives things in this way—who under-
stands this to be the actual situation, as opposed to the morally 
preferable outcome—will then have to decide if he supports the 
rhetoric of rights, at the price of destabilization and the miseries of 
war, or partition and peace, at the price of abandoning, perhaps for 
a very long time, the claim to rights.278 Ethnic autonomy is only 
rarely and incompletely a true complement to individual human 
rights; in many ways, it is their antithesis—and yet it may be the 
only possible, the necessary, even the morally right solution to 
many conflicts. For the sake of peace, it may be a solution that must 
be embraced, not to achieve human rights, but despite its denial of 
them. 
I see no options for Bosnia that do not, in some more or less radi-
cal form, build upon ethnic autonomy as the basis for the social 
peace that must precede the realization of any human rights. I do 
 
                                                                                                              
the case of Bosnia, since there has been at least as much threat and real damage to other 
cultural traditions (including “multi-ethnicity” and “Yugoslavism”) as there has been protec-
tion of endangered ethnic groups. Protection of diversity and political responses to the secu-
rity dilemma simply do not collapse one into the other. As Steiner notes, “[s]uch a normative 
arrangement raises obvious, serious issues. The ideal in the human rights movement of pre-
serving difference cannot so readily be bent to support the creation of autonom[ous] regimes. 
To the contrary, a further elaboration of that ideal prompts a deep criticism of such regimes 
and their fragmenting effects.” Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals, supra note 270, at 1551. It 
is, in any event, a perversion of the word to suppose that what is occurring in Bosnia today is 
the protection of diversity, without more. 
277. “Zagreb professor Žarko Puhovski argues controversially that ‘after ethnic cleansing, 
democracy is going to have a better chance.’ Certainly, the ethnicisation of territory in the 
Balkans is nearly complete, and there is no point in denying reality. Within the security of the 
tribes . . . a kind of plurality may yet emerge.” Anthony Borden, The Lesson Unlearned, War 
Report 58, at 8. Boyd foresees a somewhat different end result, but identifies roughly the 
same path there: 
At least for now, people feel secure only when surrounded by their own kind. But as 
economic opportunity invites interaction, these same people will gradually become con-
fident that they can live again in a mixed society. Bosnia can survive as a state in a loose 
confederation if the international community, led by the United States, explicitly ac-
knowledges the right of the ethnic factions to live among their own and govern them-
selves. Once people’s sense of national identity is secured, the appeal of radical nation-
alist politicians will evaporate and a reasonable politics and economics can emerge. 
Boyd, supra note 5, at 52–53. 
278. See Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals, supra note 270, at 1559 (noting that when 
elaborating a claim for autonomy, “the rhetoric of rights may here be inappropriate, even 
misleading.”). 
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not think there are any voices proposing the contrary anymore. But 
I assert further that these options—unavoidable, necessary, and the 
least worst hope for that torn country—are not compatible with 
what most scholars, optimistic as they are, imagine will come next. 
I do not think that the foundations of Bosnia’s regimes can be rec-
onciled with a universal vision of human rights for all the former 
citizens of their territories; yet, nor do I see an alternative that 
would provide social peace and respite from war—and are not these 
last, in their way, the highest rights and the greatest gifts? They are 
the only values still clothed in robes of high regard, in that shat-
tered, naked land. 
 
